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MakingMoral Judgements is about the relation between moral judgements and
motivation. It addresses an apparent tension between the internalist view that
there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation and
the cognitivist view that such judgements express beliefs about how the world
is morally. This thesis argues that to resolve this tension we need first to
distinguish the act ofmaking a moral judgement from the content of a moral
judgement. Act internalism asserts a necessary connection between the act of
making a moral judgement and motivation. This is perfectly consistent with
there being no connection between the truth ofmoral propositions - the content
ofmoral judgements - and motivation. The act internalist approach is
developed using speech act theory. Speech acts that do more than simply state
facts or express motivating states are ubiquitous in our linguistic practice.
Moral judgements can be construed as a type of compound speech act that
involves assertion and motivation. This approach, it is argued, can help us
better understand the complexities ofmoral motivation and ofmoral practice.
On the speech act approach, in making a moral judgement an agent goes
beyond description or cognition in holding herself and others to account with
regard to a moral requirement. To be able to do this, the agent must be
generally susceptible to a range of reactive attitudes that make up the point of
view of normative participation. It is in relation to this participant point of
view that we can account for the capacity of agents to be motivated by moral
considerations. And it is with regard to this point of view that internalism is
best understood as an expression of our interested or participatory relation to
moral deliberation and moral practice.
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to understand the nature of the relation between moral
judgements and motivation in order to defend the view that moral judgements are
both motivating and fact-stating. My point of departure is the non-cognitivist anti-
cognitivist argument. This says that ifmoral judgements are of conceptual necessity
connected to motivation, then the primary function of such judgements cannot be to
state facts or express beliefs. The view that there is a connection of conceptual
necessity between moral judgements and motivation is known as moral judgement
internalism. In chapter one, I claim that the anti-cognitivist argument is invalid and
that there is no quick way of dismissing the union of internalism and cognitivism.
Nonetheless, I stress that we should take seriously the non-cognitivist view that
moral judgements in some sense go beyond mere belief or description. I suggest we
think of internalism as an expression of our interested or participatory relation to
moral deliberation and practice.
According to the non-cognitivist version of internalism, the connection between
moral judgements and motivation holds at the level of linguistic function rather than
at the level of truth-conditional content. This suggests a distinction between two
senses of'moral judgement'. Sometimes when we talk about moral judgements our
focus is on what is judged - the moral proposition. For example, we might say that
her judgement that stealing is wrong is true. In such cases, 'moral judgement' refers
to the content of the judgement. But 'moral judgement' can also refer to the act of
making a judgement. We might say, for example, that her judgement about stealing
was vehement or ill-timed. In such cases it seems that our focus is on the act of
judging rather than on the proposition judged. I argue that recognising this
distinction is crucial to understanding the debate between moral judgement
internalists and externalists (those who deny a necessary connection between moral
judgements and motivation).
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Those who defend the combination of cognitivism and internalism tend to assume
that the internal connection to motivation must be secured via moral belief.
However, the notion of a necessary connection between belief and motivation is
difficult to sustain in light of the orthodox view of belief as motivationally inert.
This view forms part of a theory ofmotivation and action explanation called the
desire/belief thesis. It says that beliefs can only motivate with the help of essentially
motivating states such as desire. Cognitivists sometimes attempt to accommodate
internalism and the desire/belief thesis by including motivation in the content of
moral judgements. I reject 'content internalism' as an interpretation ofmoral
judgement internalism because it fails to secure a necessary connection between
moral judgements and motivation. It is also inconsistent with the widely accepted
doctrine that moral requirements apply to agents regardless of their contingent and
particular desires. I claim that to defend cognitivist internalism we need to develop
the view that there is a necessary connection between the act ofmaking a moral
judgement and motivation.
In chapter two, I explore the possibility that internalism is misguided and that a
plausible version ofmoral cognitivism is better served by adopting the thesis of
moral judgement externalism. Externalists reject the view that there is a necessary
connection between genuine moral judgements and motivation. They argue that
moral judgements motivate, when they do, because of the presence of an independent
and contingent desire to do what is right or, perhaps, because of a desire the agent
happens to have to do the act judged right. Part of the reason externalists view
internalism as a threat to cognitivism and, by extension, to realism in ethics is that
they accept the non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument. I claim that externalism is
far less compelling once this argument is rejected. I also attempt to show how the
failure to distinguish clearly between the act and content ofmoral judgements
obscures the nature of the debate between moral judgement internalists and
externalists. I conclude that externalist explanations of the action-guiding and
motivating features ofmoral judgements are unconvincing, given their claim that the
motivating force and justifying authority of such judgements are only contingently
related to the nature ofmoral requirements. I also raise some doubts about the
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standard view of the role of desires and beliefs in motivation and the explanation of
action.
In chapter three, I use Searle's theory of speech acts to develop the view that moral
judgement internalism is a doctrine about judgement acts. 'Act internalism' allows
us to avoid locating the connection between moral judgements and motivation at the
level of the content ofmoral judgements or at the level of an external and
independent desire to do the right thing. The speech act approach is one way of
interpreting act internalism. Speech acts that involve both cognitive and non-
cognitive states are common in our linguistic practice. I argue that construing moral
judgements as a type of compound speech act allows us to account for the fact-
stating and the motivating aspects of such judgements.
A potential problem with the speech act model is that it seems unable to account for
failures of moral motivation that result from depression, accidie, and other kinds of
mood disorders. Ifmoral judgements entail motivation, then those who fail to be
motivated because of such disorders are unable to make genuine moral judgements.
However, agents who fail to be motivated by what they judge to be right are often
well aware of their failings. In at least some of these cases the agents appear to be
capable ofmaking genuine moral judgements despite their lack ofmotivation. In
chapter four, I attempt to refine my speech act account ofmoral judgements to
incorporate the problem of failures ofmotivation. I argue that an agent can be
sincere in her moral judgement even if she fails to be motivated by it, so long as she
holds herself and others to account with regard to the requirement expressed by the
judgement.
The notion of holding to account or 'normative expectation' I adapt from the work of
Peter Strawson and R.J. Wallace. Specifically, I follow Strawson and Wallace in
attempting to understand the stance of holding someone to account in relation to a
range of sanctioning or 'reactive' attitudes. I develop my own view of the relation
between normative expectation and the reactive attitudes. I argue that to be capable
of holding someone to account an agent must be generally susceptible to the reactive
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attitudes and sanctioning responses that characterise the point of view of normative
engagement. This allows me to assert a necessary connection between making a
moral judgement and being susceptible to a range ofmotivating attitudes, while
accommodating the view that moral judgements function to express beliefs and state
facts. In this way my approach secures both moral judgement internalism and moral
cognitivism.
In chapter five I address the criticism that, while the speech act approach provides a
version of internalism about moral language, it does not address the deeper question
ofwhether thinking something morally right entails motivation. The speech act
account needs to explain in what sense the rules governing moral speech acts have
implications for moral psychology. I claim that this point misconstrues the nature of
the connection between moral thought and moral language. I concede that it is
logically possible to have moral beliefs without motivation; however, I argue that
because of the interdependence between moral practice and moral language, the rules
governing moral speech acts play a crucial role in the nature ofmoral deliberation
and moral thought.
Next, I turn my attention to the account ofmoral motivation suggested by the speech
act analysis ofmoral judgements. I argue that the picture ofmoral motivation that
emerges is far too complex to be accommodated by the standard desire/belief model
ofmotivation. Motivation seems to figure in the reactive attitudes entailed by
agents' moral judgements as well as, in some sense, in the agents' responses to the
justifying content of their judgements. I argue that we need to distinguish between
what I term 'normative motivation' and 'conative motivation'. This is basically a
distinction between motivation by justifying considerations and motivation by
conative states. The distinction is used to address the issue ofwhether moral beliefs
are capable ofmotivating and the status of the desire/beliefmodel ofmotivation and
action explanation. I argue that moral beliefs are ideally suited to convey the
considerations that normatively motivate agents to act and that desires are ideally
suited to their role as states of being motivated.
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I then claim that any plausible account of intentional action must accommodate the
distinction between normative and conative motivation. The desire/belief model fails
to do this. The concept of normative motivation is central to our ordinary notion of
acting for a reason. I argue that it is crucial in explaining the role ofjustifying
considerations in the motivation and explanation of intentional action. I end by
considering whether the approach I advocate might be extended to accommodate
different versions of internalism in ethics. I suggest that the notions of normative
engagement and susceptibility to the reactive attitudes, central to my account of
moral judgements, can plausibly be extended to capture the kinds of intuitions that
generate internalism about moral requirements and motivation.
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1
Internalism and the Problem of Moral Motivation
1. Introduction: The Problem of Moral Motivation
Moral judgements appear to be intimately connected with motivation and motivating
states in a way that distinguishes them from standard assertions of fact. This is
because judgements of fact are thought not to commit agents to acting or being
motivated to act in one way rather than another. The problem ofmoral motivation
arises because making a moral judgement does appear to commit an agent to being
motivated to do or promote what is judged favourably and to refrain from or
discourage what is judged unfavourably. An adequate account ofmoral motivation
needs to explain how moral judgements, in so far as they do involve assertions of
fact, can have a feature seemingly not shared by other fact-stating discourse.
A standard way of expressing the intuition that moral judgements and motivation are
intimately connected is to say that moral judgements are of conceptual necessity tied
to motivation. Those who support this view are said to hold an internalist account of
moral judgement.1 According to moraljudgement internalism there is a connection
of conceptual necessity between an agent's judgement that something is morally
right and her being motivated to act on that judgement.2 For example, if I see
someone drop a banknote and judge that retrieving it and returning it to them is the
right thing to do, this version of internalism says that I will have at least some
motivation to do so. In so far as I fail to be motivated by my judgement, it will not
count as a genuine moral judgement.
1 See Falk (1948) and Frankena (1958) for early discussions of internalism. These articles primarily
involve what I term below content internalism - the doctrine that there is a necessary connection
between the truth ofmoral propositions and motivation - but are generally cited as the origins of the
current debate about moral judgement internalism; see, for example, Dancy 1993: 1. This has led to a
good deal of confusion which 1 try to address in the text.
2 What we might call simple moral judgement internalism is implicit in most versions ofnon-
cognitivism: For example, Stevenson 1937; Hare 1952: chap 5; Blackburn 1984: chap 6; Gibbard
1990: chap 1. It is criticised by Brink (1989: 45-50), and Svavarsdottir (1999).
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Internalism presents a difficulty for the cognitivist view that in making a moral
judgement an agent expresses a truth-evaluable belief about how the world is
morally. There is a standard non-cognitivist argument which exploits this difficulty
in order to deny the fact-stating status ofmoral judgements.3 It takes the following
form:
1. Judging that an act is morally right entails motivation.
2. No judgement that some fact or state of affairs obtains entails
motivation.
C(i) Judging that an act is morally right must be something other than a
judgement that some fact or state of affairs obtains.
Premise two captures the thought that it is always logically possible to be indifferent
to any belief or set of facts. I may judge that the truck bearing down on me will hit
and kill me if I don't move out of the way, but this doesn't seem to entail that I am
motivated to move. Nonetheless, we would expect most people to be motivated to
get out of the way. This is because we think that most people have a desire for their
own personal safety and thus a desire not to be hurt or killed. Notice that if I do
jump out of the way of the truck, this desire not to be hurt or killed helps to explain
why I get out of the way. If I desire not to be hurt or killed and believe that if the
truck were to hit me it would hurt or kill me, then, it seems, I will be motivated to get
out of the way of the truck.
The theory of explanation the truck example is based on is known as the desire/belief
theory of action explanation and is an orthodoxy in the theory of action.4 It is meant
as a theory of intentional action or action done for a reason. On this model, the
reason I move out of the way of the truck would be a combination ofmy desire not to
be hurt or killed and my belief that if the truck hits me I will be hurt or killed.
Together, the desire and the belief explain why I get out of the way. This kind of
3 The argument is not, of course, always explicit; this is a reconstruction ofwhat I take to be its central
form.
4
It is also often referred to as the 'Humean theory ofmotivation': e.g., Dancy 1990: chap 1; Smith
1994: chap 4. Given doubts about whether Hume held such a position, I follow Schueler (1995) in
calling it the desire/belief theory. See also Davidson (1980) for a version of this doctrine.
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explaining reason is often contrasted with a good or justifying reason for action.5 A
justifying reason is a reason that counts in favour of a particular course of action. If I
leap out ofmy seat in the cinema because 1 believe that the truck on the screen is
going to hit me and I desire not to be hit, then this belief and desire constitute my
explaining reason for jumping out of the seat. However, it seems that the reason that
explains my action in this case is not a reason in favour of the action. The belief and
the desire constitute my explaining reason for leaping from my seat, but what I have
a justifying or good reason to do is to stay in my seat and enjoy the movie.
If the desire/belief model is correct then action that results from moral deliberation
should also be explicable in terms of desire/ belief pairings. Consider Emma: Just
before entering her card to withdraw money from an automatic teller machine, the
machine starts to dispense fifty pound notes. Reflecting on the matter, Emma judges
that the right thing to do is to return the money to the bank and notify the staff of the
problem. How do we explain her action if she goes ahead and does this? According
to the model above, we need to posit a relevant belief and desire pairing. Let's say
that Emma believes that the right thing to do is to return the money and that she
desires to do the right thing. When these states are combined, the desire/belief thesis
says we have a pair of states capable of explaining Emma's returning the money.6
The crucial point about the desire/belief thesis for the issue ofmoral motivation is
that it views desires and beliefs as distinct states neither of which can entail the other,
but both ofwhich are necessary for intentional action to take place.7 The difference
between the two types of states is usually put in terms of a difference in their
5 See Brink 1989: 39-40; Schueler 1995: chap. 2. Smith (1994: chap. 4) refers to the same distinction
as the 'motivating reasons/normative reasons' distinction, as does Dancy (2000: chap. 1).
6 It is not always clear whether the desire/belief thesis asserts only necessary or both necessary and
sufficient conditions for the explanation of intentional action (cf. Schueler 1995: 44). Smith defends
the view that the model provides necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action (1994: 92).
But even if the model only provides necessary conditions for action, the problem for moral motivation
raised by the non-cognitivist argument still remains.
7 Cf. Smith (1994: 7): 'For any belief and desire pair that we imagine, we can always imagine
someone having the desire but lacking the belief, and vice versa.' I'm not sure about this claim.
While it seems prima facie plausible that no belief entails desire, it seems less plausible that no desire
entails belief. For example, my desire that Chris stop drumming seems to entail that I believe that
Chris is drumming. In the context of the present discussion, however, it is the claim that no belief
entails desire that is crucial.
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directions of fit (see Humberstone 1992; Smith 1994: chap. 4). Beliefs are said to be
states that are out to fit the world, whereas desires are said to be states that are out to
get the world to fit them. Beliefs represent the way the world is, whereas desires
represent how the world is to be (Smith 1994: 7). The direction of fit of desires
makes them states that are essentially or necessarily motivating. By contrast, beliefs
are only capable of contributing to motivation if paired with desires (Dancy 1993: 2).
If the desire/belief thesis is correct, then no cognitive state such as belief can entail
the kind ofmotivating or conative state such as desire that is necessary for
intentional action to take place. So Emma's moral belief that she is required to
return the money cannot entail that she is motivated to return the money or, indeed,
that she is motivated to do what she judges to be right. It seems, then, that ifwe
accept the desire/belief thesis we must abandon the internalist claim that moral
judgements entail motivation. This is the option taken by those who defend an
externalist account of the connection between moral judgements and motivation.
Moral judgement externalism holds that an agent's motivation to do what she judges
to be morally right is independent of her judgement: it is a separate and contingent
fact about her psychology that she happens to desire to do what is right.8 Moral
judgement internalists find this account ofmoral deliberation and action
unacceptable because, as we have seen, they hold that morality is in some sense
essentially practical or motivating. They argue that the essential practicality of
morality cannot be accounted for ifmotivation is only contingently and externally
related to moral judgements: ifmotivation is 'outside' rather than 'built in' to moral
judgements. According to internalism, Emma's judgement that it is right to give the
money back to the bank only counts as a genuine moral judgement if she is
motivated in some degree to return the money. This means that once it is established
that Emma has made a genuine moral judgement, there is no further question to ask
about whether she is motivated to act in accordance with it. To think that there is a
further question betrays, according to the internalist, some kind of conceptual
8
Examples ofmoral judgement extemalism include Brink (1989: chap 3), and Svavarsdottir (1999).
Frankena (1958) expresses externalist sympathies, as does Foot (1972).
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confusion: it is part of what we mean when we say that someone has made a moral
judgement that they are motivated to act in accordance with that judgement (cf Smith
1994: 6-7).
The problem ofmoral motivation, then, can be understood against the background of
a particular theory of how action is motivated. With the desire/beliefmodel in place,
there is a clear tension between the view that moral judgements are fact-stating and
the view that moral judgements entail motivating states such as desire. Externalists
reject the latter thesis in order to defend moral cognitivism. This is the view that
moral judgements primarily function to express beliefs about the way the world is
morally and that the propositions asserted by such judgements are assessable in terms
of truth and falsity. Cognitivism is a natural starting point for those wanting to
defend realism about moral facts and properties, and the externalist rejection of
internalism is often part of a broader defence ofmoral realism.9 Internalists who
accept the desire/beliefmodel are likely to be non-cognitivists.10 Non-cognitivism
seeks to preserve the essential practicality ofmoral judgements by denying that such
judgements express beliefs. It argues that the primary function ofmoral judgements
is to express non-cognitive or conative attitudes. The price of adopting non-
cognitivism is giving up the idea that moral judgements are primarily fact-stating.
This brings with it a denial of the reality ofmoral facts and properties. So non-
cognitivism accommodates internalism at the cost ofmoral cognitivism and moral
realism.
Moral judgement externalism and non-cognitivism both accept the desire/belief
model of action explanation. However, some theorists attempt to combine
cognitivism and internalism by rejecting the desire/beliefmodel's claim that
cognitive states can only motivate with the help of desires and can never be the
9 For example, Brink (1989: 25-29). Brink argues that we should treat moral cognitivism as the
default account ofmoral judgements: 'Our moral judgements not only have fact-stating and property-
ascribing form; they have cognitivist content as well. Many common moral judgements themselves
make reference to moral properties, moral facts, moral knowledge...The form and content of our moral
judgements, therefore, presupposes cognitivism' (1989: 25-26).
10 See note 13, below.
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source ofmotivation.11 Cognitivist internalists argue that it is possible for beliefs to
play the dominant role in motivating agents. On one version of this model, Emma's
belief that returning the money is the right thing to do would be sufficient to explain
her being motivated to do so. However, cognitivist internalists need not deny that
desire is present in the explanation of action, only that desire rather than belief is
always the source ofmotivation. For example, it is potentially consistent with the
internalist cognitivist view of belief as the dominant motivating factor that my belief
12that I ought to help produces or motivates a desire to help.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the kinds of arguments given in favour of
moral judgement internalism and to distinguish it from a range of other fonns of
internalism in ethics with which it is often confused. In section two, I reject the non-
cognitivist's use of internalism to argue against moral cognitivism and conclude that
there is no quick way of dismissing the possibility of combining intemalism with
cognitivism. However, I accept the non-cognitivist claim that moral judgements in
some sense go beyond cognition. It does seem that when an agent makes a moral
judgement she is doing something more than merely describing some state of affairs
from a disinterested point of view. Sections three and four are concerned with the
task of distinguishing moral judgement internalism from other versions of
internalism in ethics. In section five I try to make sense of the notion that morality is
essentially practical or action-guiding and relate it to the debate between those who
accept the desire/belief model ofmotivation and those who defend the possibility of
motivating moral beliefs. I end by raising some concerns about the desire/belief
model and discuss the prospects for combining intemalism and cognitivism by
utilising the distinction between the act ofmaking a moral judgement and the content
of a moral judgement.
The theory ofmoral judgement I develop in chapter three views moral judgements as
linguistic or speech acts. This approach reflects the traditional non-cognitivist
concern with moral language. Non-cognitivists focus on what we are doing when we
" Theorists who call into question the desire/beliefmodel include Nagel 1970; McDowell 1978,1979,
1985; Dancy 1993, 2000; Schueler 1995.
12
Dancy (1993: 7-12) calls this kind of cognitivist internalism, a 'motivated-desire theory.'
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call or say that something is morally right and on the point or function ofmoral
language (e.g. Hare 1952; Stevenson 1937, 1944). This focus means that their
particular account ofmoral psychology is based on their account ofwhat agents are
doing when they use moral language. I think the non-cognitivist emphasis on moral
language is substantially correct. I argue in chapter 3 that approaching the
internalism debate from the perspective ofmoral language rather than from that of
moral psychology allows us to accommodate many of the purportedly conflicting
intuitions underlying our notion of moral judgement.
Sometimes moral judgement internalism is viewed as a form ofmoral belief
internalism: the doctrine that moral belief entails motivation (Mele 1996). However
moral belief internalism is too specific a starting point for the general intuition that
motivates internalism in ethics. For example, viewing moral judgement internalism
as a thesis about moral belief and motivation prevents traditional non-cognitivism
from being counted as a version of moral judgment internal ism.13 As non-
cognitivism is generally held by itself and by its opponents to exemplify moral
judgement internalism, it is unlikely that an account ofmoral judgement internalism
that excludes non-cognitivism from the outset captures what we mean by this form of
internalism. The point at issue in these debates is the nature of the psychological
state or states involved in moral assent; moral belief internalism is simply question-
begging with regard to this issue.
I think that the most fruitful and least question-begging way to think ofmoral
judgments is in the context of their performance in speech situations. After all, it is
from such contexts that we gain our experience ofwhat it is for someone to assent to
a moral proposition and our understanding of the close connection between moral
judgement and action. Moral practice is a highly social and public enterprise that
takes place predominately via the use of language. In chapter 5, I argue that the
structure ofmoral psychology reflects the structure of the moral language because of
the specific role language has in the development ofmoral institutions and practices.
13
Non-cognitivism holds that there is no such thing as a specifically moral beliefor propositions with
specifically moral content. There may be a descriptive component to moral judgement and we may
have beliefs about such descriptive features, but these beliefs will not be moral beliefs.
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Despite this emphasis on moral language, the reader may find it useful in chapters 1
and 2 to think ofmoral judgements in terms mental acts or states as well in terms of
linguistic acts. This in part reflects a certain ambiguity in the use of the expression
'moral judgement' in the literature. Most of the points I make in these chapters in
favour of what I term 'act internalism' are not, I think, prima facie dependent on
interpreting moral judgements as linguistic rather than as psychological acts.
Nonetheless, my hope is that the survey of the debates between moral judgement
internalists and externalists in these chapters will highlight the need for the linguistic
turn taken in chapter three.
2. Non-cognitivist Internalism
Non-cognitivists argue that in order to preserve the essential practicality ofmorality
we need to reject the view that moral judgements are fact-stating. They thus defend
moral judgement internalism by giving up moral cognitivism. According to non-
cognitivism, moral judgements primarily function to express conative or motivating
attitudes, such as approval or disapproval, rather than to express beliefs.14 On this
model moral claims necessarily motivate because their primary function is to express
precisely those states of an agent that are the sources ofmotivation.
The non-cognitivist argument for internalism relies on the purported conceptual
connection between moral judgements and motivation.15 Like non-cognitivism,
many versions of cognitivist internalism rely on some version of this conceptual
14 This is at least true of traditional versions of non-cognitivism, such as the emotivism ofAyer (1946)
and Stevenson (1937, 1944). Hare (1952) argues that moral judgements are primarily prescriptive or
command-like rather than expressive or emotive. Nonetheless, he accepts with Ayer and Stevenson
that the main function of such judgements is not to state facts. Blackburn (1984) agrees that the
distinctive meaning of moral terms and expressions is given by their use in expressing non-cognitive
states. However, he attempts to accommodate the realist-seeming nature of ethical discourse, such as
the apparently assertoric and truth-valued nature ofmoral judgements, by adopting a deflationary
theory of truth. In this way he aims to avoid the standard objection that moral judgements on the non-
cognitivist account are not assessable in terms of truth and falsity. Gibbard presents a version ofnon-
cognitivism he terms 'norm expressivism'. He holds that to judge an act as morally wrong is 'to
accept norms for guilt and resentment that, prima facie, would sanction guilt and resentment if the act
were performed' (1990: 8).
15 For example: 'It seems to be a conceptual truth that to regard something as good is to feel a pull
towards promoting or choosing it, or towards wanting other people to feel the pull towards promoting
or choosing it' (Blackburn 1984: 188).
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argument (e.g., Smith 1994: 6). However, the kind of explanation offered of the
necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation differs considerably
between non-cognitivist and cognitivist versions of internalism. Much of the appeal
ofnon-cognitivist versions of internalism lies in their ability to explain the dynamic
and practical nature ofmorality by appealing to the widely accepted and broadly
naturalistic desire/beliefmodel of action explanation. By contrast, cognitivist
versions of internalism commonly reject the desire/belief model and replace it with
controversial accounts of how cognitive states produce or cause motivation.16 Some
cognitivist internalists attempt to retain the desire/beliefmodel and include
motivation as part of the content ofmoral judgements. These theorists include
subjectivists and proponents of response-dependent theories ofmoral value.17 In
both these cases, motivation, in the form of a desire or pro-attitude, is included in the
truth conditions for moral propositions. Non-cognitivist internalism rejects the
notion that the posited conceptual connection holds between the content ofmoral
claims and motivation because it rejects the idea of specifically moral content.18
What makes non-cognitivist internalism distinct is the view that the conceptual
connection holds at the level of linguistic function rather than at the level of truth-
conditional content. And because for non-cognitivists the linguistic function of
moral judgements is expressive or directive, there is a straightforward conceptual
connection between the act ofmaking a moral judgement and motivation. Moral
judgements function to allow the expression of evaluative attitudes. For the non-
cognitivist, to make a moral claim without being motivated is to fail to grasp the
point ofmoral discourse (Hare 1952: 169).
It is clear, then, that non-cognitivism interprets the internalist intuition in a
distinctive way. Allan Gibbard outlines the nature of this distinctive feature of non-
cognitivist internalism in the following passage:
16 See references for footnote 11. Smith is one cognitivist internalist who does not reject the
desire/beliefmodel (1994: chap 4).
17 The following theorists present 'dispositional' or response-dependent theories of value: Johnston
1989; Lewis 1989; Smith 1994.
18
See, for example, Hare 1952: chap 7.
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To call a thing [morally right] is to endorse it in some way. That suggests a scheme for
getting at the meaning of the term. Instead of trying to define the property ["moral
Tightness"] by giving conditions under which a thing would have that property or lack it,
start with the use of the term. Fix on the dictum "To call a thing [morally right] is to endorse
it," and search for a sense of 'endorse' for which the dictum holds true. (Gibbard 1990: 6.
My emphasis).19
The crucial feature of endorsement that relates it to internalism is its affective or non-
cognitive nature: to endorse something is necessarily to hold some kind of favouring
desire or pro-attitude towards the thing in question. Gibbard argues that any account
ofmoral judgement that fails to accommodate this endorsing function, such as a
descriptivist analysis, leaves a puzzle: 'It misses the chiefpoint of calling something
['right' or 'good']: the endorsement the term connotes' (1990: 10).
For non-cognitivism, then, the endorsing or, as it is often called, commendatory
function ofmoral judgements is the essence of the practicality ofmorality and is
what distinguishes moral judgements from purely descriptive judgements. Another
non-cognitivist, Charles Stevenson, puts the matter in the following way:
In normative ethics any description of what is the case is attended by considerations of what
is to be felt and done about it; the beliefs that are in question are preparatory to guiding or
redirecting attitudes. Moral judgements are concerned with recommending something for
approval or disapproval; and this involves something more than a disinterested description,
or a cold debate about whether it is already approved of... In this way moral judgements go
beyond cognition, speaking to the conative-affective natures ofmen. (Stevenson 1944: 13)
The view that moral judgements have an essentially endorsing function is implicit in
the non-cognitivist argument against cognitivism outlined in section one above. As
we saw, the argument says that if assenting to a moral judgement entails motivation,
then, because no descriptive judgement entails motivation, assenting to a moral
judgement must involve something other than a descriptive judgement. But close
attention to the argument shows that the premises do not support the anti-cognitivist
conclusion. Rather, they support the following disjunctive conclusion:
19 Gibbard actually talks of rationality in this passage rather than moral rightness; but I think he would
hold that this point applies to all types ofpractical normative judgements.
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C(ii) Judging that an act is morally right either involves something
other than a judgement that some fact or state of affairs obtains or
something in addition to such a judgement.
The non-cognitivist argument neglects the fact that speakers often and in the same
utterance do more than just describe something: that utterances can go 'beyond
cognition' while still being fully descriptive. If I argue that Churchill was a wartime
prime minister, part ofwhat I am doing is trying to convince you of the truth of the
stated proposition. By contrast, if I merely state or describe the fact that Churchill
was a wartime prime minister, I am in no way committed to having any desire that
you accept my claim. But this contrast between arguing and describing in no way
prevents a speaker from doing both. Indeed, applying the reasoning of the anti-
cognitivist argument to this example generates the following reductio:
1. Arguing that some fact or state of affairs obtains entails that one
desires the hearer to believe that the fact or state of affairs obtains.
2. No judgement that some fact or state of affairs obtains entails
motivation.
C. Arguing that some fact or state of affairs obtains must be something
other than a judgment that some fact or state of affairs obtains.
So I think we should reject the non-cognitivist's anti-cognitivist conclusion: the fact,
if it is one, that moral judgements necessarily involve commendation or endorsement
in no way prevents them from being genuine descriptive judgements. However, we
should take seriously the non-cognitivist's claim that moral judgements in some
sense go beyond bare description. There is something about what an agent is doing
when she makes a moral judgement that suggests she is not simply a disinterested
reporter of the content of her judgement. We might say that moral judgement
internalism is an expression of our interested or participatory relation to moral
deliberation. Understanding precisely what this means will be a large part of the task
of the rest of this work.
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3. Content-based Arguments for Internalism
In the last section, I said that what makes non-cognitivist internalism distinct is the
view that the conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation holds
at the level of linguistic function rather than at the level of truth-conditional content.
The distinction between the linguistic act one performs in making a moral judgement
and the content ofmoral judgement will be crucial to my argument in the following
chapters. In this section I look at arguments for internalism which, unlike non-
cognitivism, include the motivational requirement at the level of the truth conditions
for moral judgements.
One way in which theorists attempt to satisfy the internalism requirement is by
building motivation into the truth-conditional content ofmoral judgements. Content
internalism about motivation is the view that there is a necessary connection between
the truth-conditions for the propositional content ofmoral judgements and
motivation: that is, between the truth conditions for moral propositions and
motivation. On this view, part ofwhat makes it true that an agent is morally required
to perform or promote a certain act is that the agent has some motivation to perform
or promote that act. It is this version of intemalism that is at issue in early
discussions of internalism and externalism in the literature.20 Frankena borrows the
labels internalist and externalist from Falk, who uses them to refer to the
'opposition...between those who regard motivation as external and those who regard
it as internal to [moral] obligation' (Frankena 1958: 40-41).
Moral judgment internalism and content internalism about motivation are very
different theses and need to be distinguished clearly from each other. This is
important because moral judgement internalism and content internalism are often
conflated and arguments or intuitions that support one of these positions are used to
support the other.21 In order to do this effectively, we need to look briefly at a
20 Such as Falk 1948; and Frankena 1958.
21 It is not always clear in Falk (1948) or in Frankena (1958) which version of internalism is under
discussion, although the avowed version in both cases is content internalism (specifically, the
connection between moral obligation and motivation). At least one theorist has , mistakenly I believe,
interpreted Frankena's article as concerned with moral judgement internalism rather than with content
internalism: 'Of course we should remember that Frankena's discussion...is produced in the course of
an argument about...an 'internalistic' conception ofmoral judgement, the conception according to
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number of other forms of internalism in ethics. This may seem an unnecessary
complication, but I think it is important to isolate moral judgement internalism from
other internalist theses with which it is often confused. Moreover, while we can
distinguish logically between these various internalist theses, I suspect they all stem
from a much more general intuition about the connection between morality and
practicality. This is why in giving an account of moral judgement internalism we
should be aware of its relation to these other internalist doctrines.
Most versions of internalism are supported by the claim that implicit in our ordinary
thinking about morality is the view that there is a conceptual connection between
morality and motivation. For example, Mackie argues that there is a common
conception ofmoral facts and properties as both objective and as necessarily
22
motivating (1977: 23). The kind of internalism Mackie is concerned with here is
neither a version ofmoral judgement internalism nor, strictly speaking, a version of
content internalism. Mackie's version of internalism involves a necessary
connection between an agent's apprehension ofmoral facts and motivation: that is,
roughly, between moral knowledge and motivation. On this conception, the
motivating power ofmorality derives from the moral facts and properties themselves
as they impact upon moral agents; and although motivation 'is a necessary
consequence of perceiving or knowing [ethical facts]...motive is in no way intrinsic
23
to ethical facts themselves' (Darwall 1995: 10). Mackie argues that the notion of
necessarily motivating properties is naturalistically 'queer' and that this gives us
which it is impossible for an agent to make a sincere moral judgement and not to be motivated
accordingly' (Dancy 2000: 23). It is easy to see how one might gain this impression given that
Frankena begins his paper by stating that it is 'concerned with a problem about the analysis of
judgements ofmoral obligation' (1958: 40. My emphasis). But Frankena's concern is the thesis that it
is impossible for someone to have a moral obligation without having a motivation to conform with it.
22 Mackie argues that our common conception of objective values is of entities that provide 'the
knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something's being good both tells the person
who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it' (1977: 40. My emphasis). Insisting that
internalism asserts an overriding motivation is, I think, too strong a requirement. Unless otherwise
stated, I will interpret internalism, in its various forms, as the weaker thesis that moral requirements or
judgements entail some motivation for action (cf. Brink 1989: 41-42).
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Although the power to motivate is intrinsic to the ethical facts themselves.
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good reason to reject realism in ethics (1977: 38). We might call this kind of
internalism moral knowledge internalism.24
Moral knowledge internalism is easy to confuse with moral judgement internalism
because moral judgements have a role to play with regard to moral knowledge. For
example, if I know that returning the money is morally right, then presumably I
judge or believe that returning the money is morally right. So, according to moral
knowledge internalism true moral judgements that are knowledge will necessarily be
motivating. It is clear that this doctrine is quite different to moral judgement
internalism, according to which any genuine moral judgement, regardless of its
veridicality, necessarily motivates.
Content internalism depends for its plausibility on the conceptual claim made by
what I will call constitutive existence internalism. Constitutive existence
internalism asserts that there is a connection of conceptual necessity between moral
requirements and motivation because moral requirements are in part constituted by
motivation. Constitutive existence internalists, that is, endorse the view that moral
requirements entail motivation because they hold that facts about moral requirements
in part consist of facts about motivation. By contrast, moral knowledge internalists
endorse the view that moral judgements entail motivation because they hold that
facts about moral requirements necessarily bring about, but do not consist of, facts
about motivation:
Though both [constitutive existence internalists and moral knowledge internalists]
agree that [moral requirements] entail [motivation], they do so for opposite reasons.
One takes [moral requirements] to be metaphysically basic, the other takes
motivations to be...The directions ofmetaphysical dependence recognized are
24 This is similar Brink's 'hybrid internalism' about motivation: 'Hybrid internalism claims it is a
conceptual truth about morality that the recognition ofa moral obligation motivates... the agent (the
person who recognises the obligation)...' (1989: 41).
25 Darwall uses the label 'existence internalism' to describe this position (1995: 10). It is similar to
Brink's 'agent intemalism' about motivation (See Brink 1989: 40).
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opposite, even though both views agree that [moral requirements] entail [motivation]
and hence that not- [motivation] entails not-[moral requirement].26
The content internalist is someone who accepts constitutive existence internalism:
she accepts the conceptual claim that moral requirements entail motivation because
she accepts that it is part of the concept of a moral requirement that it is in part
constituted by motivation. This means that part ofwhat she asserts when she asserts
that something is a moral requirement is that the motivation that partly constitutes the
requirement is present: she asserts that the claim about the requirement is true partly
in virtue of the claim about motivation.
For my purposes, the differences between constitutive existence internalism and
content internalism are largely a matter of emphasis: the former emphasises the
connection between the existence ofmoral facts and motivation and the latter the
connection between truth conditions for moral propositions construed as asserted and
motivation. I want to emphasise the latter because I am interested in the relation
between moral judgements and motivation, and content internalism makes the
implications of the motivational requirement forjudgements more explicit than does
constitutive existence intemalism. So from here on I will talk of content internalism
rather than constitutive existence internalism, while acknowledging the sense in
which an acceptance of content internalism depends on an acceptance of constitutive
existence intemalism.
Content intemalism is also easily confused with moral judgement intemalism.
According to content intemalism, it is a condition of the truth of any moral
judgement that the agent to whom it applies is motivated to act in accordance with it.
On this view, then, an agent who makes a moral judgement asserts that a motivating
state obtains. So if I judge that Emma is morally required to return the money, part
ofwhat I am asserting is that she has some motivation for returning the money. If
261 adapt this from Susan Hurley's excellent discussion of internalism about reasons and motivation
(2001: 152). Hurley argues that most discussions of reasons internalism fail to distinguish between
the logical claim that reasons entail motivation and the issue of the direction ofmetaphysical
dependence between reasons and motivation.
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this motivational condition is not part ofmy judgement then I have not made a
genuine moral judgement, in the sense that I have failed to fully understand what it is
for something to be morally right. This would be like judging that John has a new
watch but it not being part of what I assert that John's new timepiece is small and
worn on the body. In this case, I have not made a genuine 'watch judgement'
because I have failed to understand, say, that watch judgements and clock
judgements have different truth conditions. So while content internalism is a
doctrine about moral propositions rather than moral judgements, it has implications
for the assessment ofmoral judgements.27 According to content internalism, my
moral judgement can be genuine even ifI am not motivated by it, as long as I judge
that those to whom it applies are motivated by it. Notice that it need not be true that
those to whom I direct my judgement are appropriately motivated. If they are not
motivated, I will have still have made a genuine, although false, moral judgement.
By contrast, according to moral judgement internalism, if I make a moral judgement,
even about others, I must be motivated to some extent to comply with the judgement.
Moral judgement internalism is particularly difficult to distinguish from content
internalism in cases where an agent takes the judgement she makes to apply to
herself as well as to others. This difficulty is most pressing ifwe accept that an
essential feature ofmoral judgements is their universalizability. The principle of
universalizability says that if it is right for a particular agent to perform some act then
it is right for any agent in relevantly similar circumstances to perform an act of the
same kind.28 For example, if I judge that Emma is morally required to return the
money, I am committed to holding that it would be right for anyone in circumstances
relevantly similar to Emma's to return the money. Given that the judgement applies
to me as well as to Emma, content internalism says that I must judge that both Emma
and I are, or perhaps would be under relevant conditions, motivated to comply with
the requirement. So ifwe accept that content internalism and universalizability are
correct, then my moral judgements must all make reference to my own motivations.
27 It is these implications that Frankena is alluding to when he says his paper is concerned with an
'analysis ofjudgements ofmoral obligation' (1958: 40). He is concerned with how a particular
analysis ofmoral obligation affects our understanding ofjudgements ofmoral obligation.
28 For discussions of the principle ofuniversalizability see Hare 1981: chap. 6; and Mackie 1977:
chap. 4.
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But this looks remarkably similar to moral judgement internalism: the doctrine that if
I judge that it is right to <t> then I am motivated to <J>. The crucial, and subtle,
difference is that in the case of content internalism the motivational condition is part
of the content of the judgement: the condition to be met is that I judge or believe that
I am motivated, not that I actually am motivated. This means that my judgement that
I am morally required to <I> may be false because my belief that I am motivated to O
is false. In this instance, according to content intemalism my moral judgement
would still be genuine. By contrast, as we have seen, moral judgement internalism
requires that I have an actual motivation to do what I judge to be right in order for
my judgement to be genuine.
At this point it is worth noting that content internalism comes in counterfactual as
well as occurrent versions. It may be the case, for example, that neither Emma nor I
is well placed to consider the moral implications of her not returning the money, and
so neither of us is presently motivated to return the money. This need not mean that
the ascription ofmoral obligation to us must be withdrawn. The counterfactual
version of content internalism says that the moral obligation will still apply to Emma
and to me if, were we to consider the situation from an appropriate point of view or
under relevant conditions, we would both be motivated to return the money (cf. Copp
1995: 189-190). This version of content internalism presents no problem for my
position: it merely emphasises the differences I have been stressing between moral
judgement internalism and content intemalism. If we accept the view that moral
judgement intemalism is a doctrine about the connection between moral judgements
and occurrent motivation, then counterfactual content intemalism, by its very nature,
fails to satisfy this requirement. So one important difference between both types of
content intemalism and moral judgement intemalism is that the former fail to
guarantee the necessary connection between moral judgements and occurrent
motivation asserted by the latter. More than this, however, both forms of content
intemalism fail to capture the sense in which, on the non-cognitivist model of
intemalism, moral judgements function to allow the expression and not the assertion
ofmotivating attitudes.
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Given these differences between moral judgement internalism and content
internalism, we might wonder why theorists have thought that the intuitions which
29
support one of these positions can be used to support the other. One reason is the
generality of the internalist intuition. Ifwe read the internalist's claim about moral
judgements to be merely that there is a conceptual connection between moral
judgement and motivation, then content internalism can plausibly be seen as
satisfying this claim. This is because according to content internalism there is a
straightforward conceptual connection between the content ofmoral judgements and
motivation. Part of the problem here is that the expression 'moral judgement' is
structurally ambiguous: it can refer either to the content of the judgement, the moral
proposition, or to the act ofmaking the judgement. This is the difference between
act and content alluded to in the previous section. Although a simple distinction, I
believe attending to it will allow us to become much clearer about what is at issue
between internalists and externalists in ethics, and to better understand the problem
ofmoral motivation. Remember that non-cognitivism views internalism as a thesis
about judgement acts rather than judgement content. This is the positive part of the
non-cognitivist thesis. I have already argued that we should reject the negative or
critical part of non-cognitivism. Given that it is this negative part of non-cognitivism
that gives it its title, we need another title for the kind of internalism espoused by
non-cognitivism. I will call the view that moral judgement internalism is a thesis
about judgement acts act internalism. In the rest of this section I give reasons why
we should prefer act internalism to content internalism as an interpretation ofmoral
judgement internalism.
The most obvious reason for interpreting moral judgement internalism as a doctrine
about judgement acts rather than contents is that content internalism is only
incidentally about moral judgements. As we have seen, content internalism is really
about moral propositions or moral facts: it has implications for moral judgements but
29 Smith's defence of his 'practicality requirement' appears to assume that some form of content
internalism can establish a version ofmoral judgement internalism (1994: chap. 3). I make the point
that the practicality requirement relies on a version of content internalism in my discussion ofSmith in
chap. 2.4 above. Copp's discussion ofmoral judgement internalism (what he calls 'belief
internalism') also implies that content internalism might support a version of moral judgement
internalism (1995: 190-192).
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is not a doctrine about moral judgements. By contrast, act internalism is essentially
about the connection between moral judgements and motivation. The nature of
content internalism also means that it does not secure the necessary connection
between moral judgement and motivation thought to be indicative ofmoral
judgement internalism. We saw above that content internalism only secures a
necessary connection between moral judgements and judgements about motivation
and not between moral judgements and actual motivation. Another weakness of
content internalism is that it fails to accommodate the endorsing or commendatory
nature ofmoral judgement. According to content internalism, what one is doing
when making a moral judgement is describing or asserting the fact that one is
motivated in the appropriate way. If one's judgement is true, then one is indeed
motivated to perform the act; but one's judgement may be false, in which case one
may have no desire to do what one judges it is right to do. Moreover, it is not clear
that in simply describing the fact that one is motivated, even if it is true, one endorses
or commends whatever it is that one is motivated to do.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for not interpreting moral judgement internalism
as a form of content internalism is that ifwe do so it becomes more difficult to
defend the status of internalism as a platitude or commonplace about the nature of
morality. This is because act internalism is more intuitively compelling than content
internalism. It will help here to look at the standard kind of example designed to
show the intuitive appeal of internalism. Suppose 1 tell you that we all have a moral
obligation to vote in general elections. Given this information about me you form
expectations about my behaviour. Specifically, you expect me to go and vote when
it comes to the next general election, or, if I don't, for there to be a good reason for
my not voting. So when the day of the next general election arrives and I don't vote,
you ask me to explain myself. 1 respond that while I genuinely think that I have a
moral obligation to vote, I am in no way, and have never been, motivated to vote.
The standard internalist response is to say that because I have failed to be motivated
-> A
there is some sense in which I have not made a genuine moral judgement. The
question is whether my mistake is to fail to recognise that in order for something to
30 See my chap. 2 for a discussion ofHare's 'inverted commas' version of this argument.
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count as a moral requirement for me I must be motivated to adhere to it or whether
my mistake is of some other kind.
The content internalist must explain my failure to make a genuine moral judgement
in terms ofmy not understanding that motivation is one of the truth conditions for
having a moral requirement. It is this rather than the fact that I am not motivated
which constitutes the failure ofmy judgement. If I had merely believed mistakenly
that I was motivated to vote my judgement would still be sound. But this seems an
unlikely interpretation of the thought experiment because the view that moral
requirements are contingent on an agent's desires is simply not intuitively
compelling in the way internalism is meant to be. In fact it runs counter to the
influential Kantian doctrine that moral requirements are categorical imperatives
which apply to agents regardless of their contingent wants (cf. Brink 1989: 45;
Dancy 1993: 4.). We can test this Kantian intuition by extending the example.
Suppose you agree with my claim that we all have a moral obligation to vote in
general elections. It seems unlikely that once you discover that I am not in fact
motivated to vote you would withdraw the requirement from me.31 This suggests that
the internalist intuition, if it is a platitude, must be something other than the content
internalist's claim that moral requirements are contingent on agents' desires.
My proposal is that interpreting the internalist intuition along the lines of act
internalism provides a more satisfactory interpretation of thought experiments like
the one above. According to act internalism, not being motivated by one's moral
judgements is like claiming to argue that something is the case but having no desire
to convince the hearer of the truth of one's claim. If I argue sincerely that you are
wrong, part of what I am doing is attempting to convince you of your mistake.
Similarly, if I judge that something is morally required, part of what I am doing is
commending or endorsing that option. It seems clear that if I try to convince you that
31 The counterfactual version of content internalism might seem to fare better than the occurrent
version in dealing with the issue of categoricy. However, consider the moral obligation not to torture
people for fun. Let's say Jane is in whatever ideal conditions the counterfactual theorist posits, but
that she still fails to have any motivation to refrain from torturing for fun. I suggest it is implausible
that we would withdraw from Jane the requirement not to torture for fun simply because she has no
desire not to torture people.
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p, then I desire that you accept that p. So we can say that there is a necessary
connection between a speaker arguing that p and desiring the hearer to accept that p.
Act internalism implies that if I commend an option then I desire that option to be
taken. We could then say that there is a necessary connection between judging that
an option is morally required and desiring that option to be taken and thus being
motivated to take or encourage the taking of that option. So act internalism satisfies
moral judgement internalism: the thesis that if an agent judges that something is
morally right, then she is motivated to act in accordance with her judgement.
Moreover, as act internalism does not assert a necessary connection between moral
requirements and motivation or desire, it satisfies moral judgement internalism while
being consistent with the Kantian doctrine that moral requirements are categorical
imperatives.
Although act internalism provides a better interpretation of moral judgement
internalism than does content internalism, a number of difficulties still remain. The
way the voting example was presented above didn't distinguish between
commending some act and being motivated to perform or promote such an act. We
simply assumed that if an agent commends something then she is motivated to do it.
Indeed, this is the way commendation is generally treated by non-cognitivists. But as
will become clear in following chapters, there are cases in which failures of
32motivation are explicable and perhaps to be expected. In such cases an agent still
seems to be commending the act he judges as morally right, even though he fails to
be motivated to perform it. Another issue, dealt with in the next section, is that the
incoherence attributed to the person who fails to be influenced by her moral
judgement is sometimes said to result from her failing to take the judgement as
providing a reason or justification to perform the act in question. These issues
complicate matters but do not, I think, undermine the arguments for preferring act
internalism to content internalism as an interpretation of the intuitions underlying
moral judgement internalism.
32 See especially chap. 4.2.
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4. Internalism and Justifying Reasons
In the last section, I stressed the importance of distinguishing between content
internalism, which primarily concerns moral propositions, and moral judgement
internalism proper, and I noted that the distinction is often not clearly observed.
Another crucial distinction in the internalism debate is that between internalism
about motivating states and internalism about practical justification or justifying
reasons. We have already discussed content internalism and judgement internalism
about motivating states. Below I discuss how these positions relate to content
internalism and judgement internalism about practical justification.
The four main elements to keep in mind when discussing internalism in ethics are
moral judgements, moral content, motivating states, and practical justification (Brink
1989: chap. 3). The different versions of internalism in ethics can be understood in
terms of how the former two elements are combined with the latter two elements.
Moral judgement internalism can be about either motivating states, as above, or
about justifying reasons. Moral judgement internalism about motivating states says
that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivating states;
moral judgement internalism about justifying reasons says that there is a necessary
connection between moral judgements and justifying reasons. Content internalism
can also be about either motivating states or about justifying reasons. Content
internalism about motivating states says that there is a necessary connection between
the truth ofmoral propositions and motivating states; content internalism about
justifying reasons says that there is a necessary connection between the truth of
moral propositions and justifying reasons.
To get some idea of how discussions of internalism often run these elements together
it will be useful to look at Jonathan Dancy's account ofNagel on internalism. Dancy
begins with the following passage from Nagel:
Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by
the truth of the ethical propositions themselves. On this view the motivation must be so tied
to the meaning, or truth, of ethical statements that when in a particular case someone is (or
perhaps merely believes that he is) morally required to do something, it follows that he has a
motivation for doing it. Extemalism holds, on the other hand, that the necessary motivation
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is not supplied by ethical principles and judgements themselves, and that an additional
psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance... Internalism's appeal derives
from the conviction that one cannot accept or assert sincerely any ethical proposition without
accepting at least a prima facie motivation for action in accordance with it. (Nagel 1970: 7)
Dancy then makes the following observation about the passage:
Nagel's work here is pioneering but, like many other pioneers, he did not find the best road
for others to follow. There are two ideas which he fails to keep apart in this passage. The
first is that motivation is provided by the mere truth of some proposition; the second is that
the motivation is provided by one's belief in that proposition, whether it be true or not. The
second of these is much less outlandish than the first, and is what I take to have been Nagel's
intention. (Dancy 1993: 1)
In fact there are more than two ideas that Nagel fails to keep apart, and because
Dancy doesn't recognise this he falls into similar difficulties to Nagel. Dancy is
correct in pointing out that Nagel shifts from talking about moral truth to talking
about moral beliefor moral judgements. Nagel implies that internalism about moral
truth and internalism about moral judgements are equivalent. This is why he says
that if'someone is (or perhaps merely believes that he is) morally required to do
something, it follows that he has a motivation for doing it.' But if, as he says,
motivation is guaranteed by the truth or content of an ethical proposition, then it does
not follow that a moral judgement or beliefwith this content will entail motivation.
This is because it is always possible that the judgement or belief is false and that the
motivation condition is not met.
Dancy asserts that the notion that motivation is connected to the truth of ethical
propositions is 'outlandish'. It is worth reflecting on why Dancy might think this
given that Nagel makes it explicit throughout the passage that this is how he
construes the thesis of internalism. One reason Dancy might think this view
outlandish is because it suggests a form of content internalism about motivation and
such a view contradicts the notion ofmoral requirements as categorical imperatives
by making moral truth depend on contingent desires (cf. Dancy 1993: 4). But Nagel
is clearly not a content internalist in this sense. He precisely does not want moral
requirements to depend on desires in this way:
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The position which I shall defend... provides an account of ethical motivation which does
not rely on the assumption that a motivational factor is already present among the conditions
of any moral requirement. On this view the possibility of appropriate motivation must be
guaranteed by the truth of the moral claim itself - but not because the existence of such
motivation is included in advance among the independently comprehensible truth conditions
ofevery moral claim. (Nagel 1970: 13. My emphasis)33
How else might Dancy interpret the notion ofmotivation being provided by the truth
of a moral proposition? He might view it as the claim that the truth of an ethical
proposition has the power to influence agents regardless of whether or not they are
aware of it. This does seem an extreme view, but it can be made more plausible if
changed to the claim that moral truths necessarily motivate agents but only when
they become aware of them. This is the view I called moral knowledge internalism.
But this doesn't quite capture what Nagel is saying. Nagel does seem to want to say
that all sincere moral judgements entail that one accepts a motivation for action. And
this would not be the case ifonly those moral judgements that were true entailed
motivation, as there would potentially be many sincerely held but false moral
judgements that did not motivate.
In order to make sense ofNagel we need to recognise that, in addition to the
confusion about moral truth and moral judgement noted by Dancy, he doesn't clearly
distinguish between internalism as a thesis about motivation and internalism as a
thesis about justifying reasons. Ifwe attend to all these distinctions it becomes clear
that much ofwhat Nagel says suggests a version of internalism that asserts a
necessary connection between moral requirements and justifying reasons (or motives)
for action. Contrary to Dancy's claim, it is clear that Nagel interprets his thesis as
concerned primarily with the truth ofmoral propositions and only incidentally with
moral judgements. And this emphasis would not fit with Nagel's broader position if
the posited necessary connection were said to hold between moral truth and
motivating states. By contrast, the view that moral requirements entail justifying
reasons for action is perfectly consistent with Nagel's theory. The last sentence of
the passage, at least, clearly suggests that Nagel has in mind the notion ofmotivation
as a justifying motive for action. If it is part of the truth-conditional content ofmoral
33
Nagel continues: 'There are reasons for action that are specifically moral; it is because they
represent moral requirements that they can motivate, and not vice versa' (1970: 13).
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judgements that moral requirements provide justifying motives for action, then we
can make sense of the notion that to make a sincere moral judgement one must
accept 'a prima facie motivation for action.' By contrast, it is unclear what it might
mean to accept a prima facie motivating state for action. So I think that at least part
ofwhat Nagel is arguing for under the banner of internalism is the view that moral
requirements necessarily provide justifying motives or reasons for action (cf. Brink
1989: 51).
We need to be careful here not to downplay the extent to which Nagel sees himself
as providing an account of the motivational efficacy ofmoral judgements as well
their justifying force. Strictly speaking, the only kind ofinternalism that Nagel
supports is content internalism aboutjustifying reasons: the thesis that moral
requirements entail justifying reasons for action. However, he takes it to be obvious
that a theory of practical justification must mesh with an account ofmotivational
influence, and he rejects the separation ofmotivational from normative discourse
(Nagel 1970:15, 28). So in addition to arguing for content internalism about
justifying reasons, Nagel wants to defend the notion that justifying reasons are
capable in their own right of having a motivational effect on agents. As Nagel sees
it, the desire/belief theory ofmotivation blocks this possibility because it denies that
mere knowledge or belief can motivate in the absence of desire or be the dominant
force in motivation. So he takes it that his defence of content internalism about
justifying reasons needs to be supplemented by a cognitivist account ofmoral
motivation. This allows him to provide an account of the motivating force ofmoral
considerations in terms of their justifying force. Nagel refers to this connection
between justification and motivation in the following passage:
Kant's effort to produce a categorical imperative is an attempt to discover requirements on
action which apply to a man on no conditions about what he wants, how he feels, etc. They
must nevertheless he requirements whose validity involves the capacity to be motivated in
accordance with them. Since this motivational factor cannot come from a presupposed
motivation which is made a condition of the requirements, it must...come from the
requirements themselves. That is, what makes the requirements valid for us must itself
determine the capacity of our motivational stmcture to yield corresponding action. (Nagel
1970: 12. My emphasis.)
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However, even though Nagel supports a connection between content internalism and
the theory ofmotivation, he does not support a necessary connection between moral
judgements and motivation and thus does not support moral judgement internalism:
Hence I conclude that the judgement that one has a reason to do something includes the
acceptance of a justification for doing it, and that this is its motivational content... [however]
motivational content does not necessarily imply motivational efficacy. (Nagel 1970: 65)
Dancy's mistake is to read Nagel's cognitivist theory ofmotivation as a form of
moral judgement or moral belief internalism and to identify Nagel's internalism with
this doctrine and not the form of internalism Nagel does hold, namely, content
internalism about justifying reasons. At times Dancy, himself, is unclear about the
doctrine he is defending. At one point he describes cognitivist internalism as the
doctrine that moral judgements express beliefs 'which cannot be present without
motivating.' (Dancy 1993: 3). A few lines further on, however, internalism is
associated with the doctrine that one cannot make a moral judgement without seeing
it as practically relevant, which suggests content internalism about practical
justification.34 But Dancy has already rejected interpreting internalism as a doctrine
about moral content. So it is surprising when his main argument for internalism is
actually an argument for moral content internalism about justifying reasons and not
for moral judgement internalism:
[T]here must strong intuitive reasons in favour of internalism... And there is at least one
such reason, namely the sense that morality is essentially practical, so that it would be odd
for someone to say 'This action is wrong but I don't see that as at all relevant to my
choice'... [This] can be backed up by the thought that moral considerations are ones whose
practical relevance cannot be escaped by saying 'I don't care about that sort of thing.'
(Dancy 1993: 4)
The position this argument defends is that moral requirements entail justifying
reasons for action which apply to agents independently of their desires. This
doctrine entails that if someone judges that something is morally required then part
ofwhat they judge is that doing that thing is practically justified. It does not entail
34 As it turns out, Dancy appears to opt for a position somewhat similar to the one I attribute to Nagel.
In order to accommodate the problem ofaccidie or listlessness, Dancy rejects a strict entailment
between moral beliefs and motivation and adopts a defeasible motivation theory according to which
moral beliefs are capable ofmotivating in their own right but can be present without motivating (see
Dancy 1993: 24).
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that if someone judges something is morally required they express a beliefwhich
cannot be present without motivating. It is perfectly compatible with content
internalism about justifying reasons that an agent might recognise a moral
requirement and its practical significance and remain unmoved by it. As I said, it is
to ameliorate, if not remove, this possibility that Nagel develops his cognitivist
theory ofmotivation. But there is an immense difference between establishing that
certain beliefs are capable ofmotivating independently of desires and establishing
that certain beliefs necessarily motivate independently of desires. So Dancy's
argument for internalism is not the argument for a cognitivist version ofmoral
judgement internalism that he aimed to provide.
In this section, I have argued that just as theorists discussing internalism often fail to
distinguish between moral content and moral judgements, so they often fail to
distinguish between motivating states and justifying reasons. It is because Nagel
does not distinguish clearly between motivating states and justifying reasons that
Dancy interprets him as propounding some form ofmoral judgement internalism.
However, Nagel in fact advances a form of content internalism about justifying
reasons and not a form ofmoral judgement internalism. It sometimes seems as if
Nagel supports moral judgement internalism because he supplements his content
internalism with a cognitivist account ofmoral motivation. But the cognitivist
account ofmoral motivation does not assert a necessary connection between moral
judgements and motivation. Rather, Nagel asserts the weaker claim that agents can
be, and normally are, motivated by their moral judgements because such judgements
express beliefs with motivational content capable ofmoving them to act
independently ofprior, independent desires.35
Even though I said that Nagel's internalism is primarily about moral content rather
than moral judgements or beliefs, his cognitivist account ofmoral motivation plays a
central role in vindicating his internalism. Nagel is aware that the issues underlying
35 There is some debate about how best to interpret the role of desire in Nagel's theory. InMoral
Reasons (1993), Dancy argues that, on Nagel's view, moral beliefs produce robust desires that help to
explain intentional action. However, in Practical Reality (2000) he adopts the view that Nagel's
desires are only consequentially ascribed to agents insofar as their action is deemed intentional. See
chap. 2.4 (iii) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
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the problem ofmoral motivation are simply deferred if all one does is establish that
moral judgements are judgements about what is practically justified. This is because
there can be internalism and externalism about judgements of practical justification
and motivation as well as about moral judgements. Internalists about practical
judgements assert that if an agent judges that something is practically justified then
she is motivated to act on her judgement.36 Externalists say that an agent must have
a prior, independent desire, such as a desire to do what is practically justified, in
order to be motivated to act on her judgement. Now, Nagel is strictly speaking not
an internalist about practical judgements and motivation because he doesn't hold that
practical judgements entail motivation. However, neither is he an externalist, as he
thinks that practical judgements and beliefs can motivate without the support of
prior, independent desires. Nagel holds a cognitivist theory ofmotivation according
to which practical judgements can, and usually do, motivate agents to do what they
judge to be practically required. And because moral judgements are a form of
practical judgement, they too have the capacity to motivate independently of prior,
independent desires.
Like content intemalism about motivation, Nagel's approach fails to guarantee a
necessary connection between moral judgement and motivation and so fails to satisfy
moral judgement internalism. Importantly, however, unlike content internalism
about motivation Nagel defends the notion ofmotivating moral beliefs and so
provides an alternative to moral judgement externalism. His approach also respects
the Kantian notion of moral requirements as categorical imperatives. However, his
theory doesn't appear to account for the endorsing or commendatory function that
seems integral to the act ofmaking a moral judgement. And we might worry that a
failure to secure a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation
leaves it unexplained why and when agents are motivated by their moral beliefs. We
need a more detailed account of how content internalism about justifying reasons
combines with the cognitive theory ofmotivation to explain the fact that agents are
usually motivated to do what they judge to be morally right.
36 Williams (1980) argues that motivation is internal to justifying reasons.
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5. Action-guiding Content and Motivating States
Internalism in ethics is often defended on the grounds that it is necessary in order to
secure the essential practicality ofmorality. We have seen in this chapter that there
is not one but a range of internalist positions in ethics. These different positions
attempt to capture the various ways in which morality is practical. Two forms of
internalism in particular seem necessary in this respect. The form of internalism
espoused by non-cognitivism, which I have called act internalism, captures the
motivatingforce ofmoral judgements: moral judgements express just those states
that are the sources ofmotivation. Content internalism about justifying reasons, by
contrast, captures the justifying authority of the propositional content ofmoral
judgements. Thus we can divide the claim that morality is essentially practical into
two parts. The first part is that moral requirements are essentially practically
justifying and the second part that moral judgements are essentially motivating. If
morality is essentially practical in these two ways then both ways must be captured
by an adequate theory of moral judgement.
Non-cognitivists often claim that their theory accommodates the practicality of
morality in a way moral cognitivism cannot. Hare, for example, argues that the
function of moral principles is to guide conduct and that his version of non-
cognitivism captures this action-guiding or practical nature ofmorality (1952: 1).
However, while non-cognitivism plausibly accommodates the motivating force of
moral judgements, it is not clear that it can accommodate the justifying authority of
moral requirements. Strictly speaking, non-cognitivism denies that there are facts
about moral requirements and so denies that there is such a thing as moral authority.
Of course, sophisticated versions of non-cognitivism attempt to account for the
realist seeming nature ofmoral discourse.37 So non-cognitivism can account for the
way in which moral requirements seem justifying; but this is hardly the same as
giving an account ofhow moral requirements might actually be practically justifying.
Consequently, non-cognitivists cannot easily claim that their theory accounts for the
action-guiding character ofmorality.
371 am thinking here ofBlackburn's quasi-realism (1984: chap 6).
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When we talk of the action-guiding character ofmorality we are talking both of its
normative or justifying force and the role that this practical normativity plays in our
deliberation about how to act. If the point ofmoral discourse is to guide conduct,
then moral judgements must have action-guiding content: content which tells the
agent that she is practically required or has a justified reason to behave in a certain
way. And ifmoral norms play a genuine role in deliberation about what to do, then it
must be possible that agents are sometimes motivated by the normative content of
their moral judgements. This suggests that only some form of cognitivism can
capture the action-guiding character ofmoral judgements.
In section two, we saw that the standard non-cognitivist argument against
cognitivism fails. This failure suggests that there is no quick way of dismissing the
union of cognitivism and internalism. But some attempts to combine cognitivism
and intemalism fare better than others. The version of cognitivist intemalism that
includes motivation in the truth conditions for moral requirements marries content
internalism about motivation with cognitivism. However, content internalism does
not have the same intuitive appeal as moral judgement internalism and cannot secure
the connection between moral judgements and motivation that moral judgement
internalism asserts. Nagel's version of internalism avoids the counterintuitive nature
of content internalism about motivation by construing internalism as a thesis about
the relation between moral requirements and justifying reasons. But Nagel's position
does not support moral judgement internalism: he acknowledges that there is no strict
entailment relation between moral judgements and motivation. So while there is no
quick argument against cognitivist internalism, it does seem difficult to develop a
form ofmoral cognitivism which accommodates a necessary connection between
moral judgements and motivation.
We need a better understanding ofwhy the notion of necessarily motivating
cognitive states proves so difficult to accommodate. One reason might be that
cognitive states are simply not in the business ofmotivating. It is often said that
cognitive states have a different 'direction of fit' to characteristically motivating
states like desire. Dancy explains:
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Desires are states which are guaranteed to motivate; they cannot exist without motivating.
We can say that they are essentially or necessarily motivating states. Belief, on the other
hand, requires the help of desire if it is to motivate... One way of putting this point would
appeal to the notion of direction of fit. Beliefs are supposed to fit the world; they have the
mind-to-world direction of fit. Desires try to get the world to fit them when it doesn't need
to; they have the world-to-mind direction of fit. Given this picture...desires must be
internally motivating states, since their essence is to try to get the world to fit them. (Dancy
1993:3)
The notion of desires and beliefs having different directions of fit supports the
desire/beliefmodel of action explanation outlined in section one. This is because if
desires and beliefs perform different but complementary tasks, both states will be
needed in order for intentional action to take place. Thus it is often said that for an
agent to be motivated to act there must be some end that an agent wants and a belief
or beliefs about how to achieve that end. I leave a more detailed discussion of the
desire/belief theory until chapter five; however, there are a couple of points it will be
useful to keep in mind. The first point is that discussions of the desire/belief model
rarely distinguish between it as an account of action explanation and as an account of
motivation. These are quite distinct issues and need to be kept apart. For example, it
may be that the desire/beliefmodel provides the correct account of action-
explanation but not the correct account ofwhat motivates the ends towards which
action is directed. A second and related point is that the term 'motivation' is highly
ambiguous. This causes much confusion in the literature on moral motivation. As I
see it, 'motivation' can refer either to the psychological state of being motivated, to
the consideration in light ofwhich an agent is motivated, or to the psychological state
which conveys the consideration in light of which the agent is motivated. The first
of these would typically be called a desire, the second the agent's reason, and the
third a justifying belief, with a reason claim as its content. While we might accept
readily that beliefs cannot be motivating states in the first sense given their direction
of fit, this doesn't seem to prevent them from being motivating in the sense of
conveying the consideration in light ofwhich an agent is motivated to act. In fact, it
seems this task would require a state with the direction-of-fit of a belief. I leave
these difficult issues for the moment with the understanding that they will have to be
addressed at a later point.
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6. Accommodating the Internalist Intuition
In this chapter I have distinguished moral judgement intemalism from a range of
other internalist doctrines in ethics. Specifically, I have argued that moral judgement
internalism should be viewed as a doctrine about the concept of the act ofmaking a
moral judgement. However, at a number of points it has been suggested that even
this formulation is too vague to elucidate sufficiently clearly the range of intuitions
underlying moral judgement intemalism. In this section I want to clarify which
(moral judgement) internalist intuitions I think a theory ofmoral judgement needs to
accommodate and which interpretations of intemalism it would be best to abandon.
In what follows I assume the act internalist interpretation of moral judgement
intemalism. In very general terms this version of intemalism says that moral
judgements are of conceptual necessity tied to motivation. This view is commonly
interpreted as asserting a connection of conceptual necessity between an agent's
judgement that something is morally right and her being motivated to act on that
judgement. We might call this version of intemalism, simple moral judgement
intemalism. Consider Smith's formulation of simple moral judgement intemalism:
If an agent judges that it is right for her to <I> in circumstances C, then she is motivated to O
inC. (Smith 1994: 61)
Smith rejects simple moral judgement intemalism because it fails to account for
cases ofweakness ofwill and mood-based motivational failures. I discuss these
cases in chapter 4.2. I agree with Smith that there do seem to be instances of agents
making genuine moral judgements and failing to be motivated as a result of
psychological disorders of various sorts. This means I also reject simple moral
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judgement intemalism.
It seems clear that as a result of severe depression or despair an agent may have no
desire to do the particular act prescribed by her moral judgement. Suppose John
3g
Given Smith's adherence to the desire/belief thesis, I assume that his statement of internalism is
equivalent to the following formulation: If an agent judges that it is right for her to <t> in circumstances
C, then she desires to 4> in C.
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judges that he morally ought to vote in the national election but due to high levels of
anxiety and depression cannot bring himself to leave the house. It seems odd to say
that he can no longer hold genuine or sincere views about what he morally ought to
do, views he held prior to his depression, simply because of a failure ofmotivation.
The difficulty with such examples is that our intuitions pull us in internalist and
externalist directions: we think that agents can fail to want to do what they genuinely
judge they morally ought to do, but we also think that an agent is not genuine or
sincere in her moral judgement if she is not committed to it in some way that goes
beyond bare cognition or belief. I propose to address this tension by way of the
difference, mentioned at the end of section 1.3, between endorsing the performance
of some act and being motivated to perform or promote the act, where 'being
motivated' is read as desiring to perform or promote the act. I suggest that the most
compelling and plausible version ofmoral judgement internalism asserts a
connection of conceptual necessity between judging that an act is morally right and
endorsing or commending the performance of that act. This gives us the following
formulation:
If an agent judges that it is morally right for her to <1> in circumstances C, then she
commends (endorses, approves) O-ing in C.
Recall that this is the view of internalism espoused by non-cognitivism. Non-
cognitivists argue that moral judgements have an essentially endorsing or
commending function. It is this reading of internalism that I aim to accommodate in
the rest of this work. Unlike simple versions ofnon-cognitivism, I do not think that
to commend some act is necessarily to be motivated to perform the act, in the sense
ofhaving a desire to perform the act. There are cases in which an agent commends
some act as morally right but fails to have any desire to perform the act.
Nonetheless, commending something as right necessarily involves doing something
that goes beyond bare cognition in a way that is essentially connected to the
conative-affective natures of agents (cf. Stevenson 1944: 13).
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I said above that I agree with Smith's rejection of the doctrine that a genuine
judgement ofmoral rightness entails a desire to do the act prescribed by the
judgement. There are a number of reasons to reject this view of internalism. One
reason is that, as stated, it does not easily accommodate the distinction between
sincere and insincere moral judgements, viewed as linguistic acts. As I argue in
chapter 3.5, if an agent makes an insincere moral judgement, she still expresses or
purports to have the psychological state associated with sincere examples of such
judgements. Provided the agent's judgement meets other relevant 'success
conditions' we should count such insincere moral utterances as genuine instances of
39moral judgements. This difficulty is easily met by making internalism a thesis
about sincere moral judgements and motivation:
If an agent judges sincerely that it is right for her to <I) in circumstances C, then she
desires to <t> in C.
However, this version of internalism still fails to accommodate the kinds of failures
ofmotivation that can result from depression and other sorts ofmood disorders. This
difficulty leads Smith to reject this version of internalism as too strong (1994: 61).
While there is a sense in which the entailment claim it makes is too strong, there is
also a sense in which it expresses quite a weak motivational requirement: it does not
require the agent to in any way endorse the act or to be motivated by the judged
rightness of the act. For example, suppose that John believes it is right to give
money to charity but fails to have any desire to do so until someone convinces him
that giving money to charity will make others think better of him. Now John
believes that it is right to give money to charity and desires to give money to charity,
so satisfying the internalist requirement. But the presence of this desire does not
seem appropriately relevant to the genuineness of John's moral stance. It does not
seem to capture the robust sense of endorsement or commendation that 1 have argued
39 This is a point about moral judgements viewed as linguistic or speech acts. In general it is only in
the context ofperforming linguistic acts that an agent can issue insincere judgements, promises,
assertions, commands, etc. In 3.5,1 argue that we should allow insincere speech acts to count as
genuine, albeit defective, examples of linguistic acts. Denying this status to insincere speech acts
would mean, for example, that in the case ofpromises we could not hold someone accountable if they
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is central to the function of moral judgements. While it is true that internalism states
a necessary and not a sufficient condition for genuine moral judgements, if it is not to
be empty as a claim about morality, it must state a motivational condition that is
clearly related to the status of such judgements.
A fundamental weakness, then, with the simple moral judgement intemalism is that it
does not account for the intuitive distinction between merely desiring to perform an
act and endorsing the performance of an act. For example, it would allow an agent to
believe that the morally right thing to do is to stop torturing the dog and to desire to
stop torturing the dog, but not to endorse stopping the torture of the dog. Moral
judgements go beyond belief in involving endorsing atttitudes, but they also go
beyond desire. 1 can have a strong desire and thus be motivated to eat the rest of the
birthday cake without in any way endorsing or commending my eating the rest of the
cake. To desire to perform an act is not, it would seem, the same as commending or
endorsing the performance of the act. An adequate account ofmoral judgements
needs to make sense of this distinction. I address these issues in chapters 4 and 5.
Any plausible account ofmoral judgement internalism must help to elucidate the
nature ofmoral motivation. Consequently, my favoured interpretation of internalism
needs to provide an account of the connection between commendation and
motivation. Early versions of non-cognitivism suggest that to commend, endorse or
approve of some option is simply to desire that option. Ifwe accept the claim that
desire is an internally motivating state, then such versions of non-cognitivism help to
explain how moral judgements motivate. As we have seen, however, such a view
struggles to account for the problem ofmoral motivational failure and the problem of
unendorsed desires. The account ofmoral judgement I propose aims to capture the
sense in which genuine and sincere moral judgements entail an agent's endorsement
of the option that is judged to be right and the sense in which this notion of
endorsement goes beyond bare belief or cognition in linking up with the kinds of
conative states standardly associated with action explanation and motivation.
were insincere, as they would not have made a promise. Similarly, we could not easily speak of
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There is a sense in which the position I develop does support the view that moral
judgements entail motivation. I argue in chapter 4 that in order to make a genuine
and sincere moral judgement an agent must be motivationally or conatively disposed
to be guided by the content of her moral deliberations. Genuine moral judgements
assume a background of affective-conative engagement with normative practice.
There is thus a connnection of conceptual necessity between moral judgements and
the range of conative attitudes that make up the stance of the normatively engaged
agent.40 These attitudes are sometimes termed moral emotions or reactive attitudes
and include resentment, guilt, shame, moral indignation, and moral approval. This
position is clearly distinct from the externalist view that the possession of a relevant
moral belief is sufficient for an agent to make a genuine and sincere moral
judgement. The kind of attitude I associate with moral commitment also secures an
internal connection between moral judgements and conative states. In chapter 4,1
argue that an agent is committed to the requirement expressed by her moral
judgement if she 'normatively expects' herself and all relevant others to be guided by
that requirement. To hold oneself and others to a requirement in this way is to be
disposed to respond to violations of the requirement with negative sanctioning or
reactive attitudes, such as guilt, resentment or moral indignation. This aspect ofmy
account ofmoral judgements also distinguishes it clearly from standard version of
moral judgement externalism.
It is worth keeping in mind that it is not what a position is called but what it amounts
to that is crucial in these debates. If the position I advocate excludes certain
implausible versions of internalism and accommodates some powerful intuitions
behind externalism, or at least assuages some externalist worries about internalism,
then we should see this as a virtue rather than a weakness ofmy position. The debate
between moral judgement internalists and externalists is typical of a tendency in
philosophy for certain very narrow versions of doctrines to acquire a life of their own
in the literature and to become divorced from the general intuitions which first
insincere statements or insincere requests, as such speech acts would either be sincere or not made.
40 The conceptual connection is at one remove, being mediated by the concept of endorsement or
commendation. In chapter 4,1 argue that we should think of the kind of endorsement involved in
moral judgements in terms of the notion of'holding to account' or 'normative expectation.'
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inspired them. One ofmy aims is to capture what I take to be the general and
persistent intuition that genuine moral judgements are necessarily tied to some kind
of conative or practical inclination towards those acts judged favourably and against
those acts judged unfavourably.
The version ofmoral judgement internalism I defend is a strong version on two
accounts: it asserts a non-defeasible connection of conceptual necessity between
moral judgements and endorsement and a non-defeasible connection of conceptual
necessity between moral judgements and background conative-affective dispositions.
There is a strong sense, then, in which endorsing attitudes and conative dispositions
are 'internal' to moral judgements. The full account of this version of internalism
developed in chapters 3 to 5 is more complicated than the simple version of
internalism with which I started this section. In order to understand the need for this
more complex version ofmoral judgement internalism we will need start with the
simple version and work our way back to the more sophisticated version. In chapters
2 and 3,1 assume something like the simple version ofmoral judgement internalism
in order to examine some of the central issues dividing internalists and externalists.
My approach is to establish cognitivist-internalism as a prima facie plausible position
consistent with the desire/belief thesis. This is intended to address standard
objections to cognitivist-internalism that dismiss it out of hand because it does not
accommodate the desire/belief theory of action explanation and motivation.
The application of speech act theory to the problem ofmoral motivation in chapter 3
shows that it is prima facie plausible that moral judgements express both beliefs and
motivating attitudes. Such motivating attitudes can take part in standard desire/belief
accounts of action explanation. However, I argue in chapter 4 that we need a more
developed account of the role and nature of the motivating attitudes involved in
moral judgement and deliberation, for the reasons outlined at the start of this section.
In chapter 5,1 call into question the adequacy of the standard desire/belief model in
dealing with the complex structure ofmoral motivation outlined in chapter 4. In
attempting to accommodate the simple model we come to a better understanding of
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the most plausible way of interpreting the internalist thesis and this leads to a
revision of the simple model.
7. Conclusion
Is it possible to address the central issues raised in this chapter without engaging
fully in the debate between those who think that only desire can motivate and those
who hold a cognitivist theory ofmotivation? Ultimately, I think the answer has to be
no. However, what we can do is move back from the debate about moral psychology
and approach it from a different direction in the hope of understanding it more
clearly. I attempt this in chapters three and four by applying the theory of speech
acts to the problem of moral motivation with the aim ofdeveloping a workable union
of cognitivism and moral judgement internalism. Before doing this, however, we
need to be convinced that the difficult task of combining cognitivism and internalism
is a necessary one. Perhaps the intuitions which appear to suggest internalism can be
accommodated by an externalist account ofmoral judgement, thereby removing the
need to develop the speech act model I propose or a revisionary theory ofmotivation
in place of the desire/beliefmodel. It is to an examination ofmoral judgement
externalism that I now turn.
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2
Externalism and Moral Motivation
1. Introduction: Moral Judgement Externalism
Externalists about moral motivation reject the internalist claim that there is a
connection of conceptual necessity between moral judgements and motivation and
assert the possibility of making genuine moral judgements in the absence of
motivation." They argue that moral motivation is contingent upon an agent's having
an independent desire to perform the acts she judges to be right. Most defenders of
externalism attempt to discredit the claim of internalism to reflect a common
intuition about morality by formulating a counterexample to the internalist thesis.
This usually involves a case where we feel confident in ascribing a moral judgement
to an agent even though she fails to be motivated by it. This possibility is said to be
typified by the character of the amoralist: 'someone who recognises the existence of
moral considerations and remains unmoved' (Brink 1989: 46).
It is commonly held that moral judgement externalism is simply the denial of moral
judgement internalism (e.g. Brink 1989: 42). However, as it has developed in the
literature externalism involves more than this denial. I noted in chapter one that
Nagel rejects both the claim that moral judgements entail motivation and the
desire/beliefmodel ofmotivation favoured by externalists. Nagel is neither a moral
judgement internalist nor a moral judgement externalist, at least in the sense in which
the latter is understood in the literature. Externalists do not merely deny that moral
judgements entail motivation, they deny that moral judgements are capable of
motivating at all in the absence of a prior and independent desire of the relevant kind
(Brink 1989: 42; Railton 1986: 168-170; Svavarsdottir 1999: 170). Nagel, by contrast,
' For example: Boyd 1988; Brink 1989: chap. 3, 1997; Copp 1997; Railton 1986; Svavarsdottir 1999;
Dreier 2000; Shafer-Landau 2000.
2 In general, I will abbreviate 'moral judgement internalism' and 'moral judgment externalism' to
'internalism' and 'externalism' respectively, and will refer to other forms of internalism by their full
titles. Occasionally, 'internalism' and 'externalism' will refer to a more general orientation towards
one side or the other which may encompass a number of different internalist or externalist theses in
ethics. This use will be made clear by the context in which it occurs.
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argues that, while moral judgements do not entail motivation, such judgements are
capable ofmotivating without the presence of a prior and independent desire.
Externalism is thus best understood as an attempt to combine cognitivism with the
desire/belief model ofmotivation. It does this, and provides its solution to the
problem of moral motivation, by rejecting moral judgement internalism. This allows
externalists to accept that no fact or cognitive state is capable by itself of entailing (or
producing) motivation without thereby accepting that this in any way impugns the
cognitive nature ofmoral judgements.
Much of the externalist resistance to internalism derives from the threat internalism
is thought to pose to cognitivism, and by extension to naturalism and realism in
ethics (e.g., Brink 1989: 37; Shafer-Landau 2000: 270). Externalists generally accept
the validity of the non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument and so reject the
internalist premise in that argument to defend cognitivism (Brink 1989: 44-45;
Svavarsdottir 1999: .168-169). In chapter one, I argued that the anti-cognitivist
argument is invalid and that internalism does not pose the kind of threat to
cognitivism this argument suggests. The aspects ofmorality externalists seem most
concerned to accommodate can be made consistent with what I have termed act
internalism. For example, in addition to the threat posed by non-cognitivism,
externalists worry that a connection of conceptual necessity between moral
judgements and motivation might threaten the categoricy ofmoral demands by
supporting some form of subjectivism, or what I have called content internalism
about motivation (cf. Brink 1989: 45; Railton 1986: 166-171). This would occur if the
truth ofmoral claims were dependent on the desires of those who made them.
However, because act internalism is a thesis about the act ofmaking moral
judgements and not about the content ofmoral judgements it in no way threatens the
independence ofmoral truth from contingent desires, and thus in no way threatens
the categoricy ofmoral demands.
Much ofwhat externalists want to capture about morality can be accommodated
within the framework of some form of act internalism. This is fortunate, because
externalism fails to account for the commendatory aspect ofmoral judgements and,
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more generally, the interested or participatory relation between agents and their
moral deliberations. I detail these criticisms of extemalism in section five below.
Section two begins with an outline of the two standard externalist models ofmoral
motivation. One of these explains moral motivation in terms of desires with non-
moral content, and the other explains such motivation in terms of desires with moral
content. I argue that the non-moral content model fails to account for the way in
which motivation tracks moral judgements.
In section three I discuss the externalist argument from amoralism. The amoralist is
a figure who is said to make genuine moral judgements yet remain unmoved.
Externalists argue that the possibility of such a figure undermines intemalism's
conceptual claim. I stress the importance of distinguishing between amoralism as a
thesis about motivation and amoralism as a thesis about justification. In addition, I
argue that it is crucial to identify the precise concept involved in the internalist's
conceptual claim. Section four involves a lengthy discussion of one of the central
debates in the literature on moral motivation, between Michael Smith and David
Brink. Smith presents a range ofobjections to externalism and to the amoralist
argument.3 One of his central claims is that externalism cannot account for the
reliable connection between moral judgements and motivation without invoking a
model ofmotivation that gives a false account of the motivational psychology of
virtuous agents. I argue against Smith that his objection threatens to make genuine
moral motivation impossible, and, moreover, that it applies equally to his own model
ofmoral motivation.
As already mentioned, section five raises a number of objections against externalism.
I argue that externalism provides an unconvincing explanation of the practical or
action-guiding aspect ofmoral judgements because it fails to account for the
participatory nature ofmoral deliberation. Focussing on the point or function of
moral deliberation enables us to see why someone outside morality, such as the
amoralist, is unable to make genuine moral judgements. I conclude that we have
3 See Smith 1994: esp. chap. 3, and 1997.
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reason to prefer some form of act internalism to either externalism or to the kind of
content internalism espoused by Smith.
2. Externalist Models of Moral Motivation
There are two main models of externalist moral motivation: one explains moral
motivation in terms of a desire or desires with non-moral content, and the other
appeals to a desire with specifically moral content to explain such motivation. Both
varieties are externalist, holding that the motivating desires in question are only
contingently and non-conceptually related to agents' moral judgements. I argue in
this section that the non-moral content model fails to explain effectively how
motivation tracks moral judgements.
Brink advances a version of the non-moral content model ofmoral motivation. He
argues that the connection between moral judgements and motivation is dependent
both on the content of the moral views to which an agent subscribes and to the
content of the desires the agent happens to have:
[E]xternalism can base [moral] motivation on "deep" or widely shared psychological facts.
Let's think about common moral views that recognise the other-regarding character of many
moral demands. If, for example, sympathy is, as Hume held, a deeply seated and widely
shared psychological trait, then, as a matter of contingent...psychological fact, the vast
majority of people will have at least some desire to comply with what they perceive to be
their moral obligations, even with those other-regarding moral obligations. (Brink 1989: 49)4
The problem with this model is that it fails to explain the way in which motivation
reliably tracks moral judgements, and this is something that must be accounted for by
any adequate theory ofmoral judgement (cf. Smith 1994: 71). Given the complex
nature ofmoral requirements, it is unlikely that merely having sympathy towards
others will account for the way in which changes in motivation track changes in
moral judgement. For example, suppose that John believes it is morally wrong to
4
Boyd (1988 : 215) defends an externalist account of the role of sympathy. He argues that it is
possible that sympathy plays a cognitive as well as a motivational role by giving agents the capacity to
recognize human goods and harms to which they might otherwise be insensitive.
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hold asylum seekers in detention centres, and that he is motivated to break the law to
help those held in detention out of a deep concern for their well-being. John is a kind
person with sympathy and concern for the suffering of others. However, after
numerous long conversations with a friend who works for the government, John
comes to believe that the policy of enforced detention of asylum seekers is morally
right. Let's say that the arguments which persuade him are highly abstract and don't
invoke his sympathy in any way. Nevertheless, we would expect John's motivations
to track his moral judgement and for him to be motivated to stop undermining the
system of enforced detention. John still feels concern for the well-being of the
detainees, but now believes that he is morally obliged to distance himself from their
plight. If John's motivations do change to reflect his changed moral belief, we can
no longer appeal to his sympathetic nature to explain why he is motivated to do what
he believes is right. Something else will need to be appealed to explain his new
motivation.
Shafer-Landau suggests that the externalist need not be restricted to one kind of
desire to explain the reliability ofmoral motivation (2000). He argues that the
externalist can appeal to a range of non-moral desires to explain why someone is
motivated by her moral judgements. Judgements ofmoral obligation generally will
require an agent either to perform an act that furthers her own interests or the
interests of others. If the required act furthers the agent's own interests we can
appeal to the agent's 'standing self-concern' to explain why she is motivated to
perform it. If the required act conflicts with an agent's self-interest, we can appeal to
a range of other-regarding desires - to be kind, to avoid harming others, and so on -
'to explain why our motivations track our moral judgements'(Shafer-Landau 2000:
285.).
The difficulty with Shafer-Landau's suggestion is that, contrary to his last statement,
it provides no convincing explanation of how motivations tracer moral judgements.
On Shafer-Landau's model, if I judge, for example, that I am morally required to
take my library books back on time, we can explain why I do so by appealing to my
self-interested desire not to be fined. But suppose that the library makes me exempt
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from fines because of some kind of administrative mistake, so that I can now bring
books back late with impunity. Why expect that I will still be motivated to take the
books back? According to Shafer-Landau, it is likely that I will have other-regarding
desires that will be able to explain why I continue to take my books back - that can
take over from my self-interested desires. Perhaps I decide that I don't want to
deprive others of the books. But notice that the fact that I think that taking the
library books back is morally right is irrelevant to my decision making. To see this
we simply have to imagine what happens if I decide that I have no moral obligation
to take my library books back. If I don't want to be fined, then I will still desire to
take the books back on time, and I would desire to take the books back on time even
if exempted from fines, if I had a desire not to deprive others of books. So my
motivations do not track my moral judgements; they track my interests, which may
ormay not coincide with the acts I judge to be right. I take the inability of non-moral
content versions of externalism to explain the way in which motivation tracks moral
judgements to undermine such approaches.
Externalists can avoid such difficulties and explain the way in which motivation
tracks moral judgements by invoking a desire with specifically moral content, such
as the desire to do the right thing, or the desire to be moral (e.g., Svavarsdottir 1999:
170; cf. Shafer-Landau: 286). Suppose that John has a standing desire to do what is
morally right. If he judges that it is morally right to break the law to help asylum
seekers, then we would expect him to be motivated to do so. And we would have
this expectation regardless ofwhether he normally shows a great deal of sympathy
towards others. When John's moral belief changes after talking to his friend, and he
comes to believe that he is morally required to desist from helping the asylum
seekers, we will, given his standing desire, expect him to be motivated to stop
helping the detainees. So the moral content version of externalism provides a simple
explanation ofwhy motivation reliably tracks moral judgements while upholding the
view that the connection between moral judgements and motivation is an entirely
contingent matter. In section four, I discuss Smith's fetishism objection to this kind
of externalism. He argues that while moral content versions of externalism can
explain the tracking condition on moral motivation, in doing so they give a false
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account of the motivational psychology of virtuous people. I now turn to one of the
central arguments advanced in favour of externalism.
3. The Externalist Argument from Amoralism
I said above that externalists often attempt to discredit internalism by formulating a
case where we feel confident in ascribing a moral judgement to an agent even though
she fails to be motivated by it.5 This is the approach adopted by Brink in his defence
ofmoral judgement externalism. He argues that intemalism is implausible because it
makes this kind of failure ofmotivation conceptually impossible:
[IJnternalism, so construed, seems just false to both actual and possible psychological facts.
Although indifference to what is regarded as moral considerations may be fairly rare, it does
seem to exist. Some people (e.g., certain sociopaths) do not care about what they regard as
moral consideration...The internalist about motives [moral judgement internalist] claims it is
a conceptual truth about morality that moral judgement or belief motivates. According to the
internalist, then, it must be conceptually impossible for someone to recognise a moral
consideration or assert a moral judgement and remain unmoved. This fact raises a problem
for intemalism; intemalism makes the amoralist conceptually impossible. (Brink 1989: 46)
Brink's definition of the amoralist as someone who is unmoved by her moral
judgements is largely stipulative, although it seems reasonably close to the standard
definition of an amoralist as someone who is unconcerned whether something is right
or wrong.6 The definition appears to cover the group outlined by Michael Stocker,
who fail to be motivated by their moral judgements as a result of depression, fatigue
or weakness ofwill (1979). Stocker argues that the mood, interest, and energy of an
agent can have profound effects on her ability to be motivated by her evaluative
judgements. He holds that the mediating role played by these moods and interests
confutes the claim that what is judged good must necessarily attract. The idea is that
when we suffer from depressions, tiredness, resentment, despair, and the like, we
often fail to be motivated to do what we genuinely judge to be good. Brink tends to
concentrate on more extreme examples of amoralism, such as the sociopath:
5 Svavarsdottir's (1999) example of'Patrick' takes this form, as do a number of examples in Shafer-
Landau (2000: 272-274).
6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Tenth edition) gives the following definition for 'amoral': "lacking
a moral sense; unconcerned whether something is right or wrong."
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individuals with a general disregard or contempt for morality. It is not immediately
clear why Brink opts to defend the possibility of such an extreme figure when all that
is required to undermine internalism is the conceptual possibility that an agent is on
one occasion too depressed to be moved by something she genuinely takes herself to
be morally required to do.
One reason I think Brink focuses on extreme examples of amoralism is that much of
his discussion is directed against content internalism about justifying reasons rather
than merely against moral judgement internalism. In order to undermine the former
kind of internalism Brink introduces the notion of 'amoralist scepticism'. This
involves someone who 'accepts the existence ofmoral facts and concedes that we
have moral knowledge, and asks why we should care about these facts' (1989: 46).7
Brink views the amoralist sceptic as someone who questions the justification or
rationality ofmoral demands (Brink 1989: 48). Stocker's depressed agent is not
someone who necessarily calls into question the justification ofmoral demands. She
may readily grant that she has a, perhaps overriding, justifying reason to conform to
the moral demand in question, but she simply lacks the energy to be moved to do so.
Such an agent is not sceptical about the justification or authority of moral demands
and is thus perfectly consistent with content internalism about justifying reasons.
Brink wants to deny both content internalism about justifying reasons and moral
judgement internalism and suggests we should accept the possibility of motivational
failures not linked to issues ofjustification, what he calls 'unprincipled amoralism',
and amoralist scepticism.8 But the possibility of amoralist scepticism doesn't by
itself undermine moral judgement internalism: it might be conceptually necessary
that in making a moral judgement an agent is motivated to conform to it, yet still
possible for the agent to question whether such motivation is justified (cf. Brink
1989: 48). So amoralist scepticism is neither sufficient nor necessary to undermine
7 Part of the difficulty here is that the notion of being 'unconcerned' about moral considerations is
ambiguous. I might not care about something because I see no reason to care, or I might not care
about something because I simply don't have the energy to care, even though I believe I have reason
to do so.
8 Brink means by the unprincipled amoralist someone who fails to be motivated but does not question
the rational justification of her moral judgement.
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moral judgement internalism. It is important that we keep the issue ofwhether moral
judgements are conceptually tied to justifying reasons separate from the issue of
whether moral judgements arc conceptually tied to motivation. The former issue is
only really plausible as a thesis about the content ofmoral judgements, whereas the
latter issue can be interpreted as a thesis about the act ofmaking a moral judgement
as well as about the content ofmoral judgements.9
A standard way for the internalist to respond to purported examples ofmotivational
failure is to argue that while it may appear that the unmoved agent is making a moral
judgement she is in fact doing no such thing (Hare 1952: 124; Smith 1994: 67; cf.
Brink 1989: 46). The most well known argument along these lines is Hare's inverted
commas argument. According to Hare, what distinguishes moral judgements form
purely descriptive judgements is their commendatory function. In so far as a
judgement that something is right or good is a genuine evaluative judgement it must
express the agent's motivation to do or promote the favoured option. Brink's
amoralist while giving the impression ofmaking an evaluative judgement is doing no
such thing because she fails to commend or be motivated by the option she judges
right. At most she is describing what other people take to be good or right as 'good'
or 'right' (Hare 1952: 124). Hare calls this the inverted commas use of evaluative
terms. It occurs when we allude to the evaluations of others without commending
those evaluations.
Brink argues that the inverted commas response fails to take the amoralist challenge
seriously enough (1989: 47). He says that we cannot simply dismiss the possibility
of someone who claims to believe that an action is right but who fails to be moved by
her judgement, as such a person is a familiar character historically in discussions of
such matters.10 Svavarsdottir gives a more detailed example of such an agent. She
suggests that we should think about the example in terms of which hypotheses might
plausibly explain the observable behaviour described:
9
Although I argued in chap 1 that we should interpret moral judgement internalism as a thesis about
judgement acts rather than judgements contents, the latter is at least prima facie plausible, particularly
ifwe focus on the notion of a conceptual connection rather than that of a necessary connection. By
contrast, it is difficult to see how the issue ofjustifying reasons could fit the judgement act model.
10 Brink mentions Plato's Thrasymachus and Hobbes's Fool as examples of amoralists (1989: 47).
52
Virginia has put her social position at risk to help a politically persecuted stranger because
she thinks that it is the right thing to do. Later she meets Patrick, who could, without any
apparent risk to himself, similarly help a politically persecuted stranger, but who has made
no attempt to do so. Our morally committed heroine confronts Patrick, appealing first to his
compassion for the victims. Patrick rather wearily tells her that he has no inclination to
concern himself with the plight of strangers. Virginia then appeals to explicit moral
considerations: in this case, helping strangers is his obligation and a matter of fighting
enormous injustice. Patrick readily declares that he agrees with her moral assessment, but
nevertheless cannot be bothered to help...Later he shows absolutely no sign of regret for
either his remarks or his failure to help. (Svavarsdottir 1999: 176-177)
Svavarsdottir argues that the burden of argument is on those who want to restrict the
range of hypotheses in the running as explanations of such examples. She contends
that this is precisely what internalism as an a priori constraint on accounts ofmoral
judgement does and that, therefore, the burden is on internalism to justify such a
restriction (Svavarsdottir 2001: 181).
The committed internalist will generally insist that externalist interpretations of such
examples are question-begging. As we will see in section four, this is precisely
Smith's response to Brink's argument (1994: 68-71). Svavarsdottir appears to
avoid this charge as she advances externalism merely as one possible explanation of
Patrick's behaviour. She does take externalism to be the most plausible explanation
of his behaviour but says she is more interested in the notion that it cannot be readily
ruled out as false or defective (Svavarsdottir 1999: 179). Nonetheless, she does
assume that in order for Patrick to be sincere in making his moral judgement he only
needs to believe the relevant moral proposition. What is interesting about Patrick is
that he never gives moral considerations as reasons for his actions, and he engages in
what he admits is morally wrong behaviour without displaying signs of hesitation,
regret, guilt or shame (Svavarsdottir 2001: 178). Patrick does not aspire to live by
moral standards and tends to feel regret and shame when he fails in relation to things
he finds important rather than in relation to moral considerations (Svavarsdottir
2001: 178).
While we may agree with Svavarsdottir that it is plausible to ascribe moral beliefs to
Patrick, it is not clear why we should accept that the possession of such a belief in
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the absence of any connection to moral emotions, any connection to a practical
function, and any acceptance of even minimal normative authority should count as a
fully-fledged moral judgement. Svavarsdottir touches on this point when she notes
that it 'seems reasonable to operate with the assumption that an individual who
bothers to make moral judgements is morally committed to some degree' (2001:
185). She then concedes that motivation falls out of the concept of commitment.
The issue then becomes whether our standard concept of a sincere moral judgement
includes some notion of commitment.11 We are back with a conceptual claim; but
one that cannot be decided merely by noting that it is plausible that Patrick possesses
a moral belief. 12
At least one theorist has described the debate between internalists and externalists as
'at a standoff of a sort that is 'depressing' in philosophy (Dreier 2000: 620). I think
this is not an uncommon response to a debate in which both sides take their intuitions
as bedrock, without, perhaps, exploring the possible sources of their disagreement.
At the centre of this disagreement, as we have seen, is a conceptual thesis. It states
that the necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation posited by
the internalist derives from the concept ofmoral judgement: it is part ofwhat we
mean when we say that someone has made a moral judgement that she is motivated
to act in accordance with it. It is because internalism is advanced as a conceptual
thesis that arguments for and against it rely heavily on appeals to intuition about
examples in which an agent claims something to be morally right or wrong.
Given that the internalist's conceptual thesis deals with the issue of whether a
specific concept has a motivational component as part of its meaning it would seem
'' In chapters 3-5,1 argue that if an agent makes a sincere moral judgement then she commits herself
to being guided by the requirement expressed by the judgement.
12 David Copp argues that there is a complex state ofmoral conviction that entails motivation but that
motivation is external to moral belief (1995: 205-206). In this 1995 article Copp defends a form of
moral judgement externalism and, like Svavarsdottir , seems to think that this position is vindicated by
externalism about moral belief and motivation. In chapter 4, I discuss a more recent article by Copp
which is more sympathetic to moral judgement internalism.
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to be crucial to determine from the outset the precise concept involved. There seem
to be two main candidates for the item that moral judgement internalism states is
necessarily tied to motivation. One candidate is the concept ofmaking a moral
judgement and the other the concept of the content ofmoral judgement. This is the
distinction between judgement act and judgement content outlined in chapter one. I
gave a range of reasons there for interpreting moral judgement internalism as a thesis
about judgements acts rather than judgement contents.13 However, in contemporary
discussions this distinction is not commonly noted.14 This means that it is often not
clear what the precise concept is about which internalists and externalists disagree.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that internalism as a doctrine about moral
judgements and motivation and intemalism as a doctrine about moral judgements and
justifying reasons are often not kept apart, the intuitions that support the latter often
being used to support the former (e.g., Smith 1994: 6).
In the next section, I look at how these issues play out in one of the central debates in
the literature on moral motivation in an attempt to come to a better understanding of
the precise nature of the disagreement between internalists and externalists. It will
become clear that act internalism and content internalism have very different
implications for the explanatory adequacy of internalist theories of moral motivation
and thus different levels of success in responding to the challenge of externalism.
4. Smith's Anti-Externalism
i) The analogy with colour judgements
Smith has reservations about Hare's inverted commas argument because he thinks it
unlikely that those who fail to be motivated by their moral judgements necessarily
describe what other people take to be right and wrong. However, he thinks Hare's
approach is substantially correct: 'The point is not that amoralists really make
judgements.. .about what other people judge to be right and wrong.. .The point is
13
For example, act internalism is platitudinous but content internalism is not, content internalism
threatens the categoricy ofmoral demands, and act internalism but not content internalism captures
the commendatory function ofmoral judgements.
14 Svavarsdottir mentions the distinction briefly: 'On [one] view, motivational internalism [moral
judgement internalism] falls out of the concept of a moral judgement rather than out of the concepts
employed in moral judgements' (1999: 182).
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rather that the very best we can say about amoralists is that they try to make moral
judgements but fair (Smith 1994: 68). Smith attempts to show why this claim is not
cad hoc' by developing an analogy with colour judgements. It is not clear how the
colour analogy is meant to support the inverted commas interpretation of the
amoralist argument. Its main point seems to be to show that Brink's use of the
example of amoralism to support externalism is question begging (Smith 1994: 70).
Smith argues that it seems intuitively plausible that the possession of colour concepts
and mastery of colour terms depends on an agent's having the appropriate visual
experiences. Smith gives the example of a congenitally blind person who is able to
engage reliably in colour ascription through non-visual awareness of surface
reflectance properties, and who is thus able to use colour terms reliably. The thought
is that we would be reluctant to say of this person that they were making genuine
colour judgements, though we might say that they were making 'colour judgements'.
The blind person who reliably uses colour terms is meant to be analogous to the
amoralist. The amoralist, Smith concedes, may be able to use moral terms reliably to
refer to the same descriptive properties referred to by people making genuine moral
claims; but just as the blind person fails to make genuine colour judgements because
she fails to have full mastery of colour terms, so the amoralist fails to make genuine
moral judgements because she fails to have full mastery ofmoral terms:
[Internalists say] that a subject has mastery of colour terms (moral terms), and thus really
makes colour judgements (moral judgements), only if, under certain conditions, being in the
psychological state that we express when we make colour judgements (moral judgements)
entails having an appropriate visual experience (motivation). (Smith 1994: 70)
Smith charges the externalist with question begging: in advancing the amoralist as a
counterexample to internalism, the externalist merely assumes that mastery of moral
terms does not include being motivated (1994: 70).
Before addressing Smith's use of the colour analogy, I want to comment on his
debate with Brink and how it relates to his use ofHare's inverted commas argument.
The debate between Brink and Smith about the possibility of amoralism is a central
and influential debate in the literature on moral motivation and internalism.
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However, assessing the debate is made difficult because Brink and Smith actually
work with quite different accounts of the connection between moral judgements and
motivation. Smith's 'practicality requirement' states that if an agent judges that
something is morally right, then either she is motivated to do it or she is practically
irrational (1994: 61). By contrast, Brink's version of internalism states that moral
judgements entail motivation (1997: 7-8). Smith adopts his formulation because he
accepts the argument that agents can fail to be motivated by their moral judgements
when sufficiently depressed, tired, or weak-willed. But this means that on Smith's
model it is perfectly possible to make a sincere and genuine moral judgement without
being at all motivated to act on it; and this is the denial of what I have called moral
judgement internalism. So Smith and Brink are in agreement about the possibility of
unprincipled amoralism.
It is easy to forget that Smith and Brink both accept unprincipled amoralism as they
take up opposing sides with regard to the traditional debate between non-cognitivist
internalism and externalism. Strictly speaking, Smith should side with Brink against
Hare: On Smith's theory it is possible to make a genuine moral judgement without
commending, prescribing, or expressing a motivating state of any kind. Smith
accepts the denial of moral judgement internalism. Difficulties arise because Smith
presents his practicality requirement as a weaker version ofmoral judgement
internalism, and this characterisation is generally accepted by his opponents.15 But it
is central to Smith's conceptual claim about motivation that internalism involves the
content ofmoral judgements (cf. Copp 1997: 37). This is why Smith says that
someone who fails to be motivated by her moral claim does not have mastery of the
relevant moral terms (1994: 70). Smith's developed theory is an attempt to secure a
conceptual connection between moral judgements and motivation by providing a
substantial theory of the content of such judgements.16
15 For example, Svavarsdottir accepts the weaker thesis, although she thinks we should not
characterise such failures ofmotivation in terms of failures of rationality, but in terms ofmotivational
disorders more generally (1999: 164). However, she still seems to regard Smith's practicality
requirement as a 'close relative' ofmoral judgement internalism.
16
He defends 'rationalism' or what I have termed content internalism about justifying reasons (Smith
1994: 85-91). This is the view that it is part of the concept of a moral requirement that such
requirements provide justifying reasons for action. Smith combines this with an account ofwhat it is
to have a justifying reason for action: an agent has a justifying reason to perform an act if her fully
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In chapter one I argued that any theory which attempts to secure the connection
between moral judgement and motivation at the level of content is a version of
content intemalism rather than moral judgement internalism. And this is precisely
what Smith does with the practicality requirement. But this means that the difference
between the practicality requirement and non-cognitivist versions ofmoral
judgement internalism, or what I have termed act internalism, is a difference in kind
rather than degree: the former is about judgement contents and the latter about
judgement acts.17 This is particularly confusing in relation to Smith's debate with
Brink because it is clear that Brink views moral judgment intemalism as distinct
from content intemalism about motivation (1989: 40-42).18
If it is true that making a genuine colour judgement entails having the appropriate
visual experience then Smith's analogy fails. This is because, as we have seen,
Smith denies that moral judgements entail motivation. To be structurally analogous,
colour judgements would have to be connected defeasibly to the appropriate visual
experience; that is, it would have to be possible to make genuine colour judgements
without having the appropriate visual experience. Furthermore, this condition on
colour judgements would need to derive from the content of those judgements. One
way this might work is if he adopted a response-dependent account of colour
rational self would desire her to perform the act (1994: chap 5). On this account, if an agent judges
that she is morally required to perform a certain act, then she judges that if fully rational she would
desire herself to perform the act. Consequently, if the agent fails to be motivated to perform the act,
she is, says Smith, practically irrational (1994: 62, 148).
17 The issue is further complicated by the fact that the practicality requirement is only a version of
content internalism about motivation because Smith's theory of justifying reasons means that
motivation is included in the content of reason judgements (see note 13). A content externalist about
reason judgements and motivation who accepts the practicality requirement will deny that moral
judgements (as reason judgements) have an internal connection to motivation. Consequently, the
practicality requirement is consistent with a thorough-going externalism about moral judgements and
motivation. That is, the practicality requirement is not, as it stands, necessarily a version of
internalism about motivation at all, weak or strong.
18 Brink's 'appraiser internalism' about motivation is equivalent to what I call moral judgment
internalism and his 'agent intemalism' about motivation is equivalent to my content intemalism about
motivation (1989: 40). Brink argues, as I did in chap 1, that content intemalism about motivation is
far less intuitively plausible than moral judgement intemalism (1989: 41, 45). This is because it
makes moral requirements dependent on whether or not agents happen to desire to conform to them;
and this goes against the widely held view that moral requirements are categorical, in the sense that
they apply to agents independently of their contingent desires. It is therefore highly implausible that
the internalist intuition is about this kind of content intemalism.
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concepts.19 For example, for something to be red might be for it to look red to
standard perceivers under normal conditions. But if this were the case then it should
be possible for the blind person to make colour judgements, as long as part of what
she judged was that the object in question would look red to standard perceivers
under normal conditions. Now, we might worry that a congenitally blind person
would not be able to form a concept of what it is for an object to look coloured.
Even ifwe grant this, however, it still leaves room for those who become blind or
who are temporarily blind to make genuine colour judgements (cf. Brink 1997: 24).
Ifwe adopt the response-dependent model of colour concepts, we should accept the
possibility of someone who is blind - if only temporarily or not congenitally -
making genuine colour judgements. This is supported by the fact that there seem to
be numerous everyday examples of people making colour judgements without
having at the time ofmaking the judgement the appropriate visual experience. If I
tell you that the walls in my bathroom are green, I don't need to be looking at my
walls for this to count as a genuine colour judgement. Of course, the judgement is
parasitic on my having had the appropriate visual experience, or at least normally
would be parasitic. But imagine that my partner renovates the bathroom while I am
overseas and rings me up to tell me that she has painted the bathroom green. Later in
the day I tell you about the renovations and mention that the bathroom walls are
green. Now, when I make this judgement I am not having, and have not had, the
visual experience of seeing the colour ofmy bathroom walls, yet it is typical, surely,
of genuine colour judgements that people make everyday. Adopting the response-
dependent account of colour concepts is one way ofmaking the colour judgement
example structurally analogous to Smith's account ofmoral judgements. But it
involves a particular account of the content of colour judgements, just as Smith's
practicality requirement involves a particular account of the content ofmoral
judgements. It is not by itself an argument for that account of the content of colour
judgements, and has no direct bearing on the adequacy of Smith's account of the
content ofmoral judgements.
19 For a discussion of this idea in relation to response dependent accounts of value see McDowell
1985 and Wright 1988.
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Although Smith claims that the amoralist argument is question-begging, it is not
clear that the externalist move is as crude as he suggests. The amoralist example is
meant to be compelling intuitively regardless of one's prior convictions about the
relationship between moral judgement and motivation (cf. Brink 1997: 22-23). The
externalist holds that if the force of this intuition is greater than that of the internalist
intuition, we have good reason to reject internalism about moral judgement. The
problem is not that the amoralist move is question-begging per se, but that there
seem to be few theoretically neutral intuitions we can rely on to interpret putative
examples of amoralism.20 This merely reinforces the importance ofbeing clear about
the particular conceptual connection at issue. What Smith's colour judgement
analogy does make clear is that he views internalism as a thesis about the content of
moral judgements. Importantly, Smith does recognise that such examples are
inconclusive and the need to move beyond them. This leads him to advance an
independent positive argument against externalism.
ii) The Reliability Thesis
Smith's positive argument against externalism begins with the observation that
changes in motivation reliably track changes in moral judgement:21
By all accounts, it is a striking fact about moral motivation that a change in motivation
follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgement, at least in the good and strong-
willed person. A plausible theory of moral judgement must therefore explain this striking
fact. As I see it, those who accept the practicality requirement can, whereas strong
externalists cannot, explain this striking fact in a plausible way. (Smith 1994: 71)
He uses an example of a change in moral motivation to elucidate his charge against
externalism. Suppose that I am engaged in a political debate with someone prior to
an election. I have always voted for the libertarians but my interlocutor persuades
me that the values that the libertarians promote, and which I have always adhered to,
are fundamentally mistaken. They convince me to alter my moral beliefs and to vote
for the social democratic party. This change in moral beliefs is followed reliably by
a change in motivation such that I am now motivated to vote for the social
20 For example, see my discussion of Svavarsdottir's 'Patrick' example above.
21 I will refer to this claim as the 'reliability thesis'.
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democratic party. Smith thinks that there are only two options which adequately
explain this reliable connection:
On the one hand we can say that the reliable connection between judgement and motivation
is to be explained internally: it follows directly from the content of moral judgement
itself...Or, on the other hand, we can say that the reliable connection between judgement and
motivation is to be explained externally: it follows from the content of the motivational
dispositions possessed by the good and strong-willed person. (Smith 1994: 72)
Prima facie it seems that the externalist has a straightforward and unmysterious
explanation of the reliability ofmoral motivation in the 'good and strong-willed
person'. The good person is plausibly someone who has a standing desire to do what
she takes herself to be morally required to do. And the strong-willed person is
someone in whom this desire is reliably effective in motivating her to do what she
judges she is required to do. So the externalist model conforms easily to the
desire/belief account ofmotivation. In the above example, my motivation changes
from the libertarians to the social democrats because I change my belief about which
party advances morally correct policies. Given that I have a standing desire to do
what is morally required, I now believe that this desire will be satisfied by my voting
for the social democrats rather than the libertarians. And given that I am strong-
willed, I will now be motivated to vote in the way I judge will satisfy my standing
desire to do what is morally required. Structurally, this explanation ofmotivational
change is the same as the basic desire/beliefmodel's explanation of how changes in
instrumental beliefs lead to changes in motivation.
According to Smith there are a number of disturbing implications that follow from
the externalist explanation of the reliability ofmoral motivation. He argues that if
moral agents were motivated in the way suggested by externalists, then such
motivation would be akin to a fetish or moral vice rather than a moral virtue (Smith
1994: 71-76). The fetishism argument is meant both to undermine externalism and
to vindicate the practicality requirement. However, even if the argument against
extemalism is successful, it is not clear that it directly supports the practicality
requirement rather than some other account of the reliability thesis. Smith seems
convinced that externalism and the practicality requirement are the only two options
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capable of explaining the reliability ofmoral motivation (1994: 72, 76). But we need
not accept this claim. The reliability might be explained by something other than the
content ofmoral judgement, as given by the practicality requirement, or the content
of an external desire. Specifically, it might be explained in relation to the conditions
governing the performance or act ofmaking a moral judgement. In fact, non-
cognitivist internalism, as a type of act internalism, already provides us with an
alternative to Smith's choice.
The central claim of Smith's argument is that internalism provides a significantly
more plausible explanation of the reliability of moral motivation than does
externalism. But some internalist explanations of the reliability thesis are more
compelling than others. Smith notes that internalist explanations can be either
cognitivist or non-cognitivist (1994: 72). On the cognitivist alternative, an agent's
moral motivation derives from her belief that something is good or right: the belief
somehow brings about the appropriate motivation. On the non-cognitivist
alternative, moral judgements express desires or some other kind of pro-attitude
rather than beliefs and so are essentially motivating. Obviously, choosing the
cognitivist rather than the non-cognitivist version of internalism, or vice versa, will
have implications for the kind of explanation the practicality requirement provides
for the posited connection between moral judgement and motivation.
Smith seems to think that the non-cognitivist alternative is an example of the
reliability ofmoral motivation being explained by the content ofmoral judgement
and that its success vindicates the practicality requirement (1994: 72). But non-
cognitivism tells us that having the appropriate motivation is constitutive of the act
ofmaking a moral judgement: expressing a pro-attitude or commending is part of
what we are doing when we make a moral judgement; it is not part of the content of
the moral judgement. I think that non-cognitivism, as a form of act internalism, can
claim to provide aprima facie plausible account of moral motivation. Much of the
appeal of the non-cognitivist version of internalism lies in its ability to explain a
variety of the features common to ordinary moral practice by appealing to the widely
accepted desire/belief model of action explanation. But non-cognitivism does not
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support the practicality requirement. If an agent fails to endorse or commend an
option she judges right and thus fails to be motivated to do it, non-cognitivism tells
us that she has not made a genuine moral judgement, not that she is practically
irrational.
The point to stress is that we can only assess the explanatory adequacy of specific
examples of internalism. It is not enough to say that an explanation of the reliability
ofmoral motivation follows as a 'direct consequence' of the truth of internalism or
the practicality requirement (Smith 1994: 72). When Smith criticises externalism, he
criticises a specific account of how moral judgements motivate. Internalism offers
no real explanation if all it offers is a statement of the internalist thesis without an
account of how on such a model moral motivation actually works. If, as I believe,
act internalism provides a distinct alternative to Smith's version of internalism, then
the argument based on the reliability thesis fails to vindicate the practicality
requirement and fails to deal with a significant rival.
iii) Smith's Model of Moral Motivation
How exactly on Smith's 'rationalist' model do moral judgements motivate? He
argues that they motivate by virtue of their content, so that 'the belief that an act is
right produces a corresponding motivation' (Smith 1994: 72). Smith's account of
moral motivation is initially surprising given his adherence to the desire/belief or
'Humean' model ofmotivation, as it implies that belief rather than desire can be the
principal source ofmotivation. This tension in Smith's account is not often
recognised. For example, while Brink is broadly opposed to Smith's internalism, he
does not seem to consider Smith's account ofmoral motivation to be in conflict with
the desire/belief model in the way, for example, that Nagel's version of rationalist
motivation is in conflict with it (1997: 15).
According to Brink, the Nagelian position is characterised by the view that purely
cognitive states, such as beliefs, can motivate by themselves without the help of a
desire or pro-attitude (1997: 12). What distinguishes Nagel's account, on Brink's
view, is the notion that in so far as desires do figure in intentional action, 'they are
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merely consequential on our interpreting [an agent's] behaviour as intentional: the
action is produced by her moral beliefs and does not depend upon prior, independent
conative states' (1997: 13). On the 'consequential ascription' view, the desires in
question are more like figures of speech than robust independent mental states. This
is not the only way one might interpret Nagel's account, but it seems to many to be
the most plausible interpretation.22
Dancy notes that proponents of the desire/beliefmodel have often been less than
clear about the details of their theory (2000). Specifically, while they all tend to
agree that intentional action is the product of two kinds of intentional states with
different directions-of-fit - belief and desire - and that desire is always the dominant
state, they are unclear about the way in which desire dominates. Here is Brink again,
detailing his view of the precise difference between Smith's account, which is meant
to adhere to the desire/beliefmodel, and Nagel's account, which rejects the
desire/beliefmodel:
On [Smith's] version of rationalism, pro-attitudes are not merely consequentially ascribed
because the action is intentional: the pro-attitudes are psychologically real prior to the action
and play an ineliminable role in generating, and hence, explaining action. But these pro-
attitudes are consequential or dependent on the belief that one should perform the action.
(Brink 1997: 15. My emphasis)
So on Smith's model ofmoral motivation it seems that belief rather than desire is the
dominant state: the belief brings about or produces the desire. But this suggests that
citing a moral belief is sufficient for explaining why an agent is motivated to do what
she takes to be right. And this is in conflict with Smith's official 'Humean' or
desire/belief theory ofmotivation, according to which motivation is the pursuit of a
goal constituted by desire (1994: 104, 116). Consider the following example. John
comes to the conclusion that he is morally required to support the local residents'
association. On Smith's model, assuming John is not weak-willed and so on, this
belief will directly produce a desire to support the local residents' association. Ifwe
22 InMoral Reasons (1993), Dancy interprets Nagel's position as something more akin to the model
Brink attributes to Smith - that moral beliefs produce robust desires - rather than the consequential
ascription model. However, in Practical Reality (2000) he adopts the consequential ascription
interpretation ofNagel, along the lines of Schueler's (1996) interpretation.
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assume that the motivation to support the local residents' association is indicative of
the general structure ofmoral motivation in the virtuous person, then John's
motivation must be direct and not merely contingent upon some further desire. The
reason John gives for supporting the residents' association is that he is morally
required to do so. This moral belief is sufficient, and it is sufficient on Smith's
account, to explain why John comes to desire to support the residents' association.
The desire is not motivated by some further end or goal at which John is aiming.
And this is what appears to be in direct conflict with Smith's claim that motivation is
always constituted by a relevant desire and means-end belief (1994: 92, 93).
It looks as if in trying to fill out his specific account of moral motivation, Smith has
been forced to abandon the very model ofmotivation he is concerned to defend.23
By contrast, the act internalism model I favour and that is espoused by non-
cognitivism is perfectly consistent with the desire/belief theory.24 If part of what an
agent is doing when she makes a moral judgement is expressing a motivating
attitude, then this attitude can always be cited as the principal source of the
motivation.
iv) Reasons and Reliability
In the last section we saw that the explanatory force Smith attributes to the
practicality requirement depends in part on a theory ofmotivation that is in direct
conflict with the theory ofmotivation he wants to defend. In this section I want to
look more closely at the role the notion of a rational requirement or justifying reason
plays in Smith's outline of the reliability thesis. I argue that the reliability thesis is
23 This claim requires further support, given Smith's specific contention that his approach is consistent
with the desire/belief thesis (1994: 179). I provide this support at the end of (iv), below.
24
My approach is to establish cognitivist-internalism as a prima facie plausible position consistent
with the desire/belief thesis. This is intended to address traditional objections to cognitivist-
internalism that dismiss it out of hand because it contradicts the orthodox desire/belief theory of action
explanation and motivation. However, as will become clear in subsequent chapters, the picture of
moral motivation that emerges from the speech act analysis ofmoral judgements suggests that the
desire/beliefmodel is inadequate to deal with the complex structure ofmoral motivation. In chap 5,1
argue that the desire/belief model does not provide an adequate account of the nature of intentional
action. In contrast to the approach ofother cognitivist-internalists, such as Nagel and Dancy, my
critique of the desire/belief thesis is a conclusion ofmy argument for cognitivist-internalism rather
than a premise in my argument for cognitivist-internalism (see Nagel 1970; Dancy 1993, 2000).
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not sufficiently theoretically neutral to play the role that Smith wants it to play in his
argument.
We need to be clear that the central point at issue between Brink and Smith is
whether there can befailures ofmoral motivation that do not resultfrom practical
irrationality25 This issue is central because they are in agreement about the
possibility of genuine moral judgements that fail to motivate. Smith's argument
based on the reliability thesis is meant to provide support for the practicality
requirement that is independent of the assumptions underlying internalism and
externalism. Given the point at issue, this means it has to provide an independent
reason to support the claim that failures of moral motivation necessarily result from
practical irrationality. The problem with Smith's argument is that his statement of
the reliability thesis has built into it the suggestion that failures ofmoral motivation
are due to practical irrationalities.26 It therefore cannot be used as the basis of an
independent argument to decide the issue between internalism and externalism.
Now, the reliability thesis is strictly speaking not question begging with regard to the
issue ofwhether failures ofmotivation are necessarily practically irrational: it
doesn't follow from Smith's statement of the reliability thesis that there is a
necessary connection between failures ofmoral motivation and practical unreason.
However, because the reliability thesis concerns itself with the 'striking fact' that the
connection between moral judgement and motivation is reliable in the absence of
practical irrationalities it is, surely, far too close to suggesting the very point at
issue.
If the reliability thesis is to be used to decide between the practicality requirement
and its opponents it needs to be stated in a way that is neutral between the two sides.
The fact about moral motivation that I take to be 'striking' is that motivation tracks
25 This is clearly a different question to that with which the debate begins about the connection
between moral judgement and motivation.
26 It becomes clear in Smith's later work that the 'good and strong willed person' is simply an agent
who is motivated by her moral judgements in so far as she doesn't suffer from practical irrationalities.
He now prefers the term 'moralist' to describe this agent. The moralist is someone who if she 'judges
it right to do something then she is motivated accordingly, at least absent practical irrationality'
(Smith 1997: 111).
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moral judgements in most people most of the time. There is no need to include a
caveat indicating why or for whom the connection fails to hold. The point is that
overwhelmingly it does hold and the question is how to explain this fact. Smith opts
to explain the reliable connection in relation to the content ofmoral judgement. It is
important to note that at this stage of his overall thesis, Smith's argument for the
practicality requirement is meant to be compelling independently of the specific
details of his 'rationalist' theory ofmoral content. In The Moral Problem Smith
argues that the practicality requirement does not entail rationalism (1994: 62). Yet it
is the assumption that moral requirements are requirements of reason that does all of
the explanatory work with regard to the reliability thesis. This comes out more
clearly in his later work: 'Remember, I say that the Claim about Moralists is true
because of something about the nature ofmoral judgement: moral judgements are
analyzable in terms of beliefs about our normative reasons...' (Smith 1997: 112).
We saw above that the explanatory force of Smith's claim about the content ofmoral
judgements is only as strong as the specific theory ofmotivation that his model
offers. Whereas the externalist explanation of the reliability thesis relies on the
widely accepted desire/beliefmodel ofmotivation, Smith's explanation relies on a
controversial theory ofmoral content. Remember that Smith's version of the
reliability thesis asks for an explanation of the fact that in the absence of practical
irrationalities agents are reliably motivated by their moral judgements. If moral
requirements are requirements of reason as his content claim suggests, then any
failures ofmoral motivation will, plausibly, be practically irrational; so we have a
neat explanation ofwhy motivation tracks moral judgements in the absence of
practical irrationality. But how does the rationalist theory of content fare in
explaining our revised reliability thesis, stripped of all mention of practical
irrationalities? Well, ifmoral judgements are judgements about justifying reasons,
and motivation tracks reason judgements, then there will still be a reliable connection
between moral judgements and motivation.
The problem for Smith is that once the reliability thesis is revised to exclude explicit
mention of practical irrationality, his version of content internalism no longer
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provides a simple explanation ofwhy motivation tracks moral judgements. It merely
explains one controversial doctrine by way of another controversial doctrine. A
much simpler alternative explanation, not involving the externalist model Smith
rejects but still plausibly externalist, is that moral requirements normally, but not
necessarily, coincide with requirements of reason. On this model, ifwe accept that
motivation tracks reason judgements, then motivation will normally and reliably,
though not invariably, track moral judgements. This explanation of the reliability
thesis is simpler than Smith's as it doesn't depend on a controversial thesis about the
content ofmoral judgements.27
Smith's use of content internalism about justifying reasons to explain the reliability
thesis also places him on the horns of a dilemma. This is because in order to explain
how judgements about justifying reasons motivate he must either deny the
desire/belief model he elsewhere defends or face his own accusation of fetishism. As
we have seen, the approach Smith adopts commits him to denying the desire/belief
thesis for moral motivation. To avoid this alternative, he would need to retract the
claim that reason beliefs, and thus moral beliefs, are capable of producing motivation
without relying on a prior goal-constituting desire. However, this leaves him with
the task of explaining how, on the desire/beliefmodel, reason judgements or beliefs
motivate. According to the desire/beliefmodel, in order to be motivated by a belief
that I have reason to do some act, there must be some goal constituted by desire that
doing what I have reason to do promotes. In order to explain the fact that motivation
reliably tracks reason judgements, this goal, it would seem, needs to be something
like a standing desire to do what I have a justifying reason to do. But if this were the
case, following Smith's reasoning, the virtuous agent would ultimately be motivated
by a fetishistic desire to be rational, rather than by a direct concern for the good of
others: a misrepresentation of the motivational psychology of virtuous people.
There are a number of features of Smith's theory that might be thought to address the
kinds ofobjections raised above. Consider the following passage:
27 This position together with the act internalist option means that there are at least two alternatives to
the practicality requirement that explain the reliability thesis. It is therefore clear that Smith's anti-
externalist argument does not immediately vindicate the practicality requirement.
68
Suppose an agent who does not yet desire to <X> deliberates and, as a result, conies to believe
that she has a normative reason to O. And suppose further that her coming to have this belief
then causes her to desire to O. Given C228 it follows that we should redescribe this causal
transition between belief and desire in normative terms. For her having that belief causes her
to have a desire that it is rational to have, given her belief...
Moreover, note the fact that our beliefs and desires may bear such normative relations to
each other is not inconsistent with the Humean [desire/belief] theory ofmotivating reasons
defended earlier. Indeed, this whole discussion has been premised on the Humean theory.
All actions are indeed produced by desires, just as the Humean says; no actions are produced
by beliefs alone or by besires.29 But, if what we have said here is right, some of these desires
are themselves produced by the agent's beliefs about the reasons she has, beliefs she acquires
through rational deliberation.
We are now in a position to pull the threads of the discussion together. It seems difficult to
reconcile the claim that deliberation on the basis of our values is practical in its issue to just
the extent that it is with two further claims, the claim that deliberation normally reflects our
evaluative beliefs and the claim that our actions are produced by our desires. However, we
have seen that these claims are not in conflict. Instead they reflect a substantive fact about
human agents: namely, that we are rational creatures who are sometimes more rational,
sometimes less. Deliberation on the basis of our evaluative beliefs is practical in its issue to
just the extent that it is because that is precisely the extent to which we are rational...
For...when we deliberate, we try to decide what we have, reason to do, and to the extent to
which we are rational we will either already have corresponding desires or our beliefs about
what we have reason to do will cause us to have corresponding desires... (Smith 1994:
179-180. My emphasis)
The structure ofmoral motivation Smith sets up in this passage mirrors that
attributed to him by Brink in the passage I quoted in (iii), above. Recall that Brink
said that on Smith's model, 'the pro-attitudes are psychologically real prior to the
action and play an ineliminable role in generating, and hence, explaining the action.
But these pro-attitudes are consequential or dependent on the belief that one should
perform the action.' I suggested that this meant that on Smith's model, and contrary
to the desire/belief thesis, belief plays the dominant role in motivation. However,
Dancy has suggested that we should distinguish between causal dominance and
Humean dominance (2000: 84). While the belief in Smith's scenario may be
28 Smith (1994: 148): 'C2 If an agent believes that she has a normative reason to O, then she
rationally should desire to O'.
29 'Besires' are psychological states said to have both belief-like and desire-like directions of fit. In
this way it is thought they might capture the cognitive and the motivating aspects of moral and
normative judgements (see Lewis 1988; Price 1989).
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causally dominant, the desire can still play the dominant role in motivating action, a
role it has due to its direction of fit.30
Smith stresses that his model ofmoral motivation is consistent with the desire/belief
thesis because it is consistent with the view that all action is produced by a
combination of belief and desire and not simply by belief alone. But my objection is
based on the fact that Smith presents the desire/beliefmodel, or as he terms it the
'Humean theory ofmotivation', as a theory ofmotivation, and not simply a theory of
action explanation (1994: chap. 4). And he tells us that, on the Humean theory,
motivation is the pursuit of a goal constituted by desire (Smith 1994: 104, 116).
To see that the theory ofmotivation and the theory of action explanation are distinct,
consider again the example of John's being motivated by the consideration that he is
morally required to support the local residents' association. Let's say that John has
not yet acted on his decision to help. This allows us to focus on why he.is motivated
to help the local residents' association and not his action of helping them. What we
need to explain is why John comes to be motivated to help the local residents'
association. According to Smith, the Humean theory ofmotivation tells us that
John's motivation must be explained in terms ofhis pursuit of a goal constituted by
desire. But this is not how Smith explains moral motivation; rather, he says that
desires like John's are caused by moral beliefs. This allows Smith to avoid the
fetishism horn of the dilemma: John is not motivated to do what he judges is right in
30
Dancy suggests that this point undermines Nagel's attack on the desire/beliefmodel based on the
latter's distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires (2000: 84). This might be true if two
things were the case: if, as Dancy suggests, Nagel's conception of a motivated desire is of a desire that
is caused or produced by a belief state; and if the desire/belief model only purported to provide
necessary conditions for the explanation of intentional action, and did not also purport to be a theory
ofmotivation. I deny both of these claims. As I explain in chap 5, the concept of a motivated desire
is the concept of a desire held for a reason or on the basis of deliberation, not the concept of a desire
merely caused or produced by a belief state. This means that Nagel's conception of a motivated desire
implies a conception ofmotivation radically different to that assumed by most proponents of the
desire/belief thesis. In chap 5,1 call this kind ofmotivation, normative motivation. As I explain in
the text above, I also reject the claim that the desire/belief thesis is standardly proposed as an account
of action explanation and not, in addition, an account ofmotivation more generally.
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order to satisfy some goal of his or to achieve something he desires to do.31 But in
avoiding the fetishism charge, Smith's approach is caught on the other horn of the
dilemma: it contradicts that claim that motivation must always be explained in terms
of a goal constituted by desire.
Smith might deny that the desire/belief theory is meant to be a theory of motivation
as well as a theory of action-explanation. But if the desire/belief model is restricted
in this way it becomes a much less interesting and much less contentious thesis. For
example, it would make it broadly consistent with the anti-Humean theory Dancy
calls 'pure cognitivism'.32 Perhaps Smith's theory differs from anti-Humean theories
like pure cognitivism in ultimately explaining motivation and reliability in terms of
background conative dispositions (Smith 1994: 180)33. Smith refers to this aspect of
his theory in the passage quoted above. His point seems to be that rational agents are
agents who, at a minimum, are disposed to do what they judge they have good reason
to do. It is part of being a rational agent that if one believes there is an overriding
reason to do something, then, ceteris paribus, one will desire to do it. This is an
interesting and promising suggestion, but it takes us a long way from the notion that
motivation is the pursuit of a goal constituted by desire.
31 I argue in chap 5 that it is not clear on this type ofmodel that the agent is motivated at all in a sense
consistent with the concept ofmotivation involved in intentional action. On Smith's model, John's
desire to help does not seem to be motivated by his taking its Tightness as a consideration in favour of
helping; rather it seems to be causally, and non-rationally, produced. The desire is, admittedly,
consistent with what it is rational to do, but it is 'merely the result of the operation of [the belief] in
[him] rather than an expression of [his] own mental activity' (see Korsgaard 1997: 221; and 5.4,
above)
32 See Dancy (2000: 90). Pure cognitivism accepts that in order for action to take place there must be
both a belief and a desire, and that these are distinct states with different directions of fit. However, it
sees belief as the state which motivates and desire as the state ofbeing motivated. In chap 5.3,1 argue
that beliefs are states that convey considerations that motivate, whereas desires are, normally, states of
being motivated.
33 For Smith this appears to involve our being disposed to having a 'systematically justifiable set of
desires', where the process of systematic justification is akin to Rawls' concept of reflective
equilibrium (Smith 1994:159; Rawls 1973: 48-51). Actually, Smith describes this disposition as our
having 'a goal ofhaving a systematically justifiable set of desires' (1994: 160). However, it cannot be
the goal ofhaving a coherent set of desires that motivates agents: this risks a form of desire-coherence
fetishism. 1 take it that we would be unimpressed by an agent who declined to help because he was
worried that to do so would make his desire-set less coherent. If the disposition is a background
condition that makes agents susceptible to normative considerations then, again, it suggests a far more
complex theory ofmotivation than that described by the desire/beliefmodel.
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The notion that agents have general conative dispositions which make them
susceptible to motivation by normative considerations is an idea I develop in chapter
five. But the structure ofmoral and normative motivation it suggests is far more
complex than can be accommodated on the standard desire/belief model. In the next
section, I argue that if there is such a thing as genuine moral motivation, then it must
be possible for agents to be motivated by the consideration that something is morally
right.34 The notion of being motivated by favouring considerations is something
absent from most versions of the desire/belief thesis. Ifmoral motivation is
sometimes non-instrumental, and thus non-fetishistic, it must be possible for agents
sometimes to do what is right because it is right, rather than because doing so
satisfies some further goal or desire. But this is something that cannot be
accommodated by the desire/belief thesis if it is intended as a theory ofmotivation as
well as a theory of action explanation.
v) The Accusation of Fetishism
Smith thinks that those who reject explaining the reliability thesis using the
practicality requirement must explain it in terms of some form of general or standing
desire to do the right thing. He claims that externalism misrepresents the
motivational psychology of virtuous people because virtuous people care directly for
what they judge as right, not derivatively via an independent desire to be moral
(Smith 1994: 75). I have already argued that there are at least two other options
available for explaining the fact that motivation reliably tracks moral judgements: It
might be a necessary condition of performing a genuine moral judgement act that an
agent who makes a judgement is motivated to conform to it. Alternatively, ifmoral
requirements are generally, though not invariably, judged to provide good reasons for
action, then, given that motivation tracks reason judgements, moral judgements will
reliably motivate those who make them. I leave these considerations for the moment
in order to focus on Smith's objection to the standing desire model of externalism.
The argument I presented in section two agrees with Smith that externalism must
adopt a standing desire model ofmoral motivation in order to accommodate the way
34 See chapter 5.3 for an explanation of the notion of a favouring consideration.
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in which motivation tracks moral judgements. Smith rejects the standing desire
model because, he argues, it makes the motivations of virtuous people fetishistic; and
this is something that cannot be true of virtuous agents. He views the fact that
externalism is committed to this false view as a reductio of the externalist position.
According to Smith, externalist agents are ultimately motivated to do what is right
'for the sake of its being the right thing to do, rather than for the sake of the very
feature that they believe makes it the right thing to do' (Smith 1997: 114). He
presents this distinction in terms of de dicto and de re desires to do what is right. If I
have a de dicto desire to do what is right, then I desire to do what is right because it
is the right thing to do; whereas, if I have a de re desire to do what is right, then I
desire to do what is right because, for example, someone is in need or because doing
so will prevent harm: the features that make it the right thing to do (Smith 1994: 74).
Smith says that the externalist model cannot accommodate the fact that virtuous
people care directly for the well-being of family and friends, honesty, and other
goods, and not instrumentally in so far as their acts satisfy the goal of doing what is
right. The consequence of this is that the externalist model 'alienates [agents] from
the ends at which morality properly aims' (Smith 1994: 76).
There are a number ofdifferent objections Smith makes in advancing his fetishism
argument that need to be identified to make sense of his concerns. One consideration
Smith finds troubling is that the externalist model generates 'derived' desires to do
those things that are deemed right, and that such desires are 'underived' in the
virtuous person. Presumably, Smith is not claiming that the virtuous agent's desires
are all unmotivated, in the sense that they are not based on any other considerations
or not held for any reasons. This would make such desires underived, so that, like
hunger or thirst, they simply assail the agent rather than being arrived at via rational
deliberation. There is a tradition that views virtuous agents as those who are
habituated to do what is right so that much of their behaviour is of the appropriate
kind unmediated by overt deliberation. For example, a kind person will respond to
someone in need when she becomes aware of their need without having to engage in
complex moral deliberation prior to acting. Nonetheless, if her action is rational she
will be motivated to help for a reason: she won't simply be assailed by the desire to
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help. Given Smith's rationalism, I think we can assume that he doesn't hold that
moral desires are underived in the sense of not being held for a reason.
Sometimes Smith expresses his worry about externalism in terms of'instrumental'
and 'non-instrumental' desires (1997: 114-115). Presumably, again, the distinction is
not meant to correspond to the that between desires held for a reason and those held
for no reason. If an agent desires something instrumentally, this normally means that
she desires it for the sake of something else: her reason for desiring it is in order to
satisfy some further end or purpose. By contrast, if an agent desires something non-
instrumentally, this normally means that she desires it for its own sake. Smith argues
that externalism is committed to the view that agents only desire instrumentally to do
those things that are in fact right - looking after family and friends, and other goods
- in so far as doing such things satisfies the goal of doing what is right. The virtuous
agent, by contrast, desires to look after family and friends and do other good things
non-instrumentally: she has non-instrumental concern for family and friends and
those in need.
An interesting feature of Smith's objection based on the distinction between
instrumental and non-instrumental motivation is that it potentially generates a
problem for any theory ofmoral motivation. His fundamental objection is not that
the source of the agent's motivation is a desire, but that the content of the desire,
taken as the reason for acting, is 'to do the right thing.' But a purely internalist and
cognitivist view ofmoral motivation potentially faces exactly the same charge.35 For
example, suppose I judge that I am morally obliged to volunteer to help at the local
charity shop. Let's say that Smith's model ofmoral motivation is correct, so that my
belief that it is right to volunteer produces 'straightaway' a desire to do so. The first
thing to notice is that my desire to help derives from my belief that it is right to
volunteer. Now, presumably my desire is held for a reason and does not merely
assail me. What reason might I give to explain my motivation? Plausibly, I will
35
A suggestion by Richard Holton lead me to think about this style of response to Smith's fetishism
charge.
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desire to volunteer because I believe it to be the right thing to do. But this now looks
like my desire to help is merely a means to achieving the end of doing what is
morally right. So it appears that Smith's cognitivist model ofmotivation is also
vulnerable to the charge of fetishism.
Another example might help to understand what has gone wrong with Smith's
argument. Suppose that one were genuinely motivated to work for someone because
they were the President. In such a case, the consideration that they were President
would have to be the consideration or reason in light of which one desired to work
for them. We might call such a desire a de dicto desire to work for the President. A
de re desire to work for the President might take the following form. IfCarter is the
President, then John desires to work for the President because John desires to work
for Carter. However, to be genuinely motivated by the fact that someone is
President, it must be the person's status as President that is the relevant motivating
consideration. If we were to analyse genuine instances of 'motivation-by-
presidency', we should limit our analyses to those cases in which an agent is
motivated by the consideration that someone is the President. Although it is true that
John is motivated to work for the President, it is not the case that he is motivated by
the consideration that Carter is President; rather, he is motivated by the consideration
that the President is Carter. So, given our criterion, John's being motivated to work
for the President is not a genuine case ofmotivation-by-presidency.
If it were not possible to be motivated by the consideration that someone was
President rather than that they were a particular person who happened to fill this role,
then there would be no such thing as motivation-by-presidency. It seems to me that
we have an analogous situation in the case ofmoral motivation or 'motivation-by-
rightness'. If there is such a thing as moral motivation then it must be possible for
agents to be motivated by the consideration that something is morally right. If John
is motivated to help the poor in order to alleviate their suffering, we might say that
John is doing something that is in fact morally right. But unless John is helping the
poor and alleviating their suffering because it is morally right, then we do not have a
genuine case ofmoral motivation; we just have an act that happens to accord with
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morality. Or suppose that John is motivated to do what he judges is right because it
involves volunteering. This would fail the tracking condition. If it became clear that
the right option didn't involve volunteering, we have no reason to think that John
would lose his motivation to volunteer and take the moral option.
We can make the same point from a different perspective ifwe take as an example an
act that is not obviously admirable. Headmaster Watt is motivated to give boys who
get bad grades the cane. IfWatt judges that he has a moral obligation to beat boys
who get low grades, and this is what motivates him to cane them, then we have a
genuine case ofmoral motivation, regardless of how morally mistaken we take Watt
to be. But ifWatt doesn't construe his reason in moral terms (perhaps he just wants
to improve the school average), then we have no reason to interpret his motivation as
moral motivation. Smith, in arguing that motivation by a consideration that
something is right de dicto is necessarily fetishistic, threatens to make moral
motivation impossible. And surely this is a reductio of his argument.
Another strand of Smith's fetishism objection is that the externalist agent is
unhealthily obsessed with the moral status of all her actions. I think we can agree
that a virtuous person is someone who knows when it is and is not appropriate to
engage in moral deliberation and justification. But there is nothing about the
structure of the externalist position that compels the externalist agent to engage in
moral deliberation about each and every decision she makes. She need not be
fetishistic in the sense of being constantly obsessed with the moral status of her
actions. This strand ofSmith's objection perhaps explains his appropriation of an
argument by Williams designed to show the limits of an impartial morality. But
Smith misapplies the Williams objection, which is about when moral judgements are
and are not appropriate sources ofmotivation, not about the structure ofmotivation
when moral judgements do motivate. Williams discusses a situation in which a man
is faced with saving the life of one of two drowning people in equal peril, one of
whom is his wife and the other a stranger (1976: 17-19). One question is whether the
special relationship the man has to his wife provides a moral justification for his
treating her differently to the stranger: when is it fair to give preference to one's
76
family and friends over strangers? Williams, however, is concerned about the
appropriateness of engaging in moral deliberation at all in such situations: thinking
about the moral status of his actions in such a context rather than simply the fact that
the person drowning is his wife 'provides the agent with one thought too many...'
(Williams 1976:18).
For the sake of argument, let's agree with Williams that in the case he describes it is
inappropriate for the husband to appeal to moral justification at all. So when the man
is motivated appropriately to save his wife he is motivated by the thought that it is
his wife who requires saving. ForWilliams, then, this kind ofmotivation lies beyond
moral justification and is not an example ofmoral motivation. Now, suppose that the
husband were morally motivated according to Smith's model. In this case, his belief
that it was the right thing to do would produce a desire to help his wife. But it is
precisely this kind of dependence on moral considerations that Williams says
involves 'one thought too many'. And this charge potentially applies to any model
ofmoral motivation. There is no reason to think that an externalist, any less than an
internalist, would be unable to discern those cases in which moral considerations do
not apply and in which, therefore, moral motivation is not an issue. Again, it seems
that a concern Smith raises for externalism is equally applicable to internalist
theories ofmoral motivation.
5. Externalism and the Two Views of Morality
I concluded in the last section that Smith's fetishism objection is ultimately
unsuccessful in undermining externalism. However, there are other reasons for being
sceptical about the externalist thesis. Much of the impetus for externalism is
undermined once we dismiss the non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument. If
cognitivism and internalism are not incompatible in the way that externalism fears,
then, given a number of significant problems with externalism, I think we have
reason to prefer some form of act internalism. In this section, I argue that externalist
explanations of the practical or action-guiding function ofmorality are unconvincing.
Ifmotivating force and practical normativity are only contingently related to moral
considerations, then it is difficult to account for the role such considerations play in
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our practical lives. I also claim that ifwe focus on the function or point ofmoral
practice, we can see why someone outside the practice, such as the amoralist, will be
unable to make genuine moral judgements.
Brink is clear that his preference for moral judgement externalism is largely a result
of the threat he believes internalism poses to realism in ethics. Moral realism and
internalism are, he says, 'uneasy bedfellows'(Brink 1989: 43). Much of this threat
he thinks derives from the non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument (Brink 1989:
44). Shafer-Landau refers directly to a version of the anti-cognitivist argument to
explain the view that moral judgement internalism and moral cognitivism are
incompatible: 'necessarily, moral judgements motivate. Beliefs don't. Therefore moral
judgements aren't beliefs' (2000: 270). But if, as I have claimed, the anti-cognitivist
argument is invalid and cognitivism and internalism are prima facie compatible, then
much of the initial impetus for extemalism is removed. This doesn't show that
externalism gives the wrong account of moral judgements, but, when added to other
difficulties with the externalist thesis and the intuitive pull of internalism, it does
significantly weaken the case for extemalism.
Externalists generally accept that moral considerations have an important role in
guiding action and in practical deliberation more generally: 'Moral considerations
are practical in some very important sense. Agents engage in moral deliberation in
order to decide what to do and give moral advice...' (Brink 1989: 37). Shafer-
Landau makes a similar point: 'Fact: everyone we know is motivated to some extent
to comply with his or her moral judgements. Fact: we suspect the sincerity of
someone who proclaims fidelity to a moral code, all the while showing no inclination
to abide by it' (2000: 284). Shafer-Landau suggests that despite appearances such
considerations are neutral between internalism and extemalism. This is because
while agents are usually motivated by their moral judgments, we don't observe every
person as motivated to comply with each of her moral judgements. So it seems like
everyone is always motivated to some extent to comply with their moral judgements
but only because in most cases they are motivated to do so.
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Svavarsdottir also notes the force of the connection between moral judgement and
practicality:
Admittedly, I would probably experience puzzlement upon encountering an individual who
made a moral assessment of his circumstances yet appeared indifferent to moral
values...Why would anyone who is completely indifferent to moral considerations bother to
take note of the moral conditions of his surroundings? (Svavarsdottir 1999: 184-185)
Svavarsdottir argues that this puzzlement can be explained by the general assumption
we make that someone who bothers to make a moral judgement is to some extent
committed to morality. If commitment implies motivation then, given the
assumption about moral judgement and commitment, we will expect agents to be
motivated to comply with their moral judgements.
By their own admissions, it is incumbent upon externalists to account for the
'important sense' in which morality is practical. Ifwe look at the intuitions they
mention above there is a common theme: the point or function ofmorality appears to
be tied to practical deliberation. Shafer-Landau tries to explain this away by
appealing to the consideration that agents are usually but not always seen to be
motivated by their moral judgements. Svavarsdottir suggests that moral judgements
seem necessarily to be tied to decision making only because we assume people who
make them are morally committed.
It is very difficult for externalism to accommodate the apparently close connection
between moral judgement and practical deliberation. This is because moral
judgement externalism holds that the motivational force ofmoral judgments is
entirely dependent on contingent desires to do actions of the relevant kind. And
according to content externalism about justifying reasons, moral judgements and
considerations only ever contingently justify. If one accepts both these forms of
externalism, then one must accept that moral judgements and moral considerations
have no inherent normative authority and no inherent motivating power. This seems
at odds with the function of such considerations and judgements being to motivate
action and to guide choice. Ifmoral judgements do not have an essentially action-
guiding function, then it seems somewhat mysterious that moral considerations
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overwhelmingly and consistently play the role they do in our practical lives. What
we refer to as 'morality' and as 'moral codes' in different societies and in different
historical periods appear to have as a central function the regulation of conduct. The
externalist needs to provide a convincing explanation of this apparent fact.
Is the inherent practical impotence ofmoral judgements and considerations on the
externalist model a problem for externalism? To answer this question we need to
reflect on the ways in which externalism attempts to account for the practicality of
morality. We saw in the last section that one way in which Brink attempts to account
for the motivating force ofmoral judgments is via the notion of sympathy. I argued
that non moral-content versions of externalism of this kind fail to account for the
way in which motivation tracks moral judgements. Agents are motivated on these
models by desires to do the kinds of things morality is purported to be about. For
example, ifmorality is about contributing to the general good, moral motivation is
explained by desires agents have to help others, or perhaps by other desires that are
satisfied by contributing to the general good. This approach is conducive to the
common externalist aim of defending realism and naturalism in ethics: moral facts
are less likely to be considered metaphysically queer or epistemologically
inaccessible if they are simply facts about what contributes to the general good or to
human happiness. Moreover, it seems obvious that someone could become aware of
such considerations and remain indifferent to them. For example, I might recognise
that morality requires me to help at the school fundraising event, but desire instead to
stay at home and read.
Considerations of the above sort bring us very close to the central issue that divides
externalists and internalists. Internalists, typically, do not characterise moral
judgements in terms of their content but in terms of their function or role. Brink, in a
footnote, spells out this crucial point:
Sometimes the debate between internalists and externalists depends on the two employing
different criteria for identifying judgements as moral judgements. Often, internalists employ
functional criteria - roughly, those judgements are moral judgements that the appraiser treats
as fundamentally important - whereas externalists employ contentful criteria - roughly,
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those judgements are moral judgements that concern certain sorts of matters, for instance,
having to do with the welfare of affected parties. (Brink 1997: 21)
Brink says little more on this point other than that he is committed to rejecting the
functional criterion (1989: 22). Mackie refers to what I take to be essentially the
same distinction (Mackie 1977: 106). A 'broad conception ofmorality', he argues, is
any general theory of conduct that helps to direct an agent's choices. Morality in its
'narrower sense' suggests a specific set of other-regarding concerns centring around
the well-being or interests of human agents. Mackie makes the point that while we
cannot help but act on, or have a perceived reason to act on, what we take to be
required on the broad view, it is quite possible that our preferences might run counter
to the dictates ofmorality in its narrow sense: 'I admit that morality requires that I
should do such-and-such, but I don't intend to: for me other considerations here
overrule the moral ones' (Mackie 1977: 106).
The distinction between the broad and narrow views ofmorality obviously has direct
bearing on the debate between internalism and externalism. On the broad or
functional view, moral judgements are intimately tied to practical decision making in
a way that suggests an internal or conceptual connection to motivation. By contrast,
on the narrow or content-based view, whether I am motivated to act morally will be
contingent upon my having a commitment to the kinds of actions and concerns that
characterise the narrow view. This suggests that there is a much deeper question
about the nature ofmorality that underpins the debate between externalists and
internalists. However, Mackie at least thinks that it is difficult to privilege one view
over the other: 'Both are used and both have important roots and connections in our
thought' (1977: 107). IfMackie is correct, then we may have an important
explanation of the apparent 'stalemate' between internalists and externalists: the
intuitions ofboth sides are attuned to equally important but different facts about
ordinary moral thought.
While I accept that the intuitions of both sides have their source in significant aspects
of ordinary moral thought, I suspect that the narrow view reflects widespread
consensus about answers to questions raised by the broad view — about what is
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ultimately practically valuable or important - and that, as such, it is less fundamental
than the broad view. The narrow view, on this interpretation, reflects one kind of
first-order answer to questions of value. The amoralist is always a real possibility on
the narrow view, because it is always possible to lack interest in or question the
justification of any particular considerations construed as moral. By contrast, if I
judge that something is morally right on the broad view, I make a judgement about
what is ultimately practically justified or important. It makes no sense on this view
to question the practical justification of one's moral judgements as they are simply
judgements about what is ultimately practically justified.
The issue of whether we should view morality primarily in terms of the broad or the
narrow view deserves a level of consideration that is beyond the scope of this work.
In developing my positive account of moral judgement I adopt the broad reading of
morality, as described by Brink. On this account, morality has to do with what is of
fundamental importance in terms of agents' conduct, and moral judgements are those
judgements that concern what an agent takes to be of fundamental importance in this
respect. My approach is to adopt the broad view ofmorality to determine if it can
provide the basis for a plausible version of cognitivist internalism. I will not defend
the broad view over the narrow view directly. Nonetheless, I hope to show that the
model ofmoral judgement it supports makes such a view attractive.
Hare is wrong that amoralists merely describe what other people think is right. The
amoralist externalists have in mind believes herself to be making genuine moral
judgements, and on the narrow view, a view with significant historical and
philosophical credentials, she does make such judgements. However, what interests
Hare is morality in the broad sense: the general principles of conduct that function to
guide action (1952: 1). And in this sense, the amoralist sceptic, at least, doesn't seem
to be making genuine moral judgements because she doesn't accept the practical
normative authority ofher judgements ofmoral rightness. The unprincipled
amoralist, who doesn't question the normative authority of her moral judgements but
remains unmoved by them, is a more complex matter. The internalist needs to
explain how moral judgements can both fail to motivate and have an essential
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connection to motivating attitudes. And act internalism must explain this without
including the relevant conative or motivating states at the level ofjudgement content.
The speech act approach I develop in chapters three and four will provide the
framework for a version of act internalism that can account for failures ofmotivation
in this way.
Svavarsdottir , in her defence of moral judgement externalism, states that internalism
would be an obvious conceptual truth ifmoral commitment were a precondition for
making genuine moral judgements (1999: 185). She argues in favour of externalism
that agents can fail to have such a commitment and still make moral judgements:
The 'commitment sceptic...does not dispute that there are morally better and worse
alternatives, but wonders why that should affect our decision making and action'
(Svavarsdottir 1999: 183). On the broad view, the commitment sceptic is hopelessly
confused because the point of moral deliberation is to find out precisely those things
that should affect our decision making and action. In chapter one, I said that
internalism reflects the participatory nature ofmoral judgement. So we might say
that there is a sense in which commitment to morality is a precondition for making
genuine moral judgements. That is, one must be a participant rather than an
onlooker. And this is why the amoralist fails to make genuine moral judgments: she
is, by her very nature, outside morality, at least in its broad sense.
The first two chapters have indicated a far more complex picture of moral
psychology than we find in most standard internalist and externalist accounts.
Specifically, motivation and motivating states seem to figure in moral deliberation at
a number ofdifferent levels. I think that this reflects the ambiguous nature of the
term 'motivation'. I suggested in chapter one that 'motivation' can refer to the
psychological state of being motivated, the consideration in light ofwhich an agent is
motivated, or to the psychological state which conveys the consideration in light of
which an agent is motivated: respectively, a desire, an agent's reason, and a
justifying belief with a reason claim as its content. Externalist explanations of
motivation tend to focus on the role ofmotivating states. Sympathy, for example,
involves a state that disposes people to act to help others. But the fact that an agent
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is sympathetic is rarely, if ever, the consideration that motivates the agent to help
someone else. This would more likely be the fact that the person in question is in
need of assistance.
Although the standing desire model posited by some externalists is able to account
for the way in which motivation tracks moral judgements, it suggests, like sympathy,
an implausible or inappropriate ground for doing what is morally required. The
problem with this kind of externalism is not that its agents are motivated by a de
dicto desire with the content, 'to do what is right', but that they are motivated by the
desire to do what is right rather than the consideration that it is right. Reformulated
in this way, I think that Smith's fetishism objection succeeds in casting doubt on
externalism. We expect virtuous agents to be motivated by the consideration that
something is right and not by the fact they happen to desire to do what is right. On
the latter model, the fact or consideration that something is morally required would
only ever be instrumental in satisfying the desire to do what is morally required.
This difficulty for externalism may be part of a more general problem for adherents
of the desire/beliefmodel (cf.Dancy 2000; Schueler 1995).36 If so, Smith's
adherence to the desire/beliefmodel explains why he is not in a position to formulate
the objection in this way.
6. Conclusion
Externalists argue that the possibility of amoralism undermines the internalist claim
that there is a connection of conceptual necessity between moral judgements and
motivation. However, internalists and externalists have opposing intuitions about
purported examples of amoralism, making standard thought experiments
inconclusive. Smith offers an objection to externalism that he argues is independent
of the assumptions underlying the two sides in the debate. However, Smith's
statement of the reliability thesis suggests the very point at issue between his version
36 The source of the difficulty being that on the desire/beliefmodel an agent can never be motivated
by the consideration that favours action but only, ultimately, by the desire to perform the action. 1
suspect that this difficulty stems from proponents of the desire/belief model's not distinguishing
clearly between motivating states and motivating considerations. At times the desire/belief theorist
seems committed to denying the very possibility of motivation by normative reasons (cf. Korsgaard:
1986).
84
of internalism and externalism. It cannot therefore function as the basis of an
independent argument against externalism. Moreover, Smith's version of internalism
depends for its explanatory force on a form of content internalism about justifying
reasons rather than a version of judgement internalism about motivation. The
connection Smith posits between this kind of content internalism and motivation
depends on a theory ofmoral motivation that is in direct conflict with his adherence
to the desire/belief model. Act internalism, by contrast, can accommodate the
conceptual connection between moral judgements and motivation along with
cognitivism in a way consistent with the desire/belief model. But we may wonder
whether we should accept the desire/beliefmodel given that, ultimately, it seems to
be a weakness rather than a strength of externalism. Although Smith's fetishism
objection as stated is unsuccessful, it can be reformulated in a way that undermines
the plausibility of externalism. On the externalist model, an agent can only ever be
motivated to do what is right in so far as doing so satisfies an independent and
contingent desire to do the right thing. And this does seem to conflict with our
notion ofwhat motivates the virtuous person. In the next chapter, I apply speech act
theory to the intuitions that support act internalism in order to develop an approach




Speech Acts and Moral Motivation
1. Introduction
I have argued so far in favour of interpreting moral judgement internalism as a thesis
about judgement acts rather than judgement contents. Broadly speaking, act
internalism is the kind of internalism espoused by non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivism
emphasises the way in which agents are typically doing something more than issuing
a bare description when they make moral judgements, such as endorsing or
commending what is judged right. Thus far I have assumed that the distinction
between judgement act and judgement content is clear enough for us to see the
implications of opting for act internalism rather than content internalism, or vice
versa. In order to avoid complicating these discussions unnecessarily, I have not as
yet given a specific account of the nature of so called judgement acts. To an extent
this lack of specificity reflects the way in which the notion ofmoral judgement is
used in the literature on moral motivation.' In addition to the structural ambiguity
between act and content already discussed, the notion ofmoral judgement is often
ambiguous between moral mental states and moral utterances or speech acts.
My aim in this chapter is to explore the possibility of elucidating issues to do with
internalism and moral motivation by approaching the problem from the perspective
ofmoral language. Of course, focussing on moral language may merely serve to
emphasise the primacy of moral psychology in these debates. However, I believe
that applying speech act theory to the issues discussed thus far will elucidate the
structure ofmoral judgements and their relation to moral motivation more clearly
than an account that begins with an emphasis on moral psychology. And I think we
should take seriously an approach to these issues that can accommodate many of the
purportedly conflicting intuitions underlying our notion ofmoral judgement. The
1
Some theorists clearly think ofmoral judgements primarily in terms of linguistic acts (e.g.,
Stevenson 1944; Hare 1952). More recently, theorists have emphasised moral psychology rather than
moral language in discussions ofmoral judgements (e.g., Nagel 1970; McDowell 1985; Dancy 1993;
Smith 1994).
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contention of the speech act approach is that an understanding of how and why we
are moved by moral considerations can be reached, at least in part, by understanding
how and why we use moral language.
In section two, below, I introduce the speech act approach, and in section three, I
show how Searle's speech act theory provides a structured way of distinguishing
between the act and content of a moral judgement in terms of the difference between
a judgement's illocutionary force and its propositional content. Next, I enquire
whether the internalist requirement can be met via the conditions that govern the
linguistic act of assertion. I conclude that none of the conditions governing
assertions entails that the speaker holds a particular motivating attitude or desire
towards the propositional content of an assertive utterance. This means it is unlikely
that the internalist requirement can be met by interpreting moral judgements as bare
assertions.
I then suggest that moral judgement internalism can be accommodated using the
notion of a compound speech act. A compound speech act allows speakers to
perform more than one linguistic act using a single utterance. I argue that we can
meet the internalist requirement on moral judgements by establishing that their
performance in speech situations invariably involves the performance of linguistic
acts linked to motivating states. In order to understand the different acts involved in
making a moral judgement, I suggest thinking of such judgements in relation to the
compound act ofmoral evaluation. After a brief discussion of Searle's theory of
illocutionary acts, I then outline the conditions I take to be necessary for the
successful and sincere performance of a moral evaluation. I argue that both the fact-
stating and the motivating aspects ofmoral judgement can be met via these
conditions.
In section seven, I discuss an approach to the issues of internalism and moral
motivation by David Copp (2001). Copp's approach is similar to mine in that he
attempts to accommodate moral judgement internalism and moral cognitivism by
construing the internalist requirement in terms of the linguistic conventions
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governing the performance ofmoral judgements. I argue that there are a number of
reasons for preferring my account to his. I then address the problem of adequately
distinguishing between the speech act involved in making a moral judgement and the
meaning ofmoral predicates used in making such a judgement. I argue that it is
important not to confuse how evaluative predicates are used with their literal
meaning, which must remain constant across different grammatical contexts. The
particularly close relation between evaluative predicates and the act ofevaluation is
then explained in terms of the role of evaluative predicates in the institution or
practice of evaluation. I end the chapter with a brief review of the arguments of the
first three chapters and an outline of some advantages and potential disadvantages of
the speech act approach to moral judgement.
2. Moral Motivation and Moral Language
In chapter one, I noted that non-cognitivists focus predominately on the act of calling
or saying that something is morally right and the point or function ofmoral language
(e.g., Hare 1952: 169; Gibbard 1990: 6). This focus means that their particular
account ofmoral psychology derives from a theory about what agents are doing
when they issue moral utterances. Non-cognitivists argue that if issuing a moral
judgement entails motivation, then, because no descriptive or fact-stating claim
entails motivation, moral judgements must involve something other than a
descriptive or fact-stating claim. I rejected the conclusion of this style of anti-
cognitivist argument and offered the following alternative:
C(ii) Judging that an act is morally right either involves something
other than a judgement that some fact or state of affairs obtains or
something in addition to such a judgement.
This is an important result because our ordinary experience ofmorality suggests that
moral judgements involve a fact-stating component and an affective or motivating
component. So a theory that can accommodate both these features is preferable to
one which forces us to revise our ordinary thinking about morality and accept only
one of the features (cf. Smith 1994: 13).
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In order to defend the second disjunct of the revised conclusion, we need to
understand the nature of the affective addition and its relation to the fact-stating
component ofmoral judgement. But many standard approaches to language appear
to block the possibility of combining fact-stating and motivating features in a single
judgement or utterance. For example, according to non-cognitivism the gulf between
factual and practical concerns is enshrined in our very use of language. So while
some parts of our language are fact-stating, other parts are used to do things such as
issue commands or express feelings (see Stevenson 1937; Hare 1952: esp. chap. 5).
The task then becomes one of determining whether a particular piece of language is
fact-stating or performative. However, because our use of language is not always
consonant with the grammatical form in which we express ourselves, linguistic
function can be difficult to determine. For example, the standard linguistic device
used to make statements is the indicative sentence, but not all utterances we make
using indicative sentences should be thought of as assertions of fact. Specifically,
according to non-cognitivism, evaluative utterances are best understood as
imperatives or expressions of feeling and not as the truth-evaluable statements
suggested by their surface grammar.
In How to Do Things with Words, John Austin notes this common distinction
between fact-stating language and language that seems to involve our doing
something rather than just saying something (1962). Statements, assertions,
descriptions and the like, according to this view, are distinguished by their
assessability in terms of truth and falsity and their association with belief and
objective fact. In contrast, performatives such as commands, exclamations,
promises, requests, namings and the like are not assessable in terms of truth and
falsity but in terms ofhow well they are performed. If I say to you, 'Shut the
window', it makes little sense to ask whether what I have said is true or false, but it
does make sense to ask if the utterance was appropriately performed. For example,
my choice of expression would clearly be inappropriate if it were obvious that the
window was already closed. Austin's profound insight was to note that the utterance
of statements, descriptions, assertions and the like, just as much as the utterance of so
called 'performatives', involve the speaker's doing and not just saying something.
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Speaking a language, he argues, has to do with performing linguistic or speech acts
according to certain rules. And this is the case regardless of the type of sentence
used in the performance of the speech act. Statements, as well as imperatives and
exclamations, are assessable in terms of how well they are performed. Austin's
insight points to a way of understanding how we combine practical and factual
elements in our use of language. IfAustin is correct, then the combination of the
factual and the practical, seemingly typical of our use ofmoral expressions, is
ubiquitous rather than anomalous in our linguistic practice.
In order to explain how speech act theory can help our understanding ofmoral
judgements it needs to be examined in more detail. To do this I make use of Searle's
theory of the nature and structure of speech acts and make use of his terminology.2
Searle's theory provides the basis for a systematic account of the relations between
moral utterances and the various functions such utterances are used to perform. I
argue that this allows us to accommodate a range of intuitions central to the notion of
moral judgement.
3. The Structure of Speech Acts: lllocutionary Force and Propositional
Content
Like Austin, Searle holds that speaking a language involves the performance of acts
according to certain rules. And understanding how agents communicate involves
understanding what a speaker is doing when she 'seriously'(not play acting) and
'literally'(not ironically) utters a sentence to a hearer or hearers (1969: 57).
According to Searle, in most cases the serious and literal utterance of a sentence will
involve the performance of the following acts: the act of uttering certain words or
'utterance act'\ the acts of referring and predicating, together called the
'propositional actand an act such as stating, questioning, promising, wishing,
requesting, and so on, or 'illocutionary act '(1969: 24). These different acts are
meant to be viewed as abstractions from the total speech act. While an utterance act
can be performed independently of a propositional act or an illocutionary act - for
2 Searle extends and adapts the work on speech act theory begun by Austin. See Searle 1969;
1979; 1989.
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example, I can say words without expressing a proposition or stating, questioning,
promising, etc. - a propositional act can only be performed if an utterance act and an
illocutionary act are also performed. For example, I cannot refer to a particular
window and predicate the expression 'is open' of it unless I state that the window is
open and utter the sentence, 'the window is open'. Similarly, the performance of an
illocutionary act necessarily involves the performance both of an utterance act and a
propositional act. I cannot state or question or demand that the window is open
unless I utter the appropriate sentence and perform the appropriate propositional acts
of referring and predicating.
For our purposes the distinction between illocutionary acts and propositional acts is
worthy of special attention. Searle takes as the grammatical correlate of
propositional acts sentence-parts rather than complete sentences (1962: 29). For
example, the statement 'Sam smokes habitually', the question 'Does Sam smoke
habitually?, and the imperative 'Sam, smoke habitually!' all share the same
propositional content, expressed by the sentence-part 'that Sam smokes habitually'.
On Searle's account of propositions, a speaker in uttering any one of these sentences
performs the act of referring to Sam and the act of predicating the expression
'smoking habitually' of him. That is, the three different illocutionary acts all
express the same proposition because the same propositional act is performed in each
case. In each case, however, the proposition is expressed with a different
illocutionaryforce: the first sentence has the illocutionary force of a statement, the
second sentence has the illocutionary force of a question, and the third sentence has
the illocutionary force of a command. The grammatical correlate of the illocutionary
act is a complete sentence. In order to warn, describe, request, or question, etc., one
needs to utter a complete sentence.
The expression 'I state' in the sentence 'I state that Sam smokes habitually' is an
explicit illocutionaryforce indicator, telling us directly what illocutionary act is
being performed by the speaker in the utterance of the sentence. Searle notes that the
following items can act as illocutionary force indicators in English: word order,
3 Searle points out that this may be a one word sentence such as 'Stop' (1969: 25).
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stress, intonation, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and, as in our example,
performative verbs (1969, 30). It is important to recognize that any complete
sentence will have by virtue of its meaning some kind of illocutionary force indicator
which determines the type of illocutionary act that a literal and serious utterance of
the sentence will constitute. Searle stresses that we should not take the primary
distinction to be between sentence meaning and illocutionary force, that is, between a
sentence and the illocutionary act performed in the utterance of the sentence.
Complete sentences, unlike propositions, are not neutral with regard to illocutionary
force. The serious and literal utterance of a sentence therefore will always include its
being uttered with a particular illocutionary force. Illocutionary force indicators of
some sort invariably form part of the meaning of a sentence. The crucial distinction,
Searle argues, is between illocutionaryforce and propositional content.
How do the details of Searle's theory help with the problem about moral motivation?
Recall the internalist intuition that motivation is conceptually tied to moral
judgement. Ifwe think about judgements or statements in terms of their
propositional content, that is, solely in terms of what they assert, then we will tend to
view the internalist's conceptual claim as a claim about the conceptual connections
between the propositional content ofmoral judgements and motivation. It will then
be tempting to say that motivation is conceptually tied to the moral terms and phrases
which distinguish the propositional content of moral judgements from non-moral
judgements. And thus we might conclude that it is part of the truth-conditional
meaning of terms such as 'right' and 'good' that an agent judging something as right
or good is motivated to conform to her judgement.4 However, Searle's distinction
between the illocutionary force and the propositional content of an utterance suggests
another way of interpreting the internalist intuition: namely, as a claim about the
illocutionary force rather than the truth-conditional content ofmoral utterances.
4
In chap 1,1 give a number of reasons for rejecting this form of content internalism.
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Speech act theory gives us a structured way of understanding the conditions
governing the performance of illocutionary acts and explains how these acts relate to
their propositional contents. Consider the simple case of assertions. To successfully
assert that, 'Churchill was a wartime prime minister,' I must satisfy what Searle
terms the 'essential condition.' For assertions the essential condition is that the
utterance 'counts as an undertaking to the effect that p [e.g. That Churchill was a
wartime prime minister] represents an actual state of affairs' (Searle 1969: 66). It is
clear that whether or not this condition is satisfied, and thus whether or not I
successfully perform the assertion, is independent of the truth of the proposition
asserted. That is, the proposition, 'Churchill was a wartime prime minister,' is true
or false regardless of whether I succeed in asserting it. We might say, then, that there
is a necessary connection between the illocutionary act of asserting that p and the
essential condition that the utterance involved counts as an undertaking to the effect
that p represents an actual state of affairs. This is perfectly consistent with there
being no necessary connection between the truth of the proposition asserted and the
satisfaction of the performance condition in question. In a similar way, we might
construe the motivational requirement on moral judgements as one of the conditions
regulating the performance of moral utterances, rather than as a feature of the
propositional content of such utterances. If I say, for example, 'Churchill's support
for saturation bombing was morally wrong,' this can be true or false regardless of
whether or not I successfully perform the moral speech act. Even so, we might judge
my performance of the moral speech act as faulty, in a way yet to be specified, if I
am not appropriately motivated.
In chapter one, I said that the expression 'moral judgement' is structurally
ambiguous: it can refer either to the act ofmaking a moral judgement or to the
content of a moral judgement. In this section I have suggested that speech act theory
provides a way ofunderstanding this distinction in terms of the difference between
the performance of a particular kind of linguistic act and the propositional content of
such an act. While this is a helpful first step, we need to give a precise account of
how the connection between illocutionary force and motivation will work in the case
ofmoral judgements.
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4. Assertion and Compound Speech Acts
The last section showed that even in the case of a simple assertion we can distinguish
between the conditions governing the performance of the illocutionary act of
assertion and the truth conditions for the proposition asserted. And I noted that these
two features of the speech act are logically independent. But does the example of an
assertive speech act help us with the case ofmoral judgements? It is not clear that it
does. Consider the conditions that Searle says are necessary for the successful and
sincere performance of the illocutionary act of assertion:
a) Propositional content condition. Any proposition p.
b) Preparatory conditions.
1. The speaker has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the tmth of p.
2. It is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer knows p.
c) Sincerity condition. The speaker believes that p.
d) Essential condition. The utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents
an actual state of affairs. (Searle 1969: 66)
What this list tells us is that there is nothing in the conditions governing the
successful and sincere performance of the illocutionary act of assertion that entails
that the speaker holds a particular motivating attitude or desire towards the
propositional content of the illocution. And this seems to count against the attempt
to meet the internalist requirement on the basis of the conditions governing the
performance ofmoral assertions. Does this mean that to accommodate internalism
we must return to the notion that the motivational requirement is built into the
meaning ofmoral terms or the truth conditions for moral judgements? I don't think
so. We need to examine a slightly more complex case of assertion to see why the
absence of a motivational requirement in the conditions on assertion does not
undermine a speech act approach to moral motivation.
Consider the following example. In the context of a lively discussion with a friend,
Emma issues the following utterance: 'I argue that Churchill was at one time a
member of the Liberal Party.' This utterance clearly involves an act of assertion.
Emma asserts that Churchill was once a member of the Liberal Party. But that is not
all she does. The presence of the illocutionary verb 'to argue' tells us that she is
trying to convince her friend of the truth of her assertion. As Searle points out, to say
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'I am arguing that p but not attempting to convince you that p' sounds inconsistent.
By contrast, saying 'I am simply stating that p but not attempting to convince you
that p' seems acceptable (Searle 1969: 66). Something is going on in the case of
arguing that p that is absent in the case of simply asserting that p. I suggest that in
the case of arguing that p one is attempting to convince the hearer of the truth of p.
In the vocabulary of speech act theory, we might say that arguing that p involves the
speaker's issuing a directive illocution along the lines of 'believe that p!' This is in
addition to the act of asserting that p.
The verb 'to argue' is simply one example of an illocutionary verb which when used
in the context of a speech situation involves the performance ofmore than one
illocutionary act.5 Another example of this kind of 'compound' illocutionary verb is
the verb 'to warn.' If a speaker says, T warn you that the bridge is about to
collapse,' she asserts that the bridge is about to collapse and directs the hearer to
avoid the danger. That is, she performs both an assertive and a directive
illocutionary act. If I say to you, 'Let's go to the movies tonight,' I direct you to go
to the movies and commit myself to going with you. So I perform a directive
illocutionary act and an act of commitment.
What these examples show is that we need not worry that the performance conditions
on bare assertion do not involve the speaker's having a particular motivational
attitude towards the asserted proposition. We can explain the presence of a
motivational requirement on moral speech acts by establishing that their performance
invariably involves the performance of illocutionary acts linked to motivating states.
In the case ofmoral speech acts, we need to determine what kinds of illocutionary
acts are standardly performed in the sincere and literal utterance of a moral
judgement.
5 Fotion discusses this aspect ofSearle's theory of speech acts. He refers to what I call compound
speech acts as 'double speech acts' (2000: 57-64).
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The fact that more than one illocutionary act is performed by way of a single
utterance is not by itself sufficient to explain the internalist intuitions with which we
are concerned. There are some expressions which are conventionally and
systematically used to perform illocutionary acts other than those that make up their
literal meanings.6 For example, the question, 'Can you pass the salt?,' is almost
always used to make a request, even though, taken literally, it makes no request of
the hearer to pass the salt. In a sense, we are already perfectly aware that moral
utterances are conventionally used to do more than issue bare assertions. What we
are after is an account ofwhy the connection between the various illocutionary acts
seems so close in the case ofmoral judgements.
Consider again the compound illocutionary verb, 'to argue.' In order to argue for a
proposition, the speaker must assert its truth and direct the hearer to accept it.
Arguing is a distinct kind of speech act comprising a number ofbasic illocutionary
acts unified by a particular goal: that of convincing the hearer about the truth of the
proposition presented. Is there a distinct kind of compound speech act involved in
making moral judgements? It seems to me there is: moral judgements are a type of
evaluation. Perhaps ifwe think ofmoral speech acts as evaluative illocutions rather
than bare assertions we may move some way towards understanding the different
illocutionary acts involved in moral judgement. Of course, moral judgements are
only one type of evaluation; we also make, for example, epistemic, inferential,
aesthetic, and prudential evaluations. While it is intuitively easy to distinguish moral
evaluations from the first three types of evaluation, the shared practical orientation of
prudential and moral evaluation makes distinguishing between them more difficult.
However, this is not the place to undertake the difficult task of giving a precise
account of how morality differs from other types ofpractical evaluation. For our
purposes, it will be adequate to talk of moral evaluation as a form of practical
evaluation: as one way in which we assess conduct in determining how to act.
6 See chap 2 of Searle (1979) for a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of'indirect speech acts'.
In order to understand the nature ofmoral speech acts it will help to outline the
conditions that might be said to govern the performance ofmoral evaluations.
Before attempting this, however, I want to examine in more detail elements of
Searle's theory of illocutionary acts.
5. The Nature of Illocutionary Acts
Searle's example of assertion shows that there are a number of different types of
performance conditions he thinks illocutionary acts must satisfy in order to be
successfully and sincerely performed. In this section, I discuss his classification of
illocutionary acts based on differences in the way they satisfy these conditions.
According to Searle 'there are a...limited number of basic things we do with
language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit
ourselves to doing things, we express feelings and attitudes, and we bring about
changes through our utterances' (1979: 29). The most important notion with regard
to classifying the uses of language is the essential point or purpose of a speech act
(Searle 1969: 69; 1979: 2). Searle calls this the act's 'illocutionary point' and says
that it corresponds to the notion of an essential condition (1979: 2).7 For example, if
we look at the essential condition for assertives, given above, it tells us that the
illocutionary point of assertive speech acts is to represent the world as being a certain
way. By contrast, says Searle, the essential point of a command is to get the hearer
to do something, and the essential point of a promise is to place oneself under an
obligation to perform a certain act. Using the basic notion of differences in
illocutionary point, Searle classifies illocutionary acts into five basic types: i)
assertives (e.g., statements, descriptions); ii) directives (e.g., requests, commands,
questions); iii) commissives (e.g., promises, commitments); iii) expressives (e.g.,
congratulations, apologies); iv) declarations (e.g., appointing, christening) (1979: 12-
20).
7 The analysis in terms ofperformance 'conditions' comes from Searle's Speech Acts (1969). He
introduces the notion of 'illocutionary point' in developing a detailed taxonomy of illocutionary acts
in a later piece of work (Searle: 1979: chap. 1). Given that the later analysis supplements rather than
replaces the earlier one, I draw from both in applying Searle's theory to the particular problem of
moral judgements.
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In addition to the notion of an essential or illocutionary point, Searle claims that the
psychological state expressed in the performance of a speech act is crucial in
identifying its type (Searle 1969: 60; 1979: 4). Thus, each main category of
illocutionary act has a particular type of psychological state the expression ofwhich
is necessary for the sincere performance of acts within that class. The sincerity
condition for assertives, shown above, is that the speaker believes what she asserts.
By contrast, the sincerity condition for directives is that the speaker has a desire that
the hearer do the act the speaker directs her to do. For example, if I ask you to shut
the window, I am sincere in so far as a want or desire you to shut the window. The
sincerity condition for commissives is that the speaker intends to perform the act she
has said she will do: if I promise to meet you at the theatre, I am sincere in so far as I
intend to meet you there.
Sincerity conditions are distinct from the other types of performance conditions in
that they do not have to be satisfied in order for an illocutionary act to be
successfully performed (Searle 1969: 62; 1979: 4-5). We thus distinguish between
o
sincerity conditions and success conditions. Although an agent can be insincere in
her performance of an illocutionary act and fail to have the appropriate psychological
state, in performing the act she still expresses or purports to have the psychological
state required by the sincerity condition.9 To deny giving this special status to
8 If an illocutionary act, say a promise, is unsuccessfully performed it does not count as a promise. If
the promise is merely insincere, the speaker succeeds in performing the promise even though the
perfonnance is defective. In Austin's terms, an unsuccessful attempt at an illocutionary act is a
'misfire', and a successful but insincere illocutionary act involves an 'abuse' of the relevant procedure
(1962: chaps 3, 4).
9 Mike Ridge argues that there are cases in which an agent fails to have the psychological state
necessary to satisfy the sincerity condition for the illocutionary act she performs and yet it seems her
speech act is sincere or at least not insincere (Ridge 2002; 2004). For example, Emma might believe
falsely that she wants her friend to come with her to the cinema. When Emma requests that her friend
accompany her to the cinema, on Searle's model, she is sincere insofar as she desires him to
accompany her. But Ridge points out that in cases like these, given that Emma believes she wants her
friend to come with her, it seems that Emma is sincere in her request. Ridge argues that to make sense
of these kinds ofexamples we need to distinguish between acceptance conditions and sincerity
conditions. Roughly, a speech act is sincere just in case the speaker has a second order belief that she
possesses the psychological state it is the function of that kind of speech act to express (2004: 6). The
first order states that such speech acts conventionally express are, on this account, the acceptance
conditions for the speech acts. This leads Ridge to formulate what he takes to be the most plausible
version ofmoral judgement internalism. Acceptance judgement internalism posits a necessary
connection between the acceptance of a moral judgement and the possession of a relevant motivating
state (Ridge 2002: 7). Acceptance is thus a psychological rather than a linguistic constraint on moral
judgement. Ridge argues that the real issue ofmoral motivation is thus the connection between
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sincerity conditions would raise a number of difficulties. For example, in the case of
promises, denying this status would mean that we could not hold someone
accountable for their promise if they were insincere, as they would not have made a
promise. More generally, we could not easily speak of insincere statements or
insincere requests, as such illocutions would either be sincere or not made.
The essential condition and the sincerity condition for a particular illocutionary act
allow us to determine its direction of fit. This is a notion familiar from our
discussion of the desire/belief thesis in chapter one. Searle applies it to the way in
which the propositional content of an illocutionary act relates to the world (1979: 3).
For example, in making an assertion, a speaker attempts to get her words (the
propositional content) to fit the world, whereas in issuing a directive, a speaker
attempts to get the world to conform to her words (propositional content). An
assertion is thus said to have a word-to-world direction of fit while a directive is said
to have a world-to-word direction of fit. Commissives, like directives, have a world-
to-word direction of fit: if I commit myself to meeting you tomorrow, I aim to get my
behaviour (the world) to fit what I have said I will do (my words).
Expressives and declarations are slightly more complex than the other forms of
illocutionary acts. The essential point of an expressive act is to express the
psychological state required by its sincerity condition. The precise nature of this
psychological state depends on the particular type of expressive illocutionary act
being performed. For example, if I congratulate you on winning the competition, I
am sincere in so far as I am pleased for you and respect your achievement. By
contrast, if I apologise for not posting your entry form, I am sincere in so far as I feel
sorry for having forgotten. Expressives do not have a direction of fit: they are
neither attempts to get the world to fit the words as with directives nor to get the
words to fit with the world as with assertives. Declarations, by contrast, do not have
a sincerity condition but have a dual direction of fit. The essential point of a
thinking that something is right and motivation not between saying that something is right and
motivation. In chap 5,1 argue that the linguistic rules governing moral speech acts are an integral part
ofmoral practice, and that moral thought, insofar as it reflects that practice, is also governed by the
same rules.
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declaration is to bring about a match between the prepositional content of an
utterance and reality. In performing a declaration we aim both to get the words to fit
the world and to get the world to fit the words. For example, if I declare the meeting
adjourned, I attempt to get the words to match the world by making it the case, by
virtue ofmy very utterance, that the meeting is adjourned: by making the world
match the words.
This short overview of Searle's theory of illocutionary acts provides us with the
background needed to attempt a more detailed analysis ofmoral speech acts. The
approach I favour aims to elucidate the nature ofmoral judgements by determining
how moral illocutions meet the various kinds of performance conditions outlined
above.
6. How to Make a Moral Judgement
In this section, I use Searle's model, given above for assertion, to provide an account
of the conditions governing the performance of moral evaluations.10 The following
conditions, then, are necessary for the sincere and successful perfonnance of the
illocutionary act ofmoral evaluation."
i) Propositional content condition
In the case of evaluations, unlike bare assertions, there is a feature of the proposition
expressed that acts as an illocutionary force indicating device: that tells us that an
evaluation rather that a bare assertion or some other illocution is being performed.
The feature in question is the evaluative predicate or evaluative term. In using
evaluative terms such as 'good', 'right', or 'justified', a speaker signals to her
audience that she is making an evaluative judgement. Let's say that a condition on
the propositional content of evaluations is that the speaker predicates an evaluative
10 For ease of expression and depending on the context, I will sometimes use 'practical evaluation' or
'evaluation' rather than 'moral evaluation'.
11 In order to elucidate the general structure of illocutionary acts, Searle devotes an entire chapter to
outlining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful and sincere performance of the
illocutionary act ofpromising (1969: chap. 3). Here I attempt the more limited task of outlining the
conditions necessary for the successful and sincere performance of the illocutionary act of moral
evaluation. I make no claim that the analysis provides conditions which when taken together are
sufficient for performing successful moral speech acts.
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property of the object referred to by the subject term of the uttered sentence. For
example, in the moral evaluation, 'Supporting the strike is the right thing to do,' the
property of rightness is predicated of the act of supporting the strike.
ii) Essential Condition
I have argued that evaluations involve something in addition to assertion, rather than
their being distinct from assertions, in the way, for example, that imperatives are
distinct from assertions. An evaluation is in part made up of an assertion, so the
conditions governing assertion also apply to evaluations. This means that the
essential condition for assertion must be incorporated into our statement of the
essential condition for evaluation. What then is the essential point or aim ofmoral
evaluations? That is, what is it that the speaker wants to accomplish by issuing an
evaluative speech act? I suggest we think of practically evaluative utterances as
essentially involving a commitment by the speaker to act in accordance with the
content of the uttered proposition: that is, a commitment to being appropriately
guided by those features of a situation the utterance represents as favourable or
unfavourable. Moral evaluations thus involve, in addition to assertion, the
performance of a commissive illocutionary act: an act that commits the speaker to
behaving in a certain way in the future.
On this model, an evaluative utterance counts as an attempt to represent an actual
state of affairs and so satisfies the essential condition for assertion. However, the
point of an evaluative utterance is not just to represent any old state of affairs.
Rather, and in line with the propositional content condition already discussed, its aim
is to represent those features of a situation that are of practical normative
significance: that favour acting in one way rather than another. The fact that the
utterance also constitutes a commitment to be guided by the content of the evaluation
is integral to its being practical in both its subject matter and use. Only if an agent is
committed to being guided by her practical evaluations can she be said to be
engaging in distinctly practical deliberation.
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iii) Preparatory Condition
Preparatory conditions involve the kinds of things that need to be presupposed before
a speaker can begin legitimately to issue her speech act. In general they concern the
suitability of a speech situation for the satisfaction of the point of a speech act as
described by its essential condition. Searle explains:
For example, if I make a request to someone to do something which it is obvious that he is
already doing or is about to do quite independently of the request, then my request is
pointless and to that extent defective. In an actual speech situation, listeners, knowing the
rules for performing illocutionary acts, will assume that this condition is satisfied. (Searle
1969:59)
The relation between evaluation and assertion means that the preparatory conditions
for assertion also apply to evaluation, so the speaker must have evidence for the truth
of her evaluative proposition. A preparatory condition specific to evaluative
illocutions is that the speaker issuing the illocution must be normatively engaged:
that is, the speaker must be able to be moved by normative considerations.12 A
practical evaluation is defective, then, if the speaker is unable to be influenced by
and to respond appropriately to practically normative considerations. This is because
if a speaker is outside practical normativity in this sense, then her moral evaluation is
pointless, given that its aim is to guide her action. And this means that a hearer or
hearers will assume that the speaker issuing the evaluation is able to be guided by her
judgement.
iv) Sincerity Condition
This condition looks like it might provide the best opportunity to explain the close
connection between evaluative judgements and motivation. After all, motivating
states are mental states, and the sincerity condition for illocutionary acts involves the
mental state or states that an agent must possess in order for her illocution to be
sincere. Can we say, then, that the possession of a motivating attitude of some sort is
necessary for the sincere utterance of a practical evaluation? This will depend on
which illocutionary acts we take to make up the 'compound' act of evaluation. The
12 This requirement is admittedly vague at the moment. A more precise account of it will be given in
the context of a discussion of the notion of'normative expectation' in chap. 4.
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essential condition tells us that an evaluative speech act consists of an assertive
illocutionary act and a commissive illocutionary act. The assertive portion represents
the evaluative proposition as true and the commissive portion commits the speaker to
being guided by the content of the proposition. As we have seen, making an
assertion does not entail the possession of a motivating attitude; consequently, to
elucidate the link between evaluation and motivation we must focus on the
commissive act.
The essential point of commissives is to commit the speaker to some future act or
type of act. The archetypal commissive is promising. If I promise to do A, then I
commit myself to doing A. Promising involves, essentially, the speaker's placing
herself under an obligation to act. The sincerity condition for commissives also
connects them directly with action. To commit myself sincerely to acting in a certain
way, I must intend to act in such a way. For example, to commit myself to being
guided by an evaluative proposition, I must intend to be guided by that proposition.
And intention is a motivating attitude par excellence.'3
To summarise, then, I have argued that the following conditions are necessary
(though not sufficient) for the successful and sincere performance of the speech act
ofmoral evaluation:
a) Propositional content condition. The speaker predicates an evaluative
property of the object referred to by the subject term of the uttered
sentence.
b) Preparatory conditions.
1. The speaker has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p (viz:
the evaluative proposition).
2. It is not obvious to the speaker that the hearer knows p.
3. The speaker is normatively engaged.
13 It will become clear when we discuss the issue of failures ofmotivation in the next chapter that this
formulation of the sincerity condition needs to be refined. However, it is a useful first step and points
towards the formulation for which I finally opt.
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c) Sincerity conditions.
1. The speaker believes that p.
2. The speaker intends to be guided by the content of p.
d) Essential condition.
1. The utterance counts as an undertaking by the speaker to be
guided by the content of p.
2. The utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that p
represents an actual state of affairs (viz: the features of the
situation that favour acting in a particular way).
Thus far in the chapter, I have given an account of act internalism in terms of the
performance of a certain kind of speech act called a moral evaluation. I have argued
that we can accommodate the fact-stating and the motivating aspects ofmoral
judgements by understanding them as a type of compound speech act. According to
this approach, a moral evaluation involves the 'compound' performance of both an
assertive illocutionary act and a commissive illocutionary act. The connection
between moral judgements and motivation is secured by the essential point of such
evaluations, namely, that a moral utterance counts as an undertaking by a speaker to
be guided by the content of the uttered evaluative proposition.
On the speech act model, a speaker in making a moral judgement expresses her
commitment to acting in accordance with the content of the uttered proposition. In
making a sincere moral judgement, the speaker must intend to be guided by the
content of the uttered proposition. Intention is a motivating attitude par excellence.
Consequently, an agent who makes a sincere moral judgement will have some
motivation to act in accordance with it. In so far as the speaker does not understand
that her utterance commits her to acting in accordance with the evaluation, her
utterance will not count as a moral judgement. More generally, if a speaker fails to
satisfy the essential condition of a speech act, the speech act will not count as having
been successfully performed. Nonetheless, because the motivational requirement on
moral judgement is accommodated at the level of illocutionary force rather than at
the level of propositional content, the speech act approach does not threaten the
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categoricy ofmoral requirements. That is, moral claims can be true or false
independently of whether the agent who makes them is motivated to conform to
them.
In the next section, I discuss an approach to the issues of internalism and moral
motivation by David Copp (2001). Copp's approach is similar to mine in that he
attempts to accommodate moral judgement internalism and moral cognitivism by
construing the internalist requirement in terms of the linguistic conventions
governing the performance ofmoral judgements. I argue that there are a number of
reasons for preferring my account to his.
7. Copp's Discourse Internalism
In a recent paper, David Copp proposes addressing the problem ofmoral motivation
from the perspective of language (2001). His suggestion is that the connection
between moral judgement and motivation be explicated via the linguistic conventions
governing the performance ofmoral speech acts, rather than at the level of truth-
conditional content. Copp calls his position 'realist-expressivism.' He argues, as I
did in chapter one, that the traditional opposition between moral realism and
antirealist-expressivism does not derive from the expressivist portion of the
antirealist position. That is, it does not follow from the fact that moral judgements
typically express affective or conative states that some form of non-cognitivist moral
anti-realism is true. Expressivism as a positive thesis about the linguistic function of
certain kinds of evaluative sentences is perfectly consistent with cognitivism about
the content of those sentences, and thus with realism about the evaluative facts and
properties to which such sentences refer.
Whereas I apply Searle's work on speech acts to the problem ofmoral motivation,
Copp draws on Grice's notions of conversational and conventional implicature as
well as Frege's concept of'colouring' to develop his view. This means that while
the general thrust of our positions is the same - a linguistic approach to the problem
ofmoral motivation - the details are quite different. Copp says that his view
involves the pragmatics ofmoral assertion. He argues that it is in virtue of the
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conditions on the performance ofmoral assertions that speaker's will standardly
evince a conative attitude of the relevant sort (Copp 2001: 14). And this in turn is
explained by the semantics ofmoral terms: it is because of the non-truth-conditional
meaning or 'colouring' ofmoral terms that moral assertions conventionally express
conative attitudes. Consequently, says Copp, the 'having of the relevant belief and
the having of the appropriate motivation might each be necessary to the sincerity of
the speaker's assertion without the motivation being a necessary condition of belief
(Copp 2001: 38).
As we have seen, our experience ofmorality suggests that there are both cognitive
and affective components to genuine moral judgement. Copp needs to explain why
his proposal is not merely an ad hoc restatement of this fact. His solution is to use
the Fregean notion of colouring to explain how some predicates have a 'broad' or
non-truth-conditional aspect to their meaning, in addition to their 'core' or truth-
conditional meaning, which affects their performance conditions when used to make
assertions (Copp 2001: 15). Copp suggests that pejorative terms give a clear
example of how such colouring works. He uses the pejorative term 'cur' to illustrate
the point. While 'cur' and 'mongrel dog' have the same reference, the colouring of
'cur' means that it is standardly also used to express contempt for a dog. Thus,
while, 'The mongrel dog howled all night,' and, 'The cur howled all night,' have the
same reference and express the same thought, the colouring of'cur' means that the
utterance of the latter expression also implies contempt for the dog. I will use a
different example in order to avoid difficulties arising from the fact that 'mongrel' is
also used as a term of abuse. What we require is an instance of a clearly coloured
term and its non-coloured equivalent to elucidate the way in which the colouring of a
term can explain the reliable and conceptual connections between its use and, for
example, expressions of contempt.
The term 'pinko' is a derogatory and offensive word used to describe people who
hold left-wing or socialist political views. The term is used to refer to such people
but also to express the speaker's contempt for them. If this is right, then it would
indicate a lack ofmastery of the conventions for the use of the term 'pinko' if one
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were to use it simply to refer to socialists without also to expressing contempt for
them. Even so, an assertion such as, 'The teacher is a pinko,' can be true even if the
speech performance involved is defective because the speaker does not express
contempt. The proposition believed is the same in the case of this statement and its
non-coloured equivalent, 'The teacher is a socialist,' as are the truth-conditions for
both statements. What differs is the contempt implied by judgements in which the
tenn 'pinko' is used. The reliable connection between such judgements and
contempt is a result of the linguistic conventions governing the use of the term
'pinko' rather than the truth-conditional content of such judgements, or an external
and contingent desire to condemn 'pinkos.' Copp calls this kind of internalism,
'discourse internalism'.
Copp holds that the use of coloured predicates provides an example of grammatically
assertive utterances that require the expression of a relevant conative state as well as
the usual cognitive state in order to be linguistically appropriate. He applies this
model to the use of moral terms, highlighting the difference in sincerity conditions
between assertions such as, 'Cursing is widespread,' and those such as, 'Cursing is
morally wrong' (2001: 14). The speaker of the first assertion is sincere if she has a
relevant belief. The speaker of the second assertion is sincere if she has a relevant
belief and is in a relevant conative state. Copp argues that it is the colouring of the
expression 'morally wrong' that accounts for the difference in sincerity conditions
between the two assertions. And he holds that this colouring is part of the meaning
of'morally wrong,' 'at least in a wide sense of 'meaning,' for it is characteristic of
the linguistic conventions governing the use ofthe term'' (Copp 2001: 14. My
emphasis).
A problem with Copp's notion ofwide meaning is that the presence of linguistic
norms determining what a term or expression conventionally implies does not show
that the term or expression in question has this 'coloured' aspect as part of its literal
meaning. For example, conventions governing the use of the sentence, 'You are
blocking my view,' dictate that it is standardly uttered as a request for the hearer to
get out of the speaker's line of vision. A sincere use of the sentence would normally,
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therefore, require the speaker both to believe that the hearer was blocking his view
and to desire the hearer to move. However, this does not show that the literal
meaning of the sentence includes a hidden or coloured directive aspect. Rather, the
literal and non-coloured meaning of the sentence makes it appropriate for issuing
indirect requests. A speaker is insincere if she uses this sentence in a conventional
way to issue a request but does not desire the hearer to move. However, the sentence
can be uttered sincerely and literally as a direct assertion without a request being
made. For example, I might request that my friend sit in front ofme to obscure the
view of a frightening movie. When she is in the correct position I say, 'You are
blocking my view,' and mean just what I say. The sincerity ofmy assertion in such
cases depends only on my possession of the relevant belief. None of this alters the
fact that someone who did not understand that such sentences are conventionally
used to make requests would lack mastery of the linguistic conventions regulating
their use. These considerations suggest that it cannot merely be the presence of
linguistic nonns governing the standard uses of terms and expressions that makes
those uses part of literal meaning.
The theory of indirect speech acts shows that we can generally isolate the literal
meaning of a sentence from its indirect meaning, even when the indirect meaning
forms part of the conventional use of the sentence (Searle 1979: chap. 2). However,
there may be some tenns whose conditions of use cannot be separated from their
literal meanings. If there were predicates that not only referred to particular
properties but invariably included expressive force indication as part of their literal
meaning, then they might provide an example of colouring not explicable in terms of
indirect speech acts. Pejoratives are characterised by the role they play in the
performance of expressive illocutionary acts, specifically in the expression of
contempt. For example, the literal and sincere assertion that someone is a 'nigger'
invariably includes an expression of contempt for that person. And it is difficult to
imagine a context in which the non-ironic assertive use of'nigger' would not convey
contempt. However, even if there were invariably coloured predicates, it is doubtful
that it would be in virtue of the conditions on assertion that a speaker in using them
expressed, for example, contempt. Rather, the colouring of the predicate would
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function as a separate force indicator for the relevant non-assertoric illocutionary act
which would be performed in addition to the assertive act.
There are a number of considerations that support the claim that it is not in virtue of
the conditions on the performance of assertions that the use of coloured predicates
involves the expression of conative states. As its name suggests, Copp's realist-
expressivism is an attempt to explain moral motivation along expressivist lines. An
expressivist account ofpejoratives would hold that a term such as 'pinko' is not a
genuine referring term. In so far as it refers at all, it refers to the property of being a
person with left-wing or socialist political views. We can factor out pejorative terms
into a genuine predicate and an expressive force indicator. Thus, 'pinko' might be
represented as, B! (socialist), where 'B!' indicates an expression of contempt.14 The
sentence, 'The teacher is a B! (socialist)' would therefore be equivalent to the
sentence, 'The teacher is a pinko.' This suggests that it is not by way of the
conditions governing the assertive portion of pejorative sentences that speakers
express contempt. The reason is that it is not possible to assert that someone is a
'pinko,' only that someone is a socialist. But this means that it cannot be in virtue of
the conditions governing the assertion of such terms that they standardly express
conative states of the relevant kind.
The nature of the performance conditions governing assertive illocutionary acts also
lends support to the claim that it is not by way ofmaking assertions that speakers
express conative states. Assertives are said to have a 'word-to-world' direction of fit
similar to the mind-to-world direction of fit of cognitive states. The illocutionary
point of assertives is to say that things stand in a certain way and assertives commit
speakers to the truth of the propositions asserted. The assertion of a statement is thus
the standard linguistic device for the expression of belief. It is commonly held that it
is not part of the nature of belief-like states to motivate agents. It seems reasonable
to assume that, equally, it is not the task of assertives to express speakers' non-
14 Blackburn uses this style of'expressive' language in order to give an analysis of standard indicative
moral sentences in expressivist terms: 'Imagine a language unlike English in containing no evaluative
predicates...It might contain a 'hooray!' operator and a 'boo!' operator (H!, B!) which attach to
descriptions of things to result in expressions of attitude' (Blackburn 1984: 193).
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cognitive states. If this is correct, the role of expressing conative states should not be
attributed to the assertive component of speech acts.
If the above arguments are sound, we have reason to reject Copp's account of
colouring, based as it is on a flawed account of how pejoratives work. What
implications does this have for his attempt to view the expressive force ofmoral
predicates along the lines of pejoratives? In so far as moral predicates do function
like pejoratives, the expressive force ofmoral judgements will not be explicable via
the conditions on the performance of assertive speech acts. However, we might
question the extent to which moral predicates do work like pejoratives. Unlike moral
terms, pejoratives appear to have expressive force regardless of the grammatical
context in which they are used (cf. Searle 1969: 156). For example, if I ask the
question, 'Is the teacher a pinko?', I express contempt for socialists even though I
make no assertion. Similarly, if I issue the command, 'Catch the pinko!', I express
contempt for socialists.
Now, the neutrality of predicates with regard to force is crucial in distinguishing the
propositional content of a speech act from its illocutionary force. The illocutionary
force of a speech act determines how the propositional content relates to the world,
that is, whether the proposition is to be understood as an assertion, a request, an
expression of feeling or a declaration, and so on. Pejoratives, at least as understood
by Copp, are not neutral in this way and do not refer to a property distinct from that
referred to by their non-pejorative equivalents. Thus, whereas the proposition
represented by the sentence-part, 'That the teacher is a socialist,' is force-neutral, the
proposition represented by the sentence-part, 'That the teacher is a pinko,' is not: it
includes expressive illocutionary force indication, in this case, contempt for
socialists. But this suggests that the latter sentence-part cannot play the role a
genuine proposition must play on the speech act model.
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In the case of pejoratives, it is relatively easy to isolate genuine predicates from force
indicators. Ifwe take the sentence, 'The teacher is a pinko', it clearly has assertive
and expressive force indicators as part of its meaning, determining how the
propositional content, 'That the teacher is a socialist', relates to the world.
'Socialist' rather than 'pinko' is thus the genuine force-neutral predicate. But there
seems to be no comparable way to factor thin evaluative predicates into a genuine
referring component and a force-indicating component. Unlike anti-realist
expressivists, Copp holds that moral predicates refer to genuine evaluative properties
as well functioning as expressive force indicators. Consequently, it is not an option
for him to factor an evaluative judgement into the non-evaluative properties
genuinely referred to by the sentence and the expressive force indication given by the
evaluative terms used in the sentence. For example, he cannot interpret, 'Teachers
are morally good,' as 'H! (teachers)'. However, this makes it difficult to see how
evaluative predicates can play the force-neutral role that genuine predicates play in
the propositional component of speech acts.
The problem with tying expressive force to the literal, if non-truth conditional,
meaning of a predicate is related to the issue of unasserted contexts. The claim that a
predicate must be able to occur with the same meaning in unasserted as well as
asserted contexts has been used to undermine traditional non-cognitivist or
expressivist theories of the meaning ofmoral terms.15 Any adequate theory of
meaning must account for the fact that predicates can have the same meaning
whether they occur in assertions, questions, conditionals, negations, and so on
(Searle 1969: 137). For example, if the assertion, 'It is right', is to function as an
answer to the question, 'Is it right?', 'right' must have the same meaning in both
contexts. But while an assertion of Tightness plausibly involves an act of
commendation, this does not seem to be the case with a question about Tightness.
The literal occurrence of 'right' can occur, that is, in the sincere and literal utterance
of interrogative sentences without the speaker thereby commending or endorsing
anything. And, as Searle points out, there seem to be an 'indefinite number' of
15 See Geach (1965), and Searle (1969: chap. 6) for different versions of the argument that non-
cognitivism is unable to account for the meaning ofmoral terms in unasserted contexts.
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counter-examples of this kind to the thesis that the meaning of evaluative terms is
exhausted by their commendatory or expressive function in assertive contexts (1969:
139).
An interesting feature of pejorative terms is that they retain their expressive force
even when they occur in unasserted contexts. The question, 'Is he a pinko?', and the
assertion, 'He is a pinko', both express contempt for socialists. This is one important
disanalogy between pejorative terms and moral terms: moral terms do not have
commendatory force in unasserted contexts. And this is precisely what is said to
undermine expressivist theories ofmoral meaning. However, this is a positive
outcome ifwe are concerned to defend the status ofmoral predicates as genuine
predicates. The reason is that ifmoral predicates do not retain their commendatory
force in unasserted contexts, they can play the force neutral role that genuine
predicates play in the propositional component of speech acts.16
While I agree with the general thrust ofCopp's discourse internalism, there a number
of reasons to prefer the speech act approach 1 advocate. Copp argues that the
motivational requirement on moral judgements holds via the conditions on moral
assertion. However, the standard conditions governing assertive illocutions are ill-
suited to accomplishing this task. Even ifwe view pejorative terms as having literal
non truth conditional expressive meaning, it seems it is not by way of the conditions
on assertion that the use of a pejorative requires an expression of contempt. Recall,
my proposal is that moral judgements do not entail motivation qua their status as
assertives; rather, the motivational requirement stems from the fact that in making a
moral judgement speakers perform the illocutionary act of evaluation, and
evaluations have different performance conditions to bare assertions: conditions that
include some kind of pressure on action. There are also some important disanalogies
between moral terms and pejorative terms that appear to undermine Copp's
approach. Unlike moral terms, pejorative terms are not force-neutral, retaining their
expressive force in different grammatical contexts. This means that unlike moral
16 This assumes, of course, that moral predicates are neutral with regard to other kinds of illocutionary
force. For example, it assumes that they are not essentially assertoric.
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predicates, pejoratives cannot play the force-neutral role that genuine predicates play
in the propositional component of speech acts. And this suggests that we should
avoid an analogy with pejoratives ifwe are concerned to defend the status ofmoral
predicates as genuine.
8. Evaluative Predicates and Force Indication
The discussion so far suggests that there is nothing unusual or queer about the
apparent dual direction of fit ofmoral judgements, at least from the perspective of
language. The difficult task is to give a detailed account of how in the case ofmoral
judgements a single utterance involves the performance ofmore than one
illocutionary act. I suggested we use the concept of a compound speech act to
accomplish this task. In the above discussion we also came across another way in
which a single utterance can be used to perform more than one illocutionary act: the
indirect speech act. To begin this section I want briefly to review these two kinds of
multiple speech acts.
As we have seen, compound speech acts involve illocutionary verbs or verb phrases
which when uttered literally and sincerely in the context of a complete sentence
allow the speaker to perform directly more than one illocutionary act. For example,
'I protest your treating the workers as inferior,' involves assertive, expressive, and
directive speech acts. It asserts that there is something wrong with how the workers
are being treated, it expresses disapproval of this, and it directs those responsible to
do something to improve the situation. Indirect speech acts occur when a speaker
utters a sentence with a particular illocutionary force, performs that illocution, but
also performs another illocution that is not part of the literal meaning of the sentence
(Searle 1979). In such cases there is a distinction between the literal meaning of the
sentence and the intended force with which the sentence is uttered. For example, if I
say, 'It is raining', and intend my utterance to be taken purely as a statement of fact,
the illocutionary act of stating is performed directly using the conventional linguistic
device (the indicative sentence) for making statements. However, if I utter the same
sentence for the purpose of getting you to get your umbrella, the literal meaning of
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the sentence and the intended force with which it is uttered come apart. The
illocutionary act of requesting that you get your umbrella is performed indirectly by
way of performing directly the act of stating that it is raining.17
The reason I did not construe the relation between the assertive and motivating
aspects ofmoral judgements in terms of indirect speech acts is that such a model
cannot adequately accommodate moral judgement internalism. This is because in
those cases where the performance of a particular illocutionary act is only indirectly
related to the direct performance of another act, it is always possible to perform the
direct act on its own, even if doing so is linguistically unusual. For example, it is
unusual but possible to issue purely as an assertive the sentence, 'You are standing
on my foot'. Normally the utterance of such a sentence involves an indirect request
for the hearer to get off the speaker's foot. By contrast, understanding moral
judgements in terms of compound speech acts means that an agent making a moral
judgement performs directly the illocutionary act ofmoral evaluation: the act
sanctioned by the force indicators that are part of the literal meaning ofmoral
sentences. On this model, the sincere and literal utterance of a moral sentence in the
indicative mood is necessarily an evaluation rather than merely an assertion.
There is an apparent difference between most types of compound speech acts and the
speech act ofmoral evaluation that raises some difficulties for the approach I
advocate. In order to perform most compound speech acts directly one has to utter
the relevant illocutionary verb. For example, to issue a protest directly, I must say, '/
protest that such and such', and to issue a warning directly, I must say,'/ warn you
that such and such'. This is not the case with the majority of speech acts involving a
single illocutionary act. And it doesn't seem to be the case with moral speech acts.
If a want to make a statement directly, I don't need to prefix my utterance with 'I
state'. Similarly, if 1 want to make a moral judgement directly I don't need to say, '/
evaluate such and such as right'. In the case of single illocutionary acts this is
17 Note that when one illocutionary act is performed indirectly via another, the direct illocutionary act
is not replaced by the indirect act. Even though I request that you get the umbrella, my request is
made by way of stating that it is raining. In fact, I would be unlikely to bring off the performance of
the indirect act ifmy performance of the direct illocutionary act were defective.
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explained by the fact that they generally have particular linguistic devices with force
indicators sufficient for their direct performance. For example, the indicative
sentence is the conventional device for performing assertives, and the imperative
sentence is the conventional device for performing directives.
According to the compound approach to moral speech acts it can't be the case that a
speaker says something is morally good without thereby performing a moral
evaluation. But as with other compound speech acts, agents rarely perform moral
18
speech acts using explicit illocutionary verbs. They tend to say, 'Voting is good',
rather than, 'I evaluate voting as good'. What needs to be explained is how moral
speech acts can be performed directly without the use of explicit illocutionary verbs
and why moral speech acts are distinct from most other forms of compound speech
acts in being performable in this way. To understand the first issue we need to look
at the force indicating role of evaluative predicates. If a speaker says, 'Giving the
money back is right', the presence of the evaluative predicate 'right' in conjunction
with other relevant force indicators tells us she is performing an evaluative
illocutionary act. The assertoric force indicators are crucial here, because, as we
have seen, evaluations involve assertions. This is why if a speaker asks, 'Is giving
the money back right?', she cannot be performing directly an evaluative speech act.
A single predicate cannot by itselfdetermine the force potential of a sentence; rather,
illocutionary force as part of the literal meaning of a sentence is determined by the
interplay of a range of force indicating devices, such as word order, punctuation, the
mood of the verb, performative verbs, and, 1 want to say, certain predicates. In the
case ofmoral speech acts, these force indicators together determine the type of act
constituted by the serious and literal utterance of a moral sentence.
18 In practice agents rarely prefix their compound illocutionary acts with explicit force indicating
verbs. Instead of saying, 'I protest your leaving work early every day', an agent might protest by
making an assertion, e.g., 'You leave work early everyday', or by asking a question, e.g., 'Why do
you leave work early everyday?'. In neither of these cases is the illocutionary force of the protest part
of literal meaning of the sentence. So in both cases the protest is performed indirectly via the direct
acts sanctioned by the force indicators that are part of the literal meaning of the sentences. And this
means that it is perfectly possible for an agent to assert that someone is late for work everyday without
protesting their lateness. This distinguishes such speech acts from moral speech acts which, I argue,
cannot be performed without performing an evaluation, even in the absence of the relevant
illocutionary verb.
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What explains the fact that moral evaluations are unlike other compound speech acts
in being directly performable in the absence of illocutionary verbs? I suspect one
reason for this is the ubiquity of such evaluations. Human agents make evaluations,
including moral evaluations, in a wide range of different circumstances and most of
the time. By contrast, the contexts in which we need to make protests or issue
warnings are relatively circumscribed. It makes sense, then, simply in terms of
linguistic efficiency not to have to worry about uttering evaluative illocutionary
verbs. In this sense evaluations are like assertions, imperatives and questions, but
unlike most compound speech acts and commissives.19
A crucial distinction between the approach I advocate and Copp's theory is that on
my account the motivating force ofmoral predicates is not part of their literal
meaning, in a 'narrow' or a 'wide' sense ofmeaning. Given my position, however, I
need to explain the fact that the connection between evaluative predicates and the act
of evaluation is much closer than the connection between most other kinds of
predicates and their roles in force indication. There does seem to be some kind of
conceptual connection between evaluative predicates and the motivating attitudes
typical of evaluation. This is why it is tempting to explain the meaning of evaluative
predicates in terms of their use in commending or expressing approval. However, I
argued above that we need to avoid doing this in order to preserve the force
neutrality that enables moral predicates to function adequately in the propositional
component of speech acts. To address these issues, I turn to a suggestion of Searle
about how to understand the relation between evaluative terms and evaluative speech
acts.
19 To perform a commissive illocutionary act directly, the sentence uttered must, it seems, include a
relevant illocutionary verb. If I say to you, 'I will meet you there tomorrow', I need not be
committing myself to being there to meet you. The literal force of the sentence is that of a predictive
assertion. For example, I may currently believe that I will be at the meeting tomorrow and so belief
that I will meet you there tomorrow. This need involve no commitment on my behalf to be there for
you tomorrow. By contrast, if I say literally and sincerely, 'Ipromise to meet you there tomorrow,' I
directly perform a commissive illocutionary act: I place myself under an obligation to be there to meet
you tomorrow.
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Searle agrees that we need to give some account of the apparent conceptual
connection between evaluative predicates and the illocutionary acts typically
engaged in when we use such predicates:
The data that we have to explain...are of these sorts: Calling something 'good' is
characteristically praising, or commending, or recommending, or expressing approval of
things so called. Furthermore, this seems not to be just a contingent fact, as is shown by the
fact that the word 'good' itself is sometimes described as a term of praise... How can it be
the case in these and other instances both that calling something W is indeed performing a
speech act A, and yet it does not explain the meaning ofW to say W is used to perform act
A? (Searle 1969: 150)
The answer to this problem, suggests Searle, is to be found in the way that evaluative
predicates are embedded in the institutions of assessment, appraisal, and evaluation
in general (1969: 152). The point of evaluations or assessments is to rank or grade
options: to determine which options are better, more favourable, of a higher standard,
and so on, than others. And in order to do this an agent must assign an option a rank
or grade in a relevant scale of assessment (Searle 1969: 151-152). Options can be
given higher or lower evaluations, and we use evaluative predicates or 'grading
terms' to indicate the level of assessment being given. In giving a high evaluation of
something we typically use terms such as 'good', 'excellent', 'commendable',
'praiseworthy', and so on. And in giving a low evaluation of something we use,
among others, terms such as 'poor', 'bad', and 'unsatisfactory'. So to call something
'good' or 'excellent' is necessarily to evaluate or assess it. Specifically, it is to give
a relatively high evaluation or assessment of the item in question. And giving a high
evaluation or assessment of something is typically to endorse or praise it.
Searle stresses that it does not follow from the fact that terms such as 'good' and
'excellent' are used to make high evaluations that they mean 'evaluated highly'
(1969: 139, 152). To infer from the fact that a word is used to perform a certain
illocutionary act that the meaning of the word is explicable in terms of that act is to
commit the 'speech act fallacy'(Searle 1969: 136-141).
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As an illustration ofwhy this type of inference is problematic, consider the example
of a simple case of assessment, in which a student's paper is marked as 'excellent'.
An assessment of this kind entails that the marker evaluated the paper highly. But it
does not entail that the paper is of an excellent standard. If I ask, 'Is the paper really
of such a high standard?', I am not asking whether the paper was given a high
evaluation by the marker; rather, I am asking whether the paper deserves or warrants
such a high mark. Of course, I assume that in so far as the marker is sincere, she
gave the high mark on the basis of her belief that the paper deserved or warranted
such a mark. This simply underscores the fact that what she meant by calling the
paper 'excellent' was not that it was evaluated highly by her, but that it deserved or
warranted a high evaluation: that it satisfied the requirements for being given a high
ranking on the relevant scale of assessment.
Such considerations indicate that the conceptual connections between evaluative
predicates and acts of evaluation or assessment are explicable in terms of the way the
predicates are embedded in the institutions of evaluation and assessment. If I
evaluate something, I must assign it a grade or rank on the relevant scale of
assessment. The standard device that allows me to accomplish this task is the
evaluative predicate.20 So evaluating something commits me to assigning it a rank or
grade that can be expressed using an evaluative predicate. For example, in order to
give an assessment of an essay, I cannot simply say, 'I evaluate the essay'; rather, I
must give a more or less positive or more or less negative assessment of the essay
(cf. Searle 1969: 51). Conversely, in giving either a positive or negative assessment
of the essay, I am necessarily evaluating it. These points are captured by the
following biconditional:
A particular act is an act of evaluation if and only if it involves an
assignment of rank expressible by an evaluative predicate.
20 I may not always be explicit in assigning a rank by way of a particular evaluative predicate. For
example, I might say, 'I rate it very highly'. This seems to me to be an example of an indirect speech
act: I perform an evaluation indirectly by asserting directly that I rate the option highly. This works
partly because my rating it highly commits me to assigning it a rank expressible by a positive
evaluative predicate. The hearer will typically, therefore, interpret my utterance as some form of
positive evaluation.
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It is crucial, however, to remember that such connections do not give the meaning of
evaluative predicates, they simply indicate how we use them.
9. Review of the Argument So Far and Potential Difficulties for the Speech
Act Approach
In this section I review the discussion so far in light of the above account of moral
speech acts and discuss the advantages of the speech act model with regard to
understanding the connection between moral judgements and motivation. I conclude
by raising some potential problems for the speech act approach.
I said in chapter one that the problem ofmoral motivation results from an apparent
tension between the fact-stating and the motivating aspects ofmoral judgement
against the background of a particular theory ofmotivation, known as the
desire/belief theory. The non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument is one way of
representing this tension. It asserts that the truth ofmoral judgement internalism
entails the falsity ofmoral cognitivism. I claimed that the anti-cognitivist argument
is invalid, and suggested an alternative disjunctive conclusion that allows for the
truth of both moral judgement internalism and moral cognitivism. However, I
stressed that we should take seriously the non-cognitivist claim that moral
judgements in some sense go beyond bare description. I suggested we think ofmoral
judgement internalism as an expression of our interested or participatory relation to
moral deliberation.
The task then became one of finding out how best to construe the relation between
the fact-stating and the motivating aspects ofmoral judgement. Content internalism
about motivation is one way theorists have attempted to understand this relation. It
aims to secure an internal connection between moral judgements and motivation by
including the motivational requirement at the level of the truth-conditional content of
moral judgements. I rejected content internalism as an interpretation ofmoral
judgement internalism because it threatens the categoricy of moral requirements and
the status of internalism as a commonplace of ordinary moral thought. Moreover, it
cannot secure the necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation
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asserted by moral judgement internalism. Instead, I suggested interpreting moral
judgement internalism as a form of act internalism, a position that derives from the
21
positive part of the non-cognitivist analysis ofmoral judgements. Act internalism
says that there is a necessary connection between the act ofmaking a moral
judgement and motivation. This is perfectly consistent with there being no
connection between the truth ofmoral requirements and motivation. Act internalism
is therefore compatible with the widely accepted doctrine that moral requirements
apply to agents regardless of their contingent desires.
In the second halfof chapter one, I described how Nagel's version of internalism
avoids the counterintuitive consequences of content internalism (about motivation)
by interpreting internalism as a doctrine about the relation between moral
requirements and justifying reasons. I argued that Nagel's conception of the relation
between moral judgements and motivation is not a version ofmoral judgement
internalism, as he denies that moral judgements entail motivation. Rather, Nagel
advances a cognitivist theory ofmoral motivation according to which moral
judgements normally, but not necessarily, motivate agents to do what they judge to
be morally required. Nagel rejects the desire/belief model and explains the
motivating force ofmoral judgements in terms of their justifying content. I argued
that ifmoral considerations play a genuine role in deliberation about what to do, then
it must be possible that agents are sometimes motivated by the justifying content of
their moral judgements.
Moral judgement externalists argue that in order to secure the fact-stating and
cognitive nature ofmoral judgements, the internalist requirement must be rejected.
One reason externalists view internalism as a threat to cognitivism and, by extension,
to realism in ethics is that they accept the validity of the non-cognitivist anti-
cognitivist argument. However, externalism is much less compelling once the anti-
cognitivist argument is removed as an obstacle to the union of cognitivism and
internalism. Moreover, externalist explanations of the practical or action-guiding
21 The negative or critical part of the non-cognitivist argument is that the motivating function ofmoral
judgements precludes their functioning to state facts and express beliefs.
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function ofmoral judgements are unconvincing, given their claim that the motivating
force and justifying authority of such judgements are only contingently related to
moral considerations. I argued that the desire/belief thesis is ultimately a weakness
rather than a strength of externalism. A revised version of Smith's fetishism
objection to externalism illustrates this point. It claims that the externalist agent is
only ever motivated to do what is right in so far as doing so satisfies an independent
and contingent desire to do the right thing, and argues that such an agent does
conflict with our notion of the virtuous person. This is because our conception of a
virtuous agent is of someone reliably motivated by the consideration that something
is right rather than by a desire to do what is right. For these reasons, I argued we
should prefer some alternative account of the relation between moral judgements and
motivation to that given by externalism.
Act internalism allows us to avoid locating the connection between moral
judgements and motivation at the level of truth-conditional judgement content or at
the level of an independent desire to do the right thing. The speech act approach is
one way of interpreting act internalism. Speech acts with more than one direction of
fit and more than one point or purpose to their performance are ubiquitous in our
linguistic practice. Construing moral judgements as a type of linguistic act enables
us to account for their fact-stating and motivating aspects. Searle's theory of speech
acts distinguishes between the illocutionary force and the propositional content of an
utterance. I argued in favour of interpreting the internalist requirement on moral
judgements as a claim about their illocutionary force rather than their propositional
content. Speech act theory also provides a structured way ofunderstanding the kinds
of conditions that govern the performance of different types of linguistic acts. I
suggested that moral judgements can usefully be thought of as a type of compound
speech act: a speech act that involves the direct performance ofmore than one kind
of illocutionary act, unified by a particular goal. Specifically, I said we should view
moral speech acts as evaluations rather than as bare assertions. On this model, moral
evaluations involve the direct performance of assertive and commissive illocutionary
acts, allowing them to accommodate both the fact-stating and the motivating aspects
ofmoral judgement.
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One of the principal advantages of the speech act approach is that it accounts for the
sense in which moral judgements go beyond mere description. Moral judgements
involve the performance of a commissive as well as an assertive illocutionary act. In
performing a commissive illocutionary act, an agent commits herself to acting in a
certain way in the future. And in performing a commissive act as part of a moral
evaluation, an agent commits herself to being guided by the evaluative content of the
proposition, the truth ofwhich she asserts. The essential condition for moral
evaluations reflects the sense in which agents making genuine moral judgements are
interested participants in the practice ofmoral deliberation. The essential point of a
moral evaluation is to be guided by the content of a proposition that represents those
features of a situation that favour acting in one way rather than another. So in
making a moral judgement, a speaker expresses her participation in a particular kind
of evaluative practice with the specific goal of ranking options to determine how to
act.
The speech act approach can also account for the way in which motivation reliably
tracks moral judgements. If you convince me to vote for the social democrats rather
than the libertarians, I come to judge that it is right to vote for the social democrats.
In so judging, I commit myself to acting in accordance with the content of the uttered
proposition: that it is right to vote for the social democrats. Ifmy judgement is
sincere, I will intend to be guided by this content and so be motivated to act in
accordance with it. There is thus a straightforward explanation of the reliability of
moral motivation in terms of the essential point ofmoral judgements.
As it stands, I think the speech act model provides a good account ofmany of the
intuitions underpinning our notion ofmoral judgement. However, a number difficult
issues remain. For example, the model must account for the kinds of failures of
motivation resulting from depression and despair mentioned by Stocker. Stocker's
argument appears to undermine the strong internalist claim that moral judgements
entail motivation. Now, the speech act account is not committed to this strong
internalist claim. This is because it allows for the possibility that insincere moral
judgements - those judgements we don't intend to be guided by - still count as
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genuine moral judgements. However, according to the model given above, sincere
moral judgements necessarily involve an intention to act in accordance with the
content of the uttered evaluation. A problem for this approach is that cases involving
severe depression and the like are just those cases where we would expect agents to
fail to intend to do the actions favoured by their evaluative judgements. It seems
reasonable to assume that if someone intends to perform a particular act, then she
believes that she will perform that act. Presumably, depressed agents are often all
too aware of their lack ofmotivation, and are unlikely to believe that they will
perform the required act. Consequently, in such cases they will have no intention to
perform the act in question, even though they may believe they are morally required
to perform it. The speech act account needs to explain in what sense an agent can be
sincere in her commitment to a moral requirement even when she has no intention of
doing what she takes to be right.
As a first step towards dealing with the difficulty of failures ofmotivation, we might
note that to intend to act in accordance with or to be guided by a consideration is not
the same as holding oneself to account with regard to a consideration. That is, it
seems possible to hold oneself to account with regard to a consideration without
intending to act on that consideration. This is the style of response I develop in
chapter four, where I use the notion of normative expectation to explain the sense in
which agents hold themselves to account when they make moral judgements. As a
consequence, I make a number of changes to the list of necessary conditions for the
performance ofmoral evaluations. These changes contribute to a more satisfactory
account of the nature of the commitment involved in making a moral judgement.
The other main issue the speech act approach needs to address is the relation of
moral language to moral thought. It might be argued that while our linguistic
conventions entail that the sincere performance of a moral evaluation requires the
presence of a motivating attitude, this is just a fact about how we happen to use
words; it does not address the deeper question about the connection between
psychological assent to moral propositions and motivation. For example, a society
may be possible in which it is not linguistically inappropriate to use moral terms and
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expressions in the absence ofmotivating attitudes. I address this issue in chapter
five. My response emphasises the level at which the kinds of linguistic rules outlined
in speech act theory operate on the natures of agents, like us, who are characterised
by their capacity for language and for normative deliberation. To a large extent
humans are normative animals, and the capacity to engage in normative deliberation
is facilitated in us and partly structured by our ability to use language. Consequently,
many of the rules and patterns of behaviour outlined in speech act theory are not such
that we can simply choose to ignore them without radically altering the kinds of
creatures we are and the kinds of practices in which we engage.
10. Conclusion
The speech act approach should be assessed in terms of its success in accounting for
the most important features ofmoral judgement. Act internalism makes the
accommodation of the fact-stating and the motivating aspects ofmoral judgement
prima facie plausible. The speech act model suggests a way of interpreting the
notion of a moral judgement act as a type of speech performance governed by
linguistic rules. It provides a structured way of understanding the relation between
such acts and the content ofmoral judgements in terms of the illocutionary force of a
speech act and its propositional content. The internalist requirement is
accommodated on this model at the level of illocutionary force rather than at the
level of propositional content. Consequently, unlike content intemalism, this form of
internalism does not threaten the categoricy ofmoral requirements. The speech act
approach provides a detailed account of how moral judgements can be both fact-
stating and motivating, and in doing so conforms to deeply held intuitions about the
nature of such judgements.
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Normative Expectation and the Participant Point of View
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I attempt to refine my account of the sincerity condition for the
commissive portion ofmoral judgements given in chapter three. A problem with the
intention-based model proposed in that chapter is that it seems unable to account for
failures ofmoral motivation resulting from depression, listlessness, and other kinds
ofmood disorders. An adequate version ofmoral judgement internalism must
explain in what sense an agent can be sincere in her commitment to a requirement
she judges to obtain, even when she has no intention of doing what she takes to be
required of her. I argue that an agent is sincere in her commitment to a moral
requirement if, in addition to believing it obtains, she normatively expects herself
and others to act in accordance with the requirement. This involves her being
susceptible to a range of sanctioning attitudes and emotions that make up, what Peter
Strawson terms, 'the participant point of view' (1962). It is in relation to such
attitudes that an agent holds herself and others to account with regard to moral
requirements. And it is in this sense, I argue, that making a moral judgement goes
beyond merely believing something to be the case.
2. Failures of Motivation and Sincerity Conditions
The issue I raise in this section is whether the linguistic approach developed in the
previous chapter results in a version of internalism that is too strong, and that, as
such, it inherits a number ofweaknesses of standard versions of internalism. The
concern is that it will prove unable to account for failures ofmotivation resulting
from the kinds ofdepression and mood disorders that can deprive an agent of the
motivation to do what her evaluative judgements recommend.
As we have seen, Stocker argues persuasively that changes in the mood, interest, and
energy of agents as a result of depression and the like can often mean that agents fail
to be motivated by what they genuinely judge to be good (1979). Stacker's argument
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seems to undermine the strong internalist claim that failures ofmotivation
necessarily invalidate moral judgements. As already mentioned, the speech act
approach is not committed to the strongest version of the internalist thesis: that all
failures ofmotivation, even those due to insincerity, render unsuccessful the
performance of a moral judgement. This is because on the speech act account
insincere moral judgements still count as genuine moral judgements. Recall that on
that account a speaker is sincere in performing a moral speech act when she intends
to act in accordance with the content of the moral proposition expressed by her
utterance.' If the agent has no intention of acting in accordance with the uttered
moral proposition, then her judgement is insincere. Nonetheless, she will still have
succeeded in making a moral judgement and will still have expressed her
commitment to being guided by the uttered moral proposition. The speech act
approach can thus accommodate the possibility of genuine moral judgements that fail
to motivate.
This move, however, does not help the speech act approach in relation to Stacker's
argument, because his argument also undermines the claim that sincere moral
judgements necessarily motivate. Stacker's point is not that the depressed agent
makes a genuine though insincere moral judgement, but is the stronger claim that the
depressed person is perfectly sincere in her moral judgements despite her lack of
motivation. The speech act model says that sincere moral judgements necessarily
involve a motivating intention to act in accordance with the content of the uttered
evaluation. The difficulty for this model is that cases in which agents are suffering
from severe depression and the like are just those cases where we would expect
agents to fail to intend to do the actions favoured by their evaluative judgements. It
seems reasonable to assume that if someone intends to perform a particular act, then
she believes she will perform that act.2 Presumably, depressed agents are often all
too aware of their lack ofmotivation, and are unlikely to believe that they will
perform the required act. Consequently, in such cases they will have no intention to
1
As we have seen, an agent must also believe the moral proposition expressed by her utterance in
order to make a sincere moral judgement. In making the following comments I assume this condition
is satisfied.
2
Paprzycka (1999) notes that this position is defended by Grice (1971) and Velleman (1989) but
called into question by Davidson (1980).
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perform the act in question, even though they may believe they are morally required
to perform it. And this looks like a potential vindication of externalism. In order to
provide an adequate defence ofmoral judgement internalism, the speech act
approach must explain in what sense an agent can be sincere in her commitment to a
judged requirement even when she has no intention of doing what she takes to be
right, and in what sense this commitment goes beyond mere belief. What is needed is
an account of the sincerity condition for the commissive portion of a moral speech
act capable of accommodating the kinds of failures ofmotivation outlined by
Stocker.
There are a number of other reasons why intention is a problematic state to fill the
role of sincerity condition for the commissive portion ofmoral judgements. Take the
simple example of weakness of will. Suppose I judge that I am morally required to
help at the local library fundraiser, but on the day it occurs find I am not sufficiently
motivated to leave the warmth and comfort ofmy home. I feel guilty about not
helping but cannot pull myself away from the pleasures of drinking coffee and
reading the papers. Now, in this case the motivation 1 undoubtedly have to help at
the fundraiser is overwhelmed by my desire to stay warm and drink coffee. I have no
intention of helping at the fundraiser and every intention of staying home and
enjoying myself. Nonetheless, it still seems that I can be perfectly sincere in my
judgement that I am morally required to help at the fundraiser, and still, in some
sense, sincere in my commitment to the requirement expressed by my judgement.
Intention as a sincerity condition also poses a problem in relation to moral
judgements that call for agents other than the speaker to act in certain ways, and in
ways that are not directly relevant to, or possible for, the agent making the
judgement.3 Suppose that John believes that all women should breast-feed their
babies rather than bottle-feed them. Now, while John is committed to women breast¬
feeding their babies, it is obviously not something he can intend to do himself.
3 Moral judgements involving supererogatory acts also seem to pose a problem for the notion of
intention as a sincerity condition for moral judgements. For example, 1 may sincerely judge a
soldier's behaviour as morally admirable because courageous, without thereby intending to perform
such actions myself.
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Despite this, it may seem that the version of intention as a sincerity condition already
given can accommodate this kind of problem. Recall, I said that an agent is sincere
in his commitment to a moral judgement insofar as he intends to be guided by the
content of the judgement. Perhaps John intends to be guided by his belief that
women should breast-feed their babies, even though he cannot engage in breast¬
feeding babies himself. For example, he might actively promote breast-feeding and
encourage those close to him, his wife and female friends, to breast-feed rather than
bottle-feed their babies. John is also very likely to express his disapproval ofwomen
who opt to bottle-feed where breast-feeding is an option, and to commend those who
follow his advice and breast-feed their babies. This suggests that whether an agent is
sincerely committed to a principle of action or to a behavioural standard is linked, in
some sense, to how she would respond and the emotions she would feel in situations
where the principle or standard is violated or upheld. It is not clear, however, that
the notion of an intention, even an intention to be guided in some way, is adequate to
capture these more complex types of responses.
As a way forward, we might note that to intend to act in accordance with a
consideration is distinct from holding oneself to account with regard to a
consideration. I may intend to act in accordance with the consideration that it is right
to give money to Oxfam, but only do so in order to win favour with my colleagues.
In such a case it seems incorrect to describe my intention as evidence of a sincere
commitment to the principle that it is right to give money to Oxfam. By contrast, it
seems possible to be committed to a consideration in the sense ofholding oneself to
account with regard to the consideration, without intending to act on it. For example,
suppose that John becomes deeply depressed because he cannot convince the women
in his life to breast-feed rather than bottle-feed their babies. This causes him to stop
promoting breast-feeding and to stop lecturing his friends and relatives about its
superiority to bottle-feeding. Nonetheless, John remains committed to the view that
women have an obligation to breast-feed rather than bottle-feed their babies. He still
holds himself to this view even though he now lacks any intention to act in
accordance with it. Let's say that an agent holds herself to account with regard to a
consideration or requirement if, among other things, she understands and accepts that
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the consideration or requirement applies to her and that, as such, she can be
justifiably criticised for failing to comply with it. In the case of a sincere moral
speech act, then, the speaker understands and accepts that the moral requirement
applies to her and that, as such, she can be justifiably criticised if she fails to satisfy
the requirement. More succinctly, we might say that in making a sincere moral
judgement an agent normatively expects herself to act in accordance with the
requirement expressed by the judgement.
How should we characterise the notion of normative expectation? A useful contrast
is sometimes made between normative expectations and predictive expectations
(Paprzycka 1999: 631). Predictive expectations are said to be belief-like. For
example, if I predictively expect Sarah to be home before 5pm, then I believe that
she will be home before that time. Normative expectations, by contrast, seem to be
demand-like. If I normatively expect Sarah to be home before 5pm, then I place a
demand on her to be home before 5pm: I hold her to account with regard to the
expectation. According to an account offered by Katarzyna Paprzycka, this involves
my being disposed to sanction negatively her failure to be home before this time and
to sanction positively her success in being home on time (1999: 632). A crucial
difference, then, between predictive and normative expectations is that the latter but
not the former must be had towards responsible subjects of action. In general, if I
can believe that p will happen in the future, then I can predictively expect that p. If I
can believe that it will rain tomorrow, then I can predictively expect that it will rain
tomorrow. By contrast, I cannot normatively expect that it will rain tomorrow, but I
can normatively expect that you pick me up from work if it rains tomorrow.
In addition to having normative expectations of others it seems that we can have
normative expectations of ourselves. If I normatively expect myself to get to the
meeting on time, I place a demand on myself to get to the meeting and will be
disposed to sanction myself if I fail to meet this demand. One suggestion is that the
kind of expectation involved in moral judgement involves this kind of self-regarding
normative expectation. Using this notion, we might explain the possibility of an
agent who sincerely judges that an act is morally right, yet has no intention of acting
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in accordance with his judgement, and believes he will not so act. The crucial
feature to note about normative expectation is that it involves a demand that does not
have to be withdrawn if it fails to be satisfied. Contrast this with predictive
expectation. If I predictively expect you to be home before 5pm and you in fact get
home at 7pm, then my predictive expectation is at fault and must be 'withdrawn.' If
I normatively expect you to be home before 5pm and you get home after this time,
my normative expectation will continue to apply to your behaviour and need not be
withdrawn: it is your behaviour rather than the expectation that is at fault.4
We can apply this account to the case of the depressed agent who makes a moral
judgement (performs a moral speech act) but who fails to be moved and fails to
intend to be moved to act in accordance with it. John announces to his wife that he
has a moral obligation to vote in the national election. Unfortunately, he suffers
from depression and so is not motivated to go to the polling booth and fulfil his
obligation. He doesn't intend to go and doesn't believe that he will go and cast his
vote. According to the account offered above, John's moral judgement is sincere so
long as he believes that it is right for him to vote in the election and normatively
expects himself to act in accordance with the proposition that it is right for him to
vote. The essential condition for moral judgements means that issuing his moral
utterance commits John to acting in accordance with the uttered proposition; issuing
it sincerely necessitates that he holds himself to account with regard to the content of
the proposition.
4 This will remind us of 'direction of fit' distinctions typically used to distinguish belief-like states
from desire-like states. Paprzycka notes that predictive expectations can be characterised as having a
belief-like 'mind-to world' direction of fit whereas normative expectations can be characterised as
having a more desire-like 'world-to-mind' direction of fit (1999: 632). Below 1 question the claim
that normative expectations are wholly desire-like in their direction of fit.
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3. Normative Expectation and Universalizability
Unfortunately, the notion of self-regarding normative expectation does not account
for the way in which agents hold others as well as themselves to moral demands.
Not all cases ofholding someone to account or normatively expecting something of
them are moral in character. And purely self-regarding normative expectations seem
to be of this non-moral type. Suppose I commit myself to losing a certain amount of
weight by next month and so hold myself to the expectation that I lose the weight.
This expectation or demand does not seem to generalise to others in the way it would
if it were a moral consideration. An important feature of specifically moral
expectations is their applicability to moral agents in general: moral expectations
inherit the universalizability ofmoral requirements or demands. This means that if it
is wrong for a particular agent to O in circumstances C, then it is wrong for any
relevantly similar agent to O in C (see Mackie 1977: chap. 4; Hare 1981: chap. 6).
The generalisable nature ofmoral requirements means that moral judgements
commit those making them to holding the same view about relevantly similar actions
and agents in relevantly similar circumstances. If I judge that I am morally required
to return the money to the bank, this commits me to the view that anyone relevantly
similar to me in similar circumstances would be morally required to return the money
to the bank. The universalizable nature ofmoral requirements means that my
normative expectation cannot simply be limited to my own conduct. This would
have the unfortunate consequence that I only ever held myself to account with regard
to moral requirements. And I think that if an agent in this way failed to grasp the
relevance of universalizability to moral assessment, we would be unlikely to view
her as capable ofmaking genuine moral judgements. A moral judge must be 'ready
to apply [moral requirements] equally to himself and to others, and to go on applying
in interpersonal situations when the roles are reversed...' (Mackie 1977: 85).
We might put this point another way. A moral judge does not merely hold herself to
account in sincerely issuing a moral judgement, she holds to account all those who
she deems are appropriate objects ofmoral appraisal. If I judge that I am morally
required to vote, then I normatively expect all morally responsible agents relevantly
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similar to me in circumstances relevantly similar to mine to vote. That is, I hold
myself to account for the same reason I hold other moral agents to account: the
universal applicability of moral requirements to those who are appropriate objects of
moral appraisal. The formulation of the sincerity condition for the commissive
portion ofmoral judgements needs to accommodate the universalizability of moral
requirements. It can do this by extending the scope of the normative expectation
involved in moral judgement to include all who are the appropriate objects ofmoral
appraisal. Thus we get the following formulation:
If S sincerely utters the judgement that O is morally right, then S
normatively expects all those who are appropriate objects ofmoral
appraisal to act in accordance with the proposition '(I) is morally right.'
On the account of normative expectation given above, the new formulation means
that an agent making a moral judgement is disposed to sanction negatively a failure
to comply with the judged requirement and to sanction positively conformity with
the requirement by all agents to whom the judgement correctly applies.
An important difference between the agent who makes the judgement and the other
agents to whom the judgement applies is that the judging agent has responsibility for
her own actions in relation to the requirement, whereas, in general, she is not
responsible for the actions of others. Thus the forms of sanctioning responses and
emotions the judging agent will apply to herselfwill often be different to those she
applies to others. For example, she will tend to feel guilt or shame when she believes
she has violated a requirement and moral disapproval or indignation in response to
transgressions she believes others have made. However, the general stance of
holding someone to account or normative expectation is essentially the same whether
the agent directs the expectation towards herself or to others. This neatly reflects the
irrelevance of numerical difference characteristic of the process of universalization:
the mere numerical fact that I am who I am and that you are who you are is irrelevant
to the applicability ofmoral demands to us (cf. Mackie 1977: 83-90).
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4. Unwarranted Sanctioning Emotions and Responses
The proposed account of normative expectation identifies the stance involved with a
propensity to respond in certain ways to the violation of or conformity with standards
of conduct. As described, the stance appears to involve the expression of sanctioning
emotions or the response of sanctioning behaviour rather than a judgement of any
kind. This would seem to make the stance conducive to the project of
accommodating the motivating aspect ofmoral judgement. However, I argue below
that this purely non-judgemental formulation of normative expectation cannot be
correct. This is because it allows agents to hold others, and themselves, to
expectations in situations they do not believe warrant their having such expectations:
situations they do not believe warrant the response of sanctioning behaviour or
emotions.
According to Paprzycka's account, a person B normatively expects of another person
S that p, when B is disposed to sanction negatively S's failure to bring about p and to
sanction positively S's success in bringing about p (1999: 632).5, 6 She argues that
normative expectations have a world-to-mind direction of fit like desires - the world
(the person held to account) must conform to the expectation - rather than a belief¬
like direction of fit. The problem with this account of normative expectation is that it
fails to exclude situations in which an agent does not accept as justified the
sanctioning response she makes or the sanctioning emotion she feels. For example,
John makes disapproving comments whenever Sarah does not come top of the class.
He says things such as, 'Well, you did spend a lot of time on the phone,' and, 'I
expect you will try harder next time.' John also feels a certain sense of
disappointment on the rare occasions that Sarah fails to top the class. When Sarah
sFor ease ofexpression, I won't always include reference to positive sanctions in my discussion of
normative expectation. This merely reflects the fact that it is often when moral requirements are
breached rather than when they are adhered to that sanctioning emotions are most vividly expressed.
This emphasis is not intended to imply that positive sanctions only have a secondary role in holding
agents to account (cf. note 10 below).
6
Paprzycka continues: 'The notion of sanctions is broad enough to include the reactive emotions [see
below for an account of such emotions] as well as sanctions of a lesser moral magnitude like feeling
dissatisfied or disappointed by oneself or by another, criticising oneself or others, and, on the side of
positive sanctions, feelings of satisfaction and accomplishment' (1999: 632). I follow her in stressing
a broad construal of the positive and negative sanctioning emotions and responses involved in holding
agents to expectations.
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eventually confronts John and explains that his comments make her feel bad, John is
quite shocked. He has been making the comments unreflectively and certainly does
not believe that Sarah's approach to her work warrants disapproval or sanction. That
is, John does not believe that there is a requirement that Sarah always come top of
the class, even though he often behaves as if he endorsed such a requirement. On
Paprzycka's account of normative expectation, John normatively expects Sarah
always to come top of her class if he is disposed to sanction her failure to do so.
However, given that John does not actually believe such an expectation justified, it
seems odd to say that he really holds her to account with regard to the requirement
that she always top the class.
Consider another example.7 Suppose having been raised in a traditional Catholic
home, I have a tendency to feel disapproval towards those who engage in sexual
relations outside the institution ofmarriage. However, let's say that I have come in
my adult life to reject the doctrine that it is morally wrong to have sexual relations
outside marriage. Consequently, whenever I experience the disapproval in question,
I judge it to be completely unwarranted and simply a product of the emotional
residue ofmy childhood experience ofCatholicism. This includes those times when
I feel guilty for engaging in such behaviour myself. The problem with the account of
normative expectation given above is that it does not seem to be able to deal with
examples of this kind. On that account, the fact that 1 am disposed to sanction
negatively engaging in sex outside marriage means that I normatively expect myself
and all relevant agents to abstain from sex outside marriage. But this means that I
hold myself and others to a requirement that I do not in any way endorse.
These examples suggest that merely having a disposition to sanction a certain form
ofbehaviour is not sufficient to hold someone to account with regard to a
requirement prohibiting such behaviour. It would seem that for an agent to
normatively expect someone to act in a certain way, the agent must believe that the
expectation or requirement in question is warranted, in addition to being disposed to
sanction a failure to conform to the expectation. Now, it may be that this belief-like
7 Wallace uses a similar example to explain the notion ofunwarranted guilt (1994: 43).
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or judgemental feature of normative expectation follows directly from the nature of
the kinds of attitudes or emotions typically expressed in sanctioning practices.
Following Strawson, the kinds of attitudes involved in blaming and sanctioning
practices - resentment, guilt, moral disapproval, moral indignation, and the like -
o
have been termed 'reactive attitudes' (1962)
These attitudes are 'reactive' in that 'they are reactions to the moral qualities
exemplified by an individual's attitudes and conduct' (Watson 1987: 122). The
reactive attitudes therefore have 'internal criteria' according to which they are or are
not appropriately held by an agent (Watson 1987: 122). For example, if one feels
guilty it seems there must be some perceived fault in one's behaviour towards which
the guilt is directed. Similarly, ifone feels moral indignation towards someone, there
must be something, some wrong, they have done that one is indignant about.
Wallace interprets this feature of the reactive attitudes as their having a distinctive
kind ofpropositional content (1994: 50)9 Specifically, he argues that any state of
negative reactive emotion, such as guilt or resentment, entails that the agent who has
the state believes that some expectation or requirement has been breached.10
Ifbeing in a state of reactive emotion entails a belief that a requirement has been
violated, then it might seem we can rest content with our initial formulation of
normative expectation. Assume that we interpret sanctioning responses in terms of
the expression of reactive emotions. To normatively expect Sarah to come top of the
class is to be disposed, say, to feel resentment towards her if she fails to come top of
the class; and to feel resentment towards her entails that one believes she has violated
81 will use the expressions 'reactive attitude' and 'reactive emotion' interchangeably.
9
As we will see below, Wallace's account differs fromWatson's in holding that although the
propositional content of reactive emotions involves the notion of a breached requirement or
expectation, the requirement in question need not be specifically moral in character nor one that the
agent experiencing the emotion necessarily endorses (see Wallace 1994: 20).
10 Wallace does not think that holding agents morally responsible for worthy acts is essentially linked
to positive sanctioning attitudes in the way that holding agents responsible for unworthy acts is
essentially linked to negative sanctioning attitudes. He attempts to give an account of what it is to
hold someone responsible for worthy acts in terms ofwhat he sees as the more fundamental
connection between holding someone responsible in general and the negative sanctioning
attitudes(Wallace 1994: 71). As I say in note 5 above, I don't think that the prominence of the
negative sanctioning attitudes in discussions of normative expectation necessarily signals a theoretical
asymmetry of the kind Wallace proposes.
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some requirement - presumably, the requirement that she tops the class. This
interpretation of the reactive emotions would simply exclude the possibility that one
can feel resentment or guilt in the absence of a belief about a violated requirement.
So if an agent feels guilty about engaging in sexual relations outside marriage, but
does not believe that he has violated any requirement prohibiting such behaviour,
then he is not experiencing a genuine state of guilt. Perhaps he merely experiences
feelings that resemble guilt in some respects.11 So, on this model, a disposition to
respond with the reactive emotions is a disposition to respond to believed violations
of requirements with certain emotions: the genuine experience of reactive emotions
simply entails such beliefs.
How plausible is this type ofjudgemental view of the reactive emotions? Wallace
himself concedes that we do seem to experience genuine but irrational guilt and
resentment (1994: 40, 46-47). That is, we sometimes feel real guilt and real
resentment we do not believe to be warranted. Wallace aims to accommodate this
phenomenon while maintaining the view that the reactive emotions entail beliefs of
some kind (1994: 40-50). This is necessary, he argues, in order to capture the kind of
propositional content that is distinctive of such emotions. His approach is to
distinguish between the belief that some requirement has been violated, the belief
entailed by a reactive emotion, and the belief that the violation of a requirement
warrants one of the reactive emotions. Wallace aims to provide a middle-way
between accounts of the reactive emotions in terms of exclusively moral beliefs and
accounts that claim that the reactive emotions can be understood independently of
cognitive states. The first of these 'overmoralises' the account of the reactive
emotions by insisting that the explanation of any state of reactive emotion must
"
As Wallace notes, Rawls defends a view along these lines (see Wallace on Rawls 1994: 47; Rawls
1972: 481-482; and note 12 below.)
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invoke a moral concept (Wallace 1994: 19, 46)12 This view is difficult to sustain,
suggests Wallace, as agents often experience such emotions without believing they
have breached a moral requirement or that they are morally accountable. The
approach which eschews the role of belief, by contrast, fails to account for the
distinctive propositional content of reactive emotions that connects them essentially
with the perceived violation of demands (Wallace 1994: 19, 49).13 Wallace's generic
stance of 'holding someone to an expectation' is meant to provide the middle way
between these two extremes. It is what he terms a 'quasi-evaluative' stance rather
than a full blown stance ofmoral endorsement:
To be in a state of reactive emotion, one must believe that a person has violated some
expectation that one holds the person to: and in terms of this belief, we can give an account
of how the reactive emotions have the kind of propositional content that distinguishes them
from other emotional states. But it need not be the case that the expectation that gives the
content of a reactive emotion is a moral one, or even that it is an expectation one sincerely
endorses. (Wallace 1994: 20).
Wallace accepts that the kind of belief involved in his stance of holding someone to
an expectation only counts as a belief in a degenerate sense: '[A] state in which one
entertains a proposition one does not fully accept - to which one assigns an
extremely low probability, for instance — may be allowed to count as a belief (1994:
24). The special nature of this quasi-evaluative stance is intended to explain how
reactive emotions can be essentially explicable in terms of beliefs about the violation
of requirements, thus accounting for the distinctive propositional content of such
emotions, while allowing that agents can experience a genuine reactive emotion
without believing they have committed any moral infraction or that the emotion is a
12 I bis is the position Wallace attributes to Rawls and which informs Rawls' approach to unwarranted
reactive attitudes (see Rawls 1972: 481-482). It is worth distinguishing between Rawls' claim that
reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation must be explained in relation to beliefs about
specifically moral infractions and the claim that the reactive attitudes must be explained in relation to
normative beliefs more generally. On the latter view, in order for an agent to feel genuine, say,
resentment, she must believe that someone has behaved in a way that warrants the emotion of
resentment; she need not believe that the person has done anything morally wrong. While the charge
ofovermoralizing the reactive attitudes is avoided by this latter model, it still leaves the problem of
explaining why reactive emotions that an agent experiences but doesn't believe warranted do not
count as genuine instances of such emotions. Wallace rejects explaining reactive emotions in terms of
specifically moral beliefs and rejects explaining them in terms ofnormative beliefs more generally.
As I outline in the text, he argues that any given reactive emotion must be explained in terms of the
'quasi-evaluative' belief that some expectation or requirement has been violated.
13 Wallace attributes such a view to Gibbard (see Wallace 1994:48-50; and Gibbard 1990: 135-150).
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warranted response to the situation in question. On Wallace's model, then, it is
possible for unwarranted reactive emotions to be examples ofholding someone to an
expectation because holding someone to an expectation does not entail that one
endorses the expectation or believes that its violation would warrant a negative
sanction.
There are a number of problems with Wallace's quasi-evaluative version of holding
someone to an expectation. For instance, it would seem to be vulnerable to the same
kind of objection made against purely non-judgemental accounts of normative
expectation. According to Wallace, one can hold someone to an expectation without
believing the expectation warranted and without believing that a failure to conform
to it would warrant a negative sanction. But it seems inaccurate to our ordinary
notion of holding someone to account that we would do so while believing that there
were no grounds on which to base our stance. The apostate may feel guilt for
engaging in sexual relations outside marriage, but he does not hold himself to a
requirement to abstain from sex outside marriage precisely because he does not
believe such a requirement warranted.
The quasi-evaluative version of holding someone to an expectation also seems to get
the propositional content of the reactive emotions wrong. Wallace argues that the
reactive emotions are distinguished by their 'presumptive' connection to expectations
(1994: 20-25, 31, 39). Specifically, they are distinguished by the propositional
content that characterises them as a class. This is the content of the 'degenerate'
belief that some expectation has been violated (Wallace: 1994: 24). But this content
is ill-suited to be the defining feature of the reactive emotions, as it points to an item
that is only nominally an expectation or requirement. And purely nominal
requirements do not call for the response of a reactive emotion. For example, the
non-Muslim who believes that a woman has violated an Islamic 'requirement' to
cover her hair in public does not believe that there is an actual requirement (a
normative requirement) that women cover their hair in public. He believes that there
is a standard of conduct that a certain group treats as a nonnative requirement, and
that this standard has been violated. But the content of this belief, by its very nature,
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does not justify or make appropriate the response of a reactive emotion. By contrast,
an agent's belief that the woman's failure to cover her hair in public warrants moral
indignation allows us to see the indignation, from the agent's perspective, as an
appropriate response to the violation of a nonnative requirement.
It would seem that reactive emotions only ultimately make sense in terms of central
cases in which they are warranted responses to the violation of or conformity with
expectations. Agents understand what indignation is because they understand it as an
emotion that is only appropriately held in circumstances where a justified
requirement or standard of behaviour is breached. This suggests that the
propositional content characteristic of the reactive attitudes is essentially evaluative
rather than quasi-evaluative. How then do we account for the fact of unwarranted
reactive emotions? I suspect that the propositional aspect of unwarranted reactive
emotions can be accounted for without invoking the controversial notion of a
'degenerate' belief. As Wallace himself notes, susceptibility to a particular reactive
emotion, like guilt, in a certain context will be accompanied by a range of evaluative
thoughts one does not necessarily endorse (1994: 46). If I feel guilty about her
leaving early, it is perhaps because I wonder whether I should have been more
welcoming to her, or that I said something to upset her. Now, suppose that after
deliberation I conclude that the guilt I feel is not warranted, because I was
sufficiently hospitable to her and said nothing to upset her. We can still explain my
feeling guilty by noting the kinds of demands and considerations that I thought about
on her leaving. Sometimes, taking seriously or thinking about the prospect that one
has done wrong may be enough to trigger feelings of guilt, even in the absence of a
belief that one has done something wrong or violated a requirement. In such cases,
the presence of the guilt is still made sense of in relation to the notion of particular
requirements whose violation, if they obtained, would make the guilt appropriate. In
this way, the distinctive propositional content of reactive emotions is preserved as an
essential part of their explanation without the need to posit an actual belief about the
violation of a requirement.
139
Wallace's stance of'holding someone to an expectation' is not robust enough to play
the role I need the notion ofnormative expectation to play. Recall that on my
account normative expectation is meant to be a sincerity condition for the
commissive portion of the speech act ofmoral evaluation. That is, it determines
whether an agent is sincere in her commitment to being guided by the content of her
moral judgement. If it were possible for an agent to believe a requirement unjustified
and yet normatively expect someone else to conform to the requirement, then the fact
that the agent has this normative expectation could hardly be an expression of her
sincere commitment to the requirement in question. The robust sense of normative
expectation required by my approach means that our initial formulation of it remains
inadequate because it makes unwarranted sanctioning responses and emotions
sufficient for holding someone to an expectation. Given these considerations, it
seems that a satisfactory conception of normative expectation must make reference to
a requirement that the agent who holds the expectation accepts or believes is
warranted and believes warrants appropriate sanctions if violated.
5. Holding Someone to an Expectation and the Reactive Emotions
In the last section I argued against Wallace's claim that any experience of a reactive
emotion involves the stance of holding someone to an expectation. Wallace defends
this view because he thinks that the notion of holding someone to account must be
made sense of in terms of the reactive emotions. This is part of a broader attempt to
develop an account ofmoral responsibility based on Strawson's views in 'Freedom
and Resentment'(Wallace 1994: 18).14 Wallace commits himself to what he takes to
be one of Strawson's central themes: that moral responsibility should be understood
in terms of susceptibility to the reactive attitudes. Using this theme as a starting
point, Wallace proceeds 'by working out an account of the stance ofholding
someone responsible in terms of the reactive emotions' (Wallace 1994:18. My
emphasis).
14 See Strawson 1962.
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Strawson's central concern in 'Freedom and Resentment' is the issue ofmoral
responsibility with regard to the free-will and determinism debate (1962). Strawson
defends a non-consequentialist form of compatibilism about moral responsibility,
designed to show that the thesis of determinism has no bearing on the propriety of
the practice of holding people morally responsible - a practice characterised, he
claims, by an essential connection to the reactive attitudes.15 My focus here is not
primarily what it is to be morally responsible but is the nature of our practice of
holding people responsible or accountable for their behaviour. On Strawson's view,
there are standards internal to our practice of holding agents responsible that indicate
when it is and is not appropriate to hold someone to account (1962: 50-52). His
argument suggests that there is nothing more to our notion of being morally
responsible than is captured by the standards involved in holding people morally
responsible. But one need not accept this aspect of Strawson's position in order to
support the broadly Strawsonian theme that holding someone morally accountable is
essentially connected to susceptibility to the reactive emotions.
The concept of holding someone responsible or accountable suggests a level of
engagement or interest beyond that involved in simply believing or describing
something (cf. Wallace 1994: 52). Indeed, the way in which normative expectation
goes beyond cognition is, I contend, precisely what is distinctive about such a stance.
Consider a world in which to hold someone accountable involves merely noting that
the person has done some wrong that warrants a negative sanction, but where the
stance involves no tendency to enforce the sanction or to experience sanctioning
emotions. When someone from this world says, for example, 'I hold you to account
for losing the money,' she is not in the least inclined towards blaming the person for
losing the money or engaging in any practical sanctioning measures against the
151 am not here concerned with the issue ofwhether determinism is relevant to the justification of the
concepts of moral responsibility and freedom and related practices. If it is possible to make genuine
moral judgements (in a non-revisionary sense), then it must be possible for agents to be responsible
and to be held responsible for their actions. If the kind of incompatibilism which denies the
possibility ofmoral responsibility, and thus the propriety ofmoral sanctions, is correct, then it is never
the case that agents make genuine moral judgements, and so the issue ofmoral judgement internalism
becomes irrelevant. I am assuming, therefore, that agents sometimes makes genuine moral
judgements, and that it is possible for agents to be responsible and to be held responsible for their
actions.
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person, even though she may judge that the person 'warrants' such measures.
Moreover, she sees nothing unusual or amiss in this dislocation between what is
called for and what is done, for holding someone to account is just to make a
disinterested observation about the behaviour of an agent. I take it that what this
person means by 'holding someone to account' is something quite different to what
we normally mean by the expression. As Gary Watson notes, to hold someone to an
expectation 'means something in practice...[It] is to be ready to treat them in certain
ways'(1987: 120). I agree with Watson that any adequate analysis of our ordinary
notion of holding people accountable must capture this practical aspect of the
stance.16
According to Wallace, the role of the reactive emotions is crucial to account for the
'form of deep assessment that goes beyond mere description' characteristic of the
stance of holding someone responsible (1994: 82). It is thus vital that his theory
captures the nature of the essential connection between the reactive attitudes and the
stance of holding someone responsible. Wallace characterises the connection in the
following way:
[T]he stance of holding someone to a demand...does not have explanatory priority vis-a-vis
the reactive emotions: to be subject to the reactive emotions is to take this stance towards a
person, and to adopt this stance is in turn to be subject to the reactive emotions. (Wallace
1994:24)
I will refer to the claim expressed in this statement as the 'mutual dependence claim'.
It asserts that the notion of holding someone accountable and the notion of
susceptibility to the reactive emotions can only be elucidated in terms of each other.
It is clear that Wallace's quasi-evaluative stance of holding someone to an
expectation is developed to accommodate the Strawsonian insight captured by the
mutual dependence claim. This special stance is needed to counter the appearance
that the mutual dependence claim is contradicted by the fact of unwarranted reactive
emotions. I have already argued that it is awkward to describe an agent who feels a
16
I will use concepts of'holding to account', 'holding to an expectation or requirement', and
'normatively expecting someone to conform to a requirement' interchangeably.
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reactive emotion towards someone without believing it warranted as holding that
person to an expectation. But this seems to confute the claim that simply being
subject to a reactive emotion is to adopt the stance of holding someone to an
expectation. By contrast, the quasi-evaluative stance advanced by Wallace allows
that an agent can hold someone to an expectation even if the agent does not endorse
the expectation or believe that its violation would warrant a negative sanction. On
this model, even if I don't believe the guilt I feel about cursing is warranted, if it is
genuine guilt, I must believe 1 have violated a requirement not to curse. This will
then count as my holding myself to account with regard to the requirement not to
curse. In this way, Wallace aims to accommodate both the mutual dependence claim
and the fact of unwarranted reactive emotions.
A problem with Wallace's approach is that it weakens the stance of holding someone
to an expectation to such an extent that it no longer resembles the robust stance of
holding someone responsible with which he was initially concerned.17 This forces
him to develop a quite different account ofwhat it is to hold someone morally
responsible. According to Wallace, an agent only holds someone morally
responsible with regard to a requirement if she accepts the requirement 'as a basis for
practical deliberation and normative criticism and discussion' (1994: 63). Because
on this account the notion of'acceptance' does all the work in terms of elucidating
the stance of holding someone responsible, the initial Strawsonian connection
endorsed by Wallace between this stance and the reactive attitudes is left
inadequately explained. And this means we lose the central insight expressed by the
mutual dependence claim.
Wallace interprets the mutual dependence claim narrowly in insisting that any
particular experience of a reactive emotion or disposition to experience a reactive
17 This is related to the problem, already mentioned, that Wallace's weakened stance of holding
someone to an expectation allows agents to hold others and themselves to expectations they in no way
endorse. The point here is that implicit in his development of this attenuated version of the stance is a
recognition that it is implausible that an agent would hold someone morally responsible for an act if
the agent did not believe there to be any justified moral demand requiring or prohibiting the act. This
is why Wallace's conception of holding someone to an expectation comes apart from his conception
of holding someone morally responsible.
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emotion is an example of holding someone to an expectation. We have already seen
that this view faces difficulties in accounting for unwarranted reactive emotions. But
it also faces difficulties in accounting for cases in which an agent believes that
someone warrants being held to account, but the agent's ability to feel the relevant
reactive emotion is inhibited by fatigue, depression, or some other factor. Consider
the following example. John is waiting at a bar to be served when a friend of the
bartender pushes in and is served before him. John recognises that it would be
appropriate to feel resentment towards both the bartender and the bartender's friend,
but he is too tired and depressed to be able to work up any feelings of anger or
resentment towards them. So he continues to wait patiently to be served. Now, it
would seem that despite his failure to feel resentment, John holds the bartender and
her friend accountable for their behaviour and believes that such behaviour warrants
a negative sanction. But this suggests that, contrary to the mutual dependence claim,
it is possible to hold someone to an expectation without being subject to a reactive
emotion.
One might expect Wallace to defend the mutual dependence claim by denying that an
agent who fails to feel a reactive emotion can be said to hold someone to an
expectation. But Wallace argues that it is possible to hold someone to an expectation
merely by believing that the person would warrant a negative reactive emotion were
she to violate the expectation (1994: 21). To accommodate this view, he proposes a
disjunctive account ofwhat it is to hold someone to an expectation. Wallace says
that to hold someone to an expectation it is sufficient either that one be susceptible to
the reactive attitudes in cases where the person violates the expectation or that one
believes that one of the reactive attitudes would be warranted in such instances
18
(Wallace 1994: 21). However, this account would seem to undermine the mutual
dependence claim by allowing that one can hold someone to an expectation by way
of a belief about the reactive emotions rather than by being subject to such emotions.
Wallace recognises this tension, but argues that because the reactive emotions are
18 One might have both a susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and a belief that a reactive attitude is
appropriate (Wallace 1994: 23). Note that this latter belief is not the 'degenerate' belief entailed by
any experience of a reactive emotion: the belief that some requirement has been violated. It is not
clear what the relationship between these two kinds ofbeliefs - the 'justifying' and the 'degenerate' -
is meant to be.
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included in the content of such beliefs, someone who has a belief of this kind is
sufficiently connected to these emotions (1994: 76,77).
It seems doubtful that Wallace's disjunctive account can capture the sense in which
holding someone to an expectation is essentially tied to susceptibility to the reactive
emotions. This is because it is precisely an agent's susceptibility to such emotions
that makes it the case that she goes beyond mere belief or cognition in holding
someone to account. What is needed is an account of the essential connection
between normative expectation and the reactive emotions that allows for instances of
unwarranted reactive emotion and explains cases in which a belief that an emotion is
warranted gives the appearance of being sufficient for holding someone to an
expectation. To develop such an account, I turn in the next section to Strawson's
model of the reactive emotions.
6. Susceptibility to the Reactive Emotions and the Mutual Dependence Claim
Wallace's view of the reactive emotions emphasises the relation between the stance
of holding someone to an expectation and being susceptible to the reactive emotions
in particular cases. This approach allows that one can fail to experience a particular
reactive emotion yet still succeed in holding someone to account, provided one
believes the emotion warranted. In such cases, one is not subject to the relevant
reactive emotion or emotions. But this version of the relation between holding
someone to an expectation and the reactive emotions fails to capture a crucial strand
of Strawson's account of these emotions. It fails to capture the sense in which, for
Strawson, to be subject to the reactive emotions is to be generally susceptible to a
range of emotions and attitudes that characterise a background 'framework' within
which moral deliberation and practice take place (1962: 55). On this model, to hold
someone to an expectation is to be prone to the reactive or 'participant' attitudes; and
to be prone in this way is to be a participant in the practice of assessing and reacting
to the attitudes, intentions, and behaviour of agents as they impact upon one and
upon others (cf. Strawson 1962: 64). It is to be, what I will term, normatively
engaged.
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In this section I want to outline and defend a broad or general reading of the
connection between the reactive emotions and the stance of holding someone to
account. This is a reading I take to be implicit in Strawson's account of the reactive
emotions and of holding agents morally accountable. As I have said, Wallace's
adopts a narrow construal of the mutual dependence claim. He insists that any
genuine experience of a reactive emotion involves the stance of holding someone to
account. This approach leads to the kinds of difficulties outlined in the last section:
the possibility of an agent's holding someone to account without believing there is
any justification for doing so; and the possibility of an agent's holding someone to
account without being at all susceptible to the reactive emotions. In contrast to
Wallace's narrow approach, Strawson aims to elucidate the nature and role of the
reactive emotions and their connection to demands or expectations in relation to
broader moral and evaluative practice.19
For Strawson, to understand the practice of holding agents responsible we should
start with the 'very great importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards
us ofother human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings and
reactions depend upon, or involve, beliefs about these attitudes and intentions' (1962:
48). The reactive emotions are thus reactions to the perceived goodwill or
indifference shown towards us by others as expressed in their intentions and attitudes
(Strawson 1962: 49). As such, the reactive emotions express a demand for a certain
degree of goodwill or regard from others towards ourselves.20 For example, if a bus
driver sees me running for the bus in the rain and drives away just as I reach the
door, I am liable to feel resentment towards him in a way that I would not if I knew
that he had not seen me. In resenting the bus driver in this way, I hold him
accountable for his behaviour towards me and for the intentions and attitudes
expressed by his behaviour. And holding him accountable in this way, on
Strawson's model, is just to be prone to the reactive emotions (1962: 63)
19 Strawson views the role of the reactive attitudes as central to any adequate account of the nature of
morality and ofmoral responsibility: 'Only by attending to this range ofattitudes can we recover from
the facts as we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, when... speaking the
language ofmorals...' (Strawson 1962: 64).
20
Negative reactive emotions, such as resentment, says Strawson, are 'precisely the correlates' of this
demand or expectation 'where the demand is felt to be disregarded' (1962: 63).
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These comments indicate that Strawson elucidates the reactive emotions or attitudes
in relation to a general demand or expectation which derives from a fundamental
concern that human agents have with how they are treated by others. This is at least
the case with what Strawson terms 'personal reactive attitudes,' such as resentment
and gratitude. But he stresses that human agents also make demands on themselves
for others and demands on others for others (1962: 57). 'Self-reactive attitudes' such
21
as guilt and shame characterise the first kind of demand ; whereas the second kind
of demand is characterised by 'generalised' or 'vicarious' reactive attitudes such as
moral indignation and moral approval.22 Common to all these types of reactive
attitudes is their dependence on the normative assessment or evaluation of the
intentions, behaviour, and attitudes of those to whom they are directed. For instance,
I resent the bus driver because he behaved in a needlessly indifferent and
intentionally unhelpful manner towards me. These failings in his attitudes and
behaviour I assess or judge make appropriate the attitude of resentment towards him.
Similarly, I might feel moral indignation towards a shopkeeper who discriminates
against customers on the basis of race, because I judge his racist attitude and
behaviour to be morally wrong and indignation a warranted response to this wrong.
As we have seen, an agent may feel resentment towards someone without believing
she has any grounds for such a feeling. The crucial feature of Strawson's approach
that allows us to account for such experiences is his broad reading of the mutual
dependence claim. Implicit in his argument is the elucidation of the mutual
dependence between the reactive emotions and the stance of holding to account at the
level of general dispositions rather than at the level of specific cases of reactive
emotion. On this model, to be broadly or generally susceptible to the range of
21 For example, if I fail to do my fair share of the housework, I may violate a demand I make on
myself to treat you fairly, and thus be liable to feel guilty as a result of recognising this violation.
22 Strawson suggests these are feelings that stem from a demand for a degree of consideration from
others towards all agents who are appropriate objects ofmoral concern (1962: 57). He appears to
regard the generalised reactive attitudes as typically moral in character (1962: 56). But we need not
follow him in characterising moral reactive attitudes in this way. Just as self-reactive attitudes of guilt
and shame are often moral in character, generalised forms of disapproval or praise can be of a non-
moral nature. For example, I may disapprove of the choice of curator because I think it will be bad for
the gallery, without thinking that those who appointed the curator warrant moral condemnation.
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reactive emotions is to be generally disposed to hold agents to account with regard to
their behaviour; and to be such as to hold agents to account with regard to their
behaviour is just to be generally susceptible to the reactive emotions (cf. Strawson
1962: 53, 54). To have such dispositions and susceptibilities, says Strawson, is
constitutive of participation in normal interpersonal relations and in moral discourse
and practice (1962: 52, 57-58).23 It is against the background of this general
orientation characteristic of the participant point of view that we can make sense of
unwarranted reactive emotions and the failure to feel reactive emotions when they
are judged warranted.
Consider first the case of unwarranted reactive emotions. An agent experiences an
unwarranted reactive emotion when she experiences that emotion but does not
believe it to be an appropriate response to the behaviour or act that elicits it. I have
argued that because in such cases an agent fails to endorse her response, she cannot
be said to have adopted the stance of holding someone to account, even though she
experiences a genuine reactive emotion. Yet the mutual dependence claim tells us
that reactive emotions are essentially connected to the stance of holding someone to
account. The model of general susceptibility to the reactive emotions and
sanctioning responses suggests a response to this problem. On that model, we
understand what it is to experience genuine warranted or unwarranted reactive
emotions in relation to the role the reactive emotions play in the broader practice of
holding agents to account that characterises the participant point of view. An agent
who believes a reactive emotion towards someone is unwarranted and who is
generally disposed to hold others and herself to expectations will tend to discount
that emotion and the kind ofbehaviour the emotion, when warranted, gives agents
23 Strawson contrasts the 'participant' attitudes and their related practices with the range of 'objective'
attitudes (1962: 52). We adopt the objective attitudes (appropriately) towards those who it is
inappropriate to hold accountable for their behaviour because they are constitutionally incapable of
acting responsibly: 'To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as
an object of social policy; as a subject for what... might be called treatment; as something certainly to
be taken account.. .of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be
avoided...The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways...: it may include repulsion
or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include
resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said
to feel reciprocally, for each other' (Strawson 1962: 52).
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reason to engage in.24 For example, an agent will not see the fact of his feeling
unwarranted guilt as reason to apologise to anyone or to modify his behaviour in the
way that he would were he to believe his guilt justified (cf. Rawls 1971: 482).
Reactive emotions are thus made sense of in terms of central cases in which they are
warranted responses to conformity with or breaches of expectations and in which
they count as holding agents to expectations. These central cases characterise the
general orientation of the participant point of view. Thus, a participant agent who
experiences an unwarranted reactive emotion will still be such as to hold herself and
others to expectations. On this model, then, the reactive emotions are essentially
connected to the stance of holding agents to account, even though any particular
experience of a reactive emotion may not count as holding someone to account in the
absence of a relevant belief that the emotion is warranted.
The proposed model can also make sense ofWallace's claim that an agent can hold
someone to account in cases where the agent fails to feel a particular reactive
emotion she believes to be warranted. Consider again the example of the rude bus
driver who intentionally drives off just as I reach the bus. Perhaps I have had a very
tiring day and can't work up the resentment I think is warranted in such cases. It is
crucial to note that my failure to feel resentment in this instance does not undermine
the claim that 1 am disposed to resent people who are rude to me. Such
psychological dispositions need not manifest invariably in order to be genuine
dispositions. So while in this instance I fail to feel resentment 1 think is warranted, 1
am still disposed to feel resentment in response to such situations.
Consider how my proposed model ofmoral judgement would work in relation to this
example. I judge that the bus driver has acted wrongly because he failed to treat me
with appropriate consideration and respect. Presumably I believe there is a moral
requirement that prescribes treating others with due consideration and respect in such
contexts and I believe that the bus driver has violated this requirement. Let's focus,
then, on the judgement that the bus driver is morally required to treat her passengers
24 For example, an agent will not see the fact of his feeling unwarranted guilt as reason to apologise to
anyone or to modify his behaviour in the way that he would were he to believe his guilt justified (cf.
Rawls 1971:482).
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with due consideration and respect. What conditions must be met in order for this
judgement to be sincere? The sincerity condition for the assertive portion of the
judgement is that I believe that the bus driver is morally required to treat her
passengers with due consideration and respect. The sincerity condition for the
commissive portion of the judgement is that I normatively expect the bus driver to
conform to the requirement to treat her passengers with due consideration and
respect. To hold someone to a requirement in this way is to have a certain belief and
to have certain dispositions. If I normatively expect the bus driver to conform to this
requirement then I must believe that a violation of the requirement would warrant a
negative sanction and I must be disposed to sanction negatively violations of this
requirement. These conditions are summarised below:
Moral Judgement: S judges that the bus driver is morally required to
treat her passengers with due consideration and respect.
Sincerity Conditions:
1. S believes that the bus driver is morally required to treat her
passengers with due consideration and respect.
2. S normatively expects the bus driver to conform to the requirement
that she treat her passengers with due consideration and respect:
a) S believes that violations of this requirement warrant negative
sanctions.
b) S is disposed to sanction negatively violations of this requirement.
In this chapter I have been trying to understand what it is for an agent to be sincere in
her commitment to a moral requirement. My claim is that the posited sincerity
condition for normative expectation captures the robust sense of endorsement or
commitment that, according to moral judgement internalism, is necessarily tied to
moral judgements. We start with the internalist intuition that there is something
more to moral judgement than bare belief: something involving a notion of
endorsement or commendation that is significantly tied up with motivation. This
notion of endorsement is connected to the commissive aspect of the moral speech
act. When we judge that something is morally right we commit ourselves to being
guided by the content of the requirement expressed by our judgement. We are
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sincere in this commitment when we hold ourselves and others to account with
regard to the relevant requirement. The notion of holding to account or normative
expectation is intimately tied up with the kinds of reactive emotions that typically
characterise moral practice. My claim is that something like this notion of normative
expectation plays a central role in our moral psychology. It is what is missing from
both purely cognitivist accounts ofmoral judgement and traditional non-cognitivist
accounts ofmoral judgement. Purely cognitivist accounts ofmoral judgement fail to
account for the endorsing function of such judgements. Traditional non-cognitivist
accounts ofmoral judgement fail to account for the distinction between merely
desiring or being motivated to pursue an option and endorsing the pursuit of an
option (see chapter 1.6).
To be committed to something is, inter alia, to be disposed to promote or support
that thing. One cannot be committed to something if one has absolutely no
inclination to promote or support it. So my account of sincere commitment to a
moral requirement is designed to capture the sense in which we are inclined or
disposed to support and promote such requirements. In this section, I have argued
that the model of general susceptibility to the reactive emotions can accommodate a
version of the mutual dependence claim while accounting for the problem of
unwarranted reactive emotions and the problem ofholding someone to account in the
absence of specific reactive emotions. In chapter three, I said that a preparatory
condition for the speech act of moral evaluation is that the speaker is normatively
engaged. We are now in a position to give a more precise account of what this
means. For someone to be normatively engaged is, on my account, for her to be
generally susceptible to the reactive emotions and sanctioning responses which in
turn enables her to hold agents to expectations and thus to engage in the normative
assessment of those agents' intentions, attitudes, and behaviour.
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7. Moral Judgement, Normative Competence and the Amoralist
One of the main themes of Stocker's paper is that motivation and evaluation do not
have a simple and direct relation to each other: 'Rather, they are interrelated in
various and complex ways, and their interrelations are mediated by large arrays of
complex psychic structures, such as mood, energy, and interest' (1979: 739). This is
why he says that when agents are depressed, or lack interest or energy, they often fail
to intend to do what they believe it is best to do - the standard case of akrasia or
weakness of will. The discussion thus far in this chapter supports both the contention
that the relation between motivation and evaluation is not simple and direct and the
claim that agents often fail to intend to do what they believe it is best to do.
However, the discussion has also been an attempt to explain the view that moral
judgements are of conceptual necessity tied to endorsing attitudes which play a
central role in moral motivation: the version ofmoral judgement internalism
defended in chapter 1.
There is not a direct conflict between the phenomenon of weakness ofwill and
simple moral judgement internalism. An agent suffering from weakness ofwill only
fails to be sufficiently motivated to perform the act she judges it is best to do; and
this is consistent with her having some motivation to perform that act and thus with
there being a necessary connection between the judgement that the act is right and
motivation to perform the act. Nonetheless, opponents ofmoral judgement
internalism often raise the possibility of cases in which an agent not only fails to
intend to do what she judges is best, but fails to have anymotivation inclining her
towards her better judgement. And the possibility of this agent does seem to threaten
the thesis of simple moral judgement internalism. In chapter 1. I argued that we
should reject the simple version ofmoral judgement internalism. Part of the reason
for this is that simple moral judgement internalism neglects the complex nature of the
relation between evaluation and motivation highlighted by Stocker. I said in 1.6 that
simple moral judgement internalism is in one sense too strong and in another sense
too weak. It is too strong because agents sometimes have no desire to perform acts
they judge they are morally required to perform. It is too weak because merely
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having a desire to perform an act one believes to be right is not sufficient to count as
endorsing that act or the requirement that prescribes it.
The version of moral judgment internalism I defended in chapter 1 asserts a
connection of conceptual necessity between the act ofjudging that an option is
morally right and endorsing or commending that option. In this chapter I have
argued that in order to make a genuine moral judgement an agent must be affectively
or conatively disposed to be guided by the content of her moral deliberations. This
means that genuine moral judgements presuppose a background of affective-conative
engagement with a particular kind of normative practice. There is thus a non-
defeasible conceptual or 'internal' connection between genuine moral judgements
and the range of conative attitudes necessary for normative engagement. This
position is clearly distinct from the externalist view that the possession of a relevant
moral belief is sufficient for an agent to make a genuine moral judgement. So there
is a kind of internalism at the level of the preparatory conditions for genuine moral
judgements that distinguishes my view from moral judgement externalism.
This form of internalism at the level of preparatory conditions helps to explain the
more standard internalist claim that moral judgements necessarily express endorsing
or commendatory attitudes. So my position is also distinguished from externalism in
relation to the kinds of attitudes it says moral judgements necessarily express.
Specifically, my view says that moral judgements express an attitude or stance of
normative expectation in addition to a moral belief. The stance of normative
expectation comprises a belief that violations of the requirement expressed by the
moral judgement warrant negative sanctions and a disposition to sanction negatively
violations of this requirement. So if an agent judges that she is morally required to
d>, then she is disposed to sanction negatively violations of the requirement to <1>.
The notion of normative expectation is meant to capture the strong sense of
commitment or endorsement associated with moral judgements. This too
distinguishes it from moral judgement externalism.
One ofmy central claims, then, is that ifwe reflect on the concept of endorsement
involved in moral judgement it appears to involve something close to the stance of
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normative expectation. Something like this stance seems to be needed to account for
failures ofmotivation and, crucially, for the distinction between merely desiring an
option and endorsing an option. As I mention in chapter 5.1, the notion of normative
expectation also seems consistent with recent speculation about the nature of'higher
cognitive attitudes,' such as guilt, resentment and moral indignation. Research into
such attitudes suggests that they are highly integrated with cognitive activity
involved with long-term actions, coordination and planning (Griffith 1997: 100). It
is plausible to suppose that a stance like that of normative expectation is involved in
the kind of normatively governed intentional behaviour we associate with human
agents (cf. Gibbard 1989: chap. 4; and see 5.1 above).
In order to understand the different kinds of failures ofmoral motivation and their
implications for moral judgement internalism, I want to reflect on the complex
picture ofmoral psychology and moral motivation outlined in previous chapters. I
mentioned in chapters one and two that different notions ofmotivation seem to figure
in moral deliberation at a number of different levels. Sometimes talk of'motivation'
is talk ofmotivating states: some psychological states are considered essentially or
internally motivating in the sense that to be in such a state constitutes being
motivated. Typically, we talk of desires and wants in this respect, but there are many
other conative states that are broadly motivating in this same sense, including such
attitudes as sympathy, anger, disapproval and concern. The non-normative
motivating state sense of'motivation' should not be confused with the sense in
which someone may be motivated by a particular consideration she takes to be
25
justifying. For example, the consideration or reason in light ofwhich I helped her
was that she needed assistance. Though I felt sympathy for her, I did not take the
fact ofmy feeling sympathy to be a consideration in favour of helping her.26 The
sympathy I feel towards her is, in this case, a non-normative motivating attitude. The
consideration or reason in light ofwhich I act is also to be distinguished from a belief
with a justifying reason claim as its content, such as my belief that she needs
25 See 5.3 for an outline of the notion of a favouring consideration.
20
Though the fact that she warranted sympathy, if she did, may have been part ofmy justification for
helping her.
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assistance. In this case, it is the consideration that she needs assistance and not the
belief that she needs assistance that I take to be justification for my helping her.
Now, it is clear that the model ofmoral judgement internalism I have put forward
does not posit a necessary connection between making a moral judgement and being
motivated by the justifying content of that judgement. That is, it does not posit a
necessary connection between moral judgement and what we might call normative
motivation. And this accords with what Stacker has to say about the influence of
mood, interest, and energy on our moral motivation. John's depression means that
he is not motivated by the consideration that he has a moral obligation to vote in the
national election: a consideration he takes to be justifying. However, if John is
sincere, he must, in addition to believing his moral judgement, normatively expect
himself to act in accordance with the proposition that it is right for him (and all
relevant others) to vote in the national election. And, as we have seen, in order to
hold himself and others to an expectation in this way, John must be disposed to
sanction violations of the requirement expressed by his judgement, and to do this he
must be generally susceptible to the reactive attitudes and sanctioning responses that
characterise the participant point of view.
If the point ofmoral practice and moral judgement is to guide conduct, then we
would expect the reactive attitudes to help facilitate this aim. And it seems that they
do. The reactive attitudes put pressure on action: they help to reinforce the aim of
getting agents to be motivated by normative judgements. When the match between
normative judgement and motivation breaks apart, as in the case ofweakness ofwill
and mood-based motivational disorders, reactive attitudes help to bring motivations
back in line with normative judgements. Reactive attitudes also exert interpersonal
pressure on agents to coordinate their normative judgements with their motivations.
Given the interpretation ofmoral judgement internalism advocated above, what can
we say about the issue of amoralism and of failures ofmoral motivation more
generally? This will depend on whether our concern is with amoralist scepticism or
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with unprincipled amoralism.27 Recall that the amoralist sceptic is someone who
questions the practical justification ofmoral demands, whereas the unprincipled
amoralist is someone who accepts the justification ofmoral demands but who fails to
be motivated by them. Given the above distinction between normative and non-
normative motivation, we can distinguish two possible forms of unprincipled
amoralism. One fonn of unprincipled amoralism involves the agent who judges that
an act is morally required but who fails to be normatively motivated by her
judgement. Another form of unprincipled amoralism involves the agent who judges
that an act is morally required but who fails to have any conative attitudes inclining
her towards the act. On the model I have proposed, the latter kind of unprincipled
amoralist will not count as having made a sincere moral judgement because she lacks
general susceptibility to those attitudes that would allow her to hold agents to
expectations. More fundamentally, her lack of any susceptibility to these attitudes
prevents her from being normatively engaged in the way required to meet the
precondition for making genuine moral judgements. This means I am committed to
denying the possibility of this kind of unprincipled amoralism. By contrast, the
unprincipled amoralist who fails to be normatively motivated by her moral
judgement is potentially capable ofmaking both genuine and sincere moral
judgements. This is the familiar example of the depressed or mood-affected agent
outlined by Stocker. Let's call the unprincipled amoralist who makes a genuine
moral judgement but who fails to be normatively motivated by it the 'incontinent
amoralist'.
The incontinent amoralist can make genuine and sincere moral judgements because
she can be generally susceptible to the reactive attitudes and thus generally disposed
to hold herself and others to expectations, even though she fails to be normatively
motivated by her moral judgements. So the possibility of incontinent amoralism is
consistent with there being a necessary connection between moral judgements,
particular dispositions to sanction requirements, and the range of conative attitudes
that characterise the participant point of view. In fact, a consequence of the position
I have proposed is that the possibility of incontinent amoralism actually depends on
27 See chapter 2, section 3 for a discussion of these different forms of amoralism.
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the incontinent amoralist's being normatively engaged in this way. This is because it
is only if the incontinent amoralist is generally susceptible to the reactive attitudes
that she is capable of holding herself and others to account in the way necessary to
make genuine moral judgements. So, on my model, rather than confuting moral
judgement internalism, incontinent amoralism actually entails it.
The incontinent amoralist can fail to have sufficient normative motivation to do what
she judges is right or she can fail to have any normative motivation to do what she
judges is right. In either case, incontinent amoralism is consistent with my version of
moral judgement internalism. But perhaps the proponent of anti-internalist
amoralism has something more extreme in mind than the incontinent amoralist. This
is the other type of unprincipled amoralism: the view that there are agents who make
genuine moral judgements in the absence of any conative attitudes inclining them
towards the acts favoured by their judgements. Now, as I have said, the position I
have adopted commits me to denying the possibility of this form of amoralism. The
plausibility of this denial will, of course, in part depend on the success of the model
ofmoral judgement I have defended and the success of that model in accounting for
a range of failures ofmoral motivation. The hope is that because my model can
account for various examples of such motivational failure, it can capture the core of
the intuitions that generate the arguments from amoralism, even while it excludes
extreme examples of unprincipled amoralism.
If we reflect on my account of the nature and structure ofmoral judgement, I think
we can begin to appreciate the force of the intuitions that deny that the extreme
unprincipled amoralist makes genuine moral judgements. On my model, an agent's
moral judgement is assessed as sincere or not in relation to whether she believes the
relevant moral proposition and whether she holds herself and others to account with
regard to that proposition: both conditions must be met in order for the moral
judgement to be sincere. It is worth noting, however, that the mental states involved
in moral judgement do not make up a compound attitude comprising entirely
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unrelated states.28 We need to understand the role ofmoral judgements in relation to
broader moral and evaluative practice. The point of such a practice is to guide
conduct. This is reflected in the illocutionary point or essential condition ofmoral
speech acts (see 3.6). There are a range of conceptual connections between the
different states involved in moral judgement that allow them to function together to
achieve the aim of guiding conduct.
On the model I have presented, a moral judgement involves a belief about a moral
requirement, a belief about the kinds of responses a violation of that requirement
would make appropriate, and a tendency to sanction such violations. A failure of
moral beliefwill bring with it a failure of normative expectation. This is because
normative expectation requires both a disposition to sanction and a belief that the
sanction is warranted, and if the agent does not believe there is a genuine moral
requirement, then she cannot consistently believe that a violation of that
'requirement' would warrant some form of negative sanction. This reflects the
conceptual dependence of the reactive emotions involved in normative expectation
on normative beliefs about the propriety of such emotions. So while it is sufficient to
undermine the sincerity of a moral judgement that an agent either fails to believe the
relevant moral proposition or fails to hold herself and others to account with regard
to it, a failure of the beliefportion of the sincerity condition for moral judgements
will tend to bring with it a failure of the normative expectation portion of the
sincerity condition for moral judgements.
For an agent to be normatively engaged is for her to be capable of and disposed to
hold herself to requirements. This means that insofar as an agent believes some
requirement warranted, there will be, given her engaged stance, a range of reactive
conative attitudes inclining her towards that requirement. If the functioning of the
reactive attitudes that allow an agent to act from the participant point of view is so
28 Mele seems to have this kind of compound attitude in mind with his notion of an MR belieP (1996:
740). An MR belief* is any belief* that one is oneselfmorally required to do A, where belief* is a
compound of two distinct and unrelated attitudes, one essentially truth-seeking (a standard belief) and
one essentially motivational (a standard desire). Mele dismisses the notion of this kind of compound
attitude. See my section 8 above for a discussion ofMele's conception ofmoral judgement
internalism.
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severely inhibited that she no longer has any tendency or capacity to hold herself to
account, the agent will no longer count as being normatively engaged, and so will no
longer be able to make genuine moral judgements: she fails to meet what I called the
preparatory condition for moral judgements. As an example, consider again the case
of John's failure to vote in the national election even though he believes he is
morally required to do so. If John makes a genuine moral judgement, he must hold
himself and others to the moral requirement despite his failure to be normatively
motivated by it. Perhaps prior to the election he feels and expresses approval
towards those who intend to vote, and after the election he disapproves of those who
failed to vote and feels guilt himself for his failure to vote. But if John's depression
is so severe that he is simply unable to feel anything about those things he believes to
be right, then, on my approach, he is incapable of holding himself and others to
requirements and incapable ofmaking genuine moral judgements.
We should not confuse the agent whose mental state is such that he is incapable of
any reactive emotional response with the agent who temporarily fails to manifest
appropriate reactive emotions. Jane believes she is morally required to vote but fails
to do so because she has just fallen in love and spends the day of the election, and
much of the next week, with her lover. Jane does not forget about the election, but is
completely preoccupied with her current situation.. Even during the next week, she
cannot seem to think of anything or anyone but her new lover; she certainly does not
have the emotional room to feel guilty for not voting. Nonetheless, Jane knows that
her failure to vote warrants feeling guilty, and as her passions cool and the
consequences of her failure to vote in a marginal electorate become clear - the
election of a government to whom she is ideologically opposed and the institution by
them of policies she finds objectionable - she begins to feel bad about having not
voted. The complex network of dispositions and attitudes that make up the
participant point of view - the general tendency to hold herself and others to account
- was always intact in Jane, and throughout the entire incident she held herself to the
expectation that she vote in the national election. By contrast, John is so severely
affected by depression that his general susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is
undermined and he becomes incapable in general of holding himself or anyone else
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to account. We might say that the unity ofJohn's moral identity has been
fragmented to the point where it is no longer reasonable to attribute to him a coherent
moral point of view.
It should now begin to be clear why determining the status ofmoral judgements can
be both difficult and contentious. Determining whether or not to ascribe a moral
judgement to an agent depends in part upon an assessment of the competence of the
agent to make such judgements. Only if an agent is normatively competent is she
capable of holding herself and others to account in the way necessary to make
genuine moral judgements. In general, normative expectation will track moral belief
in the normatively engaged agent; insofar as it does not, we will tend to consider the
agent as lacking normative competence and withdraw ascriptions ofmoral
judgement. The central idea here is that we have presuppositions about the kind of
agents who are capable ofmaking genuine moral judgements: who are capable of
being moral appraisers. What I have been considering, following Strawson, is that
the capacity to hold agents to account and the role of the reactive emotions in this
capacity are an integral part of our ordinary conception of moral competence. More
than this, however, I think that the capacities of the normatively engaged agent are an
integral part of our ordinary notion of the morally responsible agent.29 Below, I
explore some connections between the kind of normative competence necessary for
making moral judgements and the kind ofmoral accountability necessary to be an
appropriate object ofmoral appraisal. I relate these issues to the problem of the
extreme amoralist.
My suggestion is that the extreme amoralist suffers from a degree of nonnative
incompetence that places her outside ordinary moral practice and which makes it
inappropriate to ascribe moral judgements to her.30 To support this view, I want to
29 Cf. Wallace 1994: 53:'To view people as responsible...is to see them as autonomous agents who
are reflective about their lives, who have a set of values and commitments sufficiently structured to
constitute... a conception of the good, and who aim to advance that conception in their action.'
30 Such normative incompetence does not mean that the agent in question is not an appropriate object
ofmoral concern. Indeed, we may acquire specific moral obligations towards such an agent precisely
because of her status.
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consider some conditions under which we tend to exempt agents from moral
responsibility. Sometimes we judge it inappropriate to hold agents morally
responsible, not because in particular instances they are blameless, but because they
are in general inappropriate objects of this kind ofmoral appraisal (cf. Strawson
1962: 50-52, 58-59). As Strawson points out, the conditions under which we exempt
an agent from general responsibility 'do not invite us to see the agent's action in a
way consistent with the full retention of ordinary interpersonal attitudes and merely
inconsistent with one particular attitude' (1962: 51). Such agents are typically
'psychologically abnormal' or 'morally undeveloped', and it is thus appropriate to
adopt towards them the objective range of attitudes in place of the reactive attitudes
(Strawson 1962: 52).31 This seems correct. For example, we do not generally hold
very young children responsible for their behaviour; and this is in large part due to
their lack of cognitive and emotional development. Adopting the objective stance
towards such children means training and managing their behaviour rather than
apportioning blame.32 It also means that we do not ascribe moral judgements to
them. And this is not simply because they are unable to grasp moral concepts. Such
children lack the capacity to regulate their conduct in a way that would make it
appropriate to appraise them morally. A large part of this lack of capacity is their
inability to hold themselves and others to expectations: an inability that also means
they cannot make genuine moral judgements. So one of the factors that makes it
inappropriate to hold young children morally responsible also makes it inappropriate
to ascribe moral judgements to them.
Strawson's model suggests that we tend to take up the objective stance towards those
who lack the reactive attitudes or whose reactive emotional capacity is inhibited in
some serious way. Such agents suffer from a kind of deep practical normative
31 See note 22, above, for the distinction between the objective and the reactive range ofattitudes.
Strawson notes that we sometimes adopt the objective attitudes towards normal responsible agents for
purposes of therapy or 'as a refuge... from the strains ofpersonal involvement' (1962: 52).
32 Of course, a crucial part of this training will be the rehearsal of disapprobation and approval
towards the child to bring her towards moral competence. The case of children illustrates why
ascriptions ofmoral judgement and ofmoral responsibility can be difficult: 'Thus parents and others
concerned with the upbringing of young children cannot have to their charges either kind of attitude
[reactive or objective] in a pure or unqualified form. They are dealing with creatures who are
potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being objects of, the full range of human and
moral attitudes, but are not yet truly capable of either' (Strawson 1962: 61-62).
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incompetence or immaturity. My claim is that the objective stance is the appropriate
stance to take towards the extreme amoralist as he too suffers from this kind of
practical normative incompetence. Consider one of Brink's examples of amoralism,
the sociopath (1989: 46). The sociopath would seem to be a clear example of
someone who is outside the kind of normative practice characterised by susceptibility
to the reactive attitudes. The following comments by Strawson capture this point:
But suppose we see the agent... as one whose picture of the world is an insane delusion; or as
one whose behaviour...is unintelligible to us, perhaps even to him, in terms of conscious
purposes, and intelligible only in terms of unconscious purposes; or even, perhaps, as one
wholly impervious to the...reactive attitudes...wholly lacking...in a moral sense...[T]o the
extent to which the agent is seen in this light, he is not seen as one on whom demands and
expectations lie in that particular way in which we think of them as lying when we speak of
moral obligation; he is not, to that extent, seen as a morally responsible agent, as a term of
moral relationships, as a member of the moral community. (Strawson 1962: 59)33
By adopting the objective attitudes towards the sociopath, we signal that it is
inappropriate to treat him either as an object ofmoral appraisal or as a subject
capable ofmoral appraisal. Because he is unable to hold himself or others to
account, the extreme amoralist is incapable of being morally responsible for his
actions and is incapable ofmaking genuine moral judgements.34
8. Bare Moral Belief
In the previous section, I rejected the extreme form of amoralism that is said to
undermine moral judgement internalism. However, it needs to be made clear
precisely what has been denied, as some opponents ofmoral judgement internalism
will undoubtedly object that I have failed to capture the real force of the externalist's
amoralist argument. While I have shown that the extreme amoralist cannot make a
genuine moral judgement, construed as a moral speech act, the externalist might
argue that moral judgement externalism, in its most potent and interesting form, is a
33 Watson (1987) discusses the issue ofmoral responsibility and the sociopath/ psychopath in relation
to Strawson's views on the participant attitudes and moral community.
34 Insofar as such an agent does warrant moral indignation or blame, we must hold that he is an
appropriate object ofmoral appraisal and, as such, capable of holding himself and others to
expectations. But the extreme amoralist is not someone whose evaluative judgements are merely
horribly misguided - someone, for example, who believes he is justified in brutalising women and
normatively expects himself to do so; he is someone who lacks any, or sufficient, susceptibility to the
kinds of attitudes that would allow him to hold himself and others to account.
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thesis about moral psychology rather than moral language. And nothing 1 have said
shows that it is logically impossible for the extreme amoralist to believe that he is
morally required to perform some act and have no motivation to act in accordance
with that requirement.
We saw in chapter one that much of the difficulty in assessing moral judgement
internalism stems from a lack of clarity about the precise nature of the thesis under
consideration. I argued that there are good reasons for interpreting moral judgement
internalism as a thesis about judgement acts rather than judgement contents. Some
theorists seem to view moral judgement internalism as equivalent to what we might
call moral belief internalism.35 I said in chapter one that Dancy interprets Nagel as
holding a view of internalism along these lines. Dancy interprets moral judgement
internalism as the doctrine that moral judgements express beliefs which 'cannot be
present without motivating' (1993: 3).36 Like Dancy, Alfred Mele interprets Nagel's
version of internalism as a form ofmoral belief internalism (1996: 729).
Specifically, he argues that in order to capture a 'robust' version of internalism in
which motivation is 'built into' moral judgements, moral judgement internalism
•37
should be construed as, what he terms, 'constitutive internalism':
Necessarily, any belief that one is (oneself) morally required to A constitutes motivation to
A. (Mele 1996: 731 )38
Mele is persuaded, again like Dancy, that Nagel's talk ofmotivation being
'guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions' should not be interpreted as a form
35 For example, Dancy characterises moral cognitivists as holding that 'moral judgement is
belief(1993: 7)
36 Because of the problems such a position has accounting for mood-based failures ofmotivation or
'accidie', Dancy rejects strict entailment between moral belief and motivation. He defends a purely
cognitivist account ofmoral motivation according to which moral beliefs are 'intrinsically motivating
states, which can be present without motivating but which when they do motivate do so in their own
right' (1993: 24).
37 The constitutive reading of internalism is intended to block the possibility of a necessary connection
between moral belief and motivation being explained by factors external to the moral belief: for
example, by desire or motivation of some sort being a necessary precondition for coming to hold
genuine moral beliefs (Mele 1996: 730).
38 Mele notes that he has 'no objection to substituting 'judgement' for 'belief (1996: 731). He limits
his account of internalism to first person moral ought beliefs; my objections to moral belief
internalism are not affected by this restriction.
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of content internalism about motivation (1996: 729).39 However, as I have argued,
Nagel does not assert a necessary connection between moral judgements or beliefs
and motivating states but a necessary connection between moral requirements and
justifying motives for action (and thus a necessary connection between judging that
something is a moral requirement and judging that it provides a justifying motive for
action). This is the position I called content internalism about justifying reasons.
Mele's reading ofNagel leads him to argue for the thesis that internalism requires
any genuine moral belief to constitute a motivating state (1996: 730). And this is the
position he takes to be ultimately untenable because, not only is it contradicted by
instances ofunprincipled amoralism arising from Tistlessness' or accidie, but it
depends upon the dubious notion of 'a noncompound attitude that is - at once and
essentially - receptive to a species ofmoral truth and constitutive ofmotivation to
engage in suitable behaviour' (Mele 1996: 740).40
I agree with Mele that the notion of a noncompound essentially motivation
constituting and truth-seeking state is suspect. However, a state of this kind is not
entailed by Nagel's version of internalism and is not something which moral
judgement internalists are, or should be, required to accept. Why not? Well, it
presents moral motivation as a form of state-based non-normative motivation. The
problem with this view is that ifmoral considerations play a genuine role in
deliberation about what to do, then it seems it must be possible that agents are
sometimes motivated by the normative content of their moral judgements.41 The
state-based view misses the sense in which moral motivation is a species of
normative motivation. Rather than supporting the state-based view, Nagel's
approach supports a conception ofmoral judgements as having essentially justifying
content capable ofmotivating moral agents (1970: 65). On this model, it makes
39 Mele refers to what I have called content internalism about motivation as 'requirement internalism'
(1996: 729). Recall that this is the view that an agent's having a motivation to perform or promote
some act is part of what it is for a moral proposition requiring her to perform that act to be true (see
chap 1.3)
40 Mele argues that were constitutive internalists to discover that there were no such things as
intrinsically motivating ought beliefs it would be more likely they would modify their conception of
the nature ofmoral motivation than conclude that no one has ever had a genuine moral beliefor has
ever had a moral obligation: 'This is an indication that morality does not conceptually or
metaphysically require that moral ought beliefs of the kind at issue be in the psychological repertoire
ofmoral agents...' (1996: 751-752).
164
sense that that the attitude agents have towards moral propositions is belief-like
rather than desire-like.
Another consideration that counts against construing moral judgement internalism as
a form of belief internalism is that doing so prevents traditional forms of non-
cognitivism from being counted as internalist. Non-cognitivists cannot assert a
necessary connection between moral beliefs and motivation because they deny that
moral judgements express beliefs. However, this sits awkwardly with the fact that
non-cognitivism is normally advanced as an exemplar ofmoral judgement
internalism.42 And I think we should be sceptical of any formulation of a familiar
doctrine which excludes one of the standard exemplars of that doctrine. One of the
central points at issue in the internalism debate is the nature of the psychological
state or states involved in moral assent. In assuming the state involved is belief,
moral belief internalism is simply question-begging with regard to this issue.
The opponent of the speech act approach to moral judgements may accept that moral
judgement internalism should be characterised in a way that is neutral between
different mental states. Nonetheless, she is likely to stress that given the speech act
account is cognitivist, it does not block the possibility of an agent's having a bare
moral belief independently of any motivations to act in accordance with the
requirement expressed by the belief. Now, I am not inclined to deny the logical
possibility of bare moral beliefs of this kind. What I do want to deny is that someone
who fails to be normatively engaged, and who is thus unable to hold themselves or
others morally responsible, is capable ofmaking genuine moral evaluations. The
crucial point to make is that the conception ofmoral judgement I have defended,
which incorporates the notion of normative expectation and a particular conception
of normative competence, is closer to our ordinary notion ofwhat it is to make a
moral judgement than is the concept of a moral belief possessed by the extreme
amoralist: someone who, though devoid ofmoral emotions, is capable of
representing moral facts. Part of the general intuition underlying internalism is that
41 cf. chap. 1.5., above.
42
Non-cognitivism's ability to accommodate internalism is often put forward as a reason to accept it.
See chap. 1.2 for a discussion of this aspect ofnon-cognitivism.
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in making a moral judgement an agent is doing something that goes beyond mere
cognition. Part ofwhat she is doing, I have suggested, is holding agents morally
accountable for their behaviour: something that cannot be done merely by believing
that some fact obtains.
Even ifwe construe moral judgement internalism as a thesis about psychological
assent to moral propositions, it is still open to the speech act advocate to explain the
apparently dual nature ofmoral assent in terms of the linguistic rules that are part of
evaluative practice. The linguistic rules encode aspects of the practice - its point and
presuppositions - and in turn influence and are an integral part of the practice. It is
part ofmoral practice in general that moral assent involves belief and normative
expectation. Insofar as agents are part of this practice, insofar as they are moral
agents, they must follow the rules constitutive of the practice. These points are quite
general and need to be expanded upon. I take up this task in the next chapter.
9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued against intention as the sincerity condition for the
commissive portion ofmoral judgements because it cannot deal with the kinds of
failures ofmotivation that result from depression and other mood-based disorders.
By contrast, the stance of holding someone to account, or normative expectation,
allows that an agent can be sincerely committed to a moral requirement even if, due
to depression or fatigue, she fails to be normatively motivated to act in accordance
with the requirement. We have seen that to be capable of holding someone to
account an agent must be generally susceptible to the reactive emotions and
sanctioning responses that characterise the participant point of view, and that to be
susceptible in this way is just to be normatively engaged. On the proposed model,
then, there is a necessary connection between making a genuine moral judgement
and being susceptible to a range of conative attitudes. It is in holding herself and
others to account in making a moral judgement that an agent's judgement goes
beyond mere belief or cognition. And this is why the extreme amoralist cannot make
genuine moral judgements: she cannot hold agents to account because she is not
subject to the reactive emotions. The proposed model can thus accommodate various
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types ofmoral motivational failure, and associated versions of amoralism, while
supporting intuitions that exclude those who suffer severe forms of practical
normative incompetence from making genuine moral judgements.
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5
Moral Thought, Intentional Action and the Desire/Belief
Thesis
1. Introduction
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the connection between moral thought and
moral language on the proposed account. This is necessary if I am to defend the
notion that the speech act model has implications for the nature ofmoral psychology.
The analysis ofmoral speech acts suggests that moral motivation is more complex
than is often claimed. Motivating states figure in the endorsing attitudes entailed by
agents' moral judgements and motivation figures, in some sense, in agents' responses
to the content of their moral judgements. I argue that we can distinguish two senses
of the term 'motivation' corresponding to a distinction between motivating states and
(being motivated by) motivating considerations. The distinction is used to address
the issue ofwhether moral beliefs are capable of motivating independently of desires
and the status of the desire/belief model of motivation and action explanation.
2. Moral Thought and Moral Language
I have argued throughout this work that we need to take seriously the non-cognitivist
claim that moral judgements in some sense go beyond mere cognition or description.
The speech act approach is thus in part an attempt to accommodate the endorsing,
commending or favouring aspect that seems central to ordinary notions ofmoral
judgement. Unlike non-cognitivism, however, the speech act approach holds that
moral judgements can be both commendatory and assertive in nature. Non-
cognitivism traditionally concerns itselfwith an analysis ofmoral language, and
draws its conclusions about moral psychology from this analysis. I think that this
emphasis on moral language is largely correct: moral practice is an overwhelmingly
social and public enterprise that predominately takes place via linguistic interchange.
In this section, I suggest, following Gibbard, that moral practice is 'linguistically
infused' in a way that makes the study of the structure ofmoral language and moral
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speech acts particularly useful in coming to understand the nature ofmoral
judgements (Gibbard 1990).
Non-cognitivists argue that any adequate analysis ofmoral judgements must capture
those judgements commendatory or endorsing function. The notion of holding
someone to a requirement or expectation captures, I think, a robust sense of
endorsement or commendation. In general, if an agent endorses a requirement, we
would expect her to be disposed to sanction positively conformity with that
requirement and to sanction negatively violations of that requirement. Compare this
view of endorsement with the view that the mere presence of a motivating state
secures the endorsing function ofmoral judgements. Standard formulations ofmoral
judgement internalism require that if an agent judges that it is right for her to O in
circumstances C, then she is motivated to (h in C (e.g. Smith 1994: 61). Smith
argues that this is a very strong version of internalism, but in many ways it expresses
quite a weak motivational requirement. It simply insists that the agent has some
motivation to perform or promote the act she believes to be right; it does not require
the agent to be motivated by the perceived Tightness of the act or for her to in any
way endorse the act. For instance, suppose that John believes it is right to give
money to charity, but fails to have any desire to do so until someone convinces him
that doing so would make others think better of him. Now John believes it is right to
give money to charity and desires to give money to charity, so satisfying the
internalist requirement. But the presence of this desire seems irrelevant to the
genuineness of John's moral stance: it is not an expression of his endorsement of the
moral requirement that one should give money to charity. While it is true that
internalism states a necessary and not a sufficient condition for genuine moral
judgements, if it is not to be empty as a claim about morality it must state a
motivational condition that is clearly related to the status ofmoral judgements.
Moral judgements go beyond belief in involving endorsing attitudes, but they also go
beyond desire. For example, an agent can desire to eat the rest of a birthday cake
without holding herself to a requirement that she eat the cake; and she can hold
herself to the requirement that she not eat the rest of the cake, while desiring very
much to eat all the cake. To desire to perform an act is not, it would seem, the same
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as to commend or endorse the performance of the act.1 I take it that any adequate
account ofmoral judgement needs to make sense of this distinction.
Gibbard in his version of non-cognitivism attempts to capture the intuitive distinction
between merely desiring to perform an act and endorsing the performance of an act
(1990: chap. 4). To this end, he distinguishes between motivation characterised by
the acceptance of a norm or requirement and motivation characterised by desires that
arise from basic impulses such as hunger and thirst (Gibbard 1990: 56). He also
distinguishes between motivation characterised by having merely 'internalised' a
norm and motivation characterised by acceptance of a norm (Gibbard 1990: 68-71).
For instance, an agent may have internalised a norm or requirement to queue
patiently in shops, but accept that in this instance, given that someone has pushed in,
it is appropriate to make a fuss. Often in such cases the agent will not do what he
thinks he should do because, in Gibbard's terms, the agent is 'in the grip of a norm'.
In this example, the agent is in the grip of a norm prescribing patient queuing, even
though he accepts that what he should do is take the queue-jumper to task over her
behaviour. We would say that while the agent endorses or commends telling the
queue-jumper to return to the back of the queue, his overriding motivation is to stay
quiet and wait patiently to be served.
Ultimately, Gibbard characterises the notion of genuinely accepting a norm in terms
of an agent's tendency to avow the norm publicly in unconstrained contexts (1990:
74). As Gibbard's view is non-cognitivist, he cannot invoke belief in the validity of
a norm in order to capture the notion of genuine acceptance. I think this makes his
account of norm acceptance excessively behaviouristic, but I do not want to dwell on
this aspect of his theory. Gibbard aims to provide an account of norm acceptance in
evolutionary terms. He argues that the notion of normative avowal and the kind of
1 Cf. Korsgaard (1997: 234): 'In Kant's view, an inclination is a kind of attraction to something, which
is grounded in our sensuous nature, and in the face ofwhich we are passive. By themselves,
inclinations have no normative force; they are not reasons.' Presumably we might endorse some
desires or inclinations ifwe judge we have reasons for holding them (see 5.4, below).
2 He also stresses the role of demands for consistency in normative discourse in contributing to the
acceptance of norms: 'To accept a norm... is in part to be disposed to avow it in unconstrained
normative discussion, as a result of the workings of demands for consistency in the positions one takes
in normative discussion' (Gibbard 1990: 74).
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public discussion that characterises taking up and avowing normative positions -
what he terms 'normative discussion' - can plausibly be viewed as fitness-enhancing
forms ofbehaviour in humans because they facilitate improved social coordination
and planning (Gibbard 1990: 72-73). What interests me here is not so much
Gibbard's attempt to provide an evolutionary account of normative acceptance, but
the general importance he attributes to the role of normative language in the
development and functioning ofmoral practice.
The points I am about to make rest on what I take to be uncontroversial empirical
claims about human nature and human society. Gibbard uses such points in the
context of his broader evolutionary account of normative practice; I am interested in
seeing how these facts about human nature and society might support the kind of
approach to moral judgement I have been advocating. Human beings, it seems, are
characterised by their capacity for language and by their sociality. And the human
capacity for language would seem to figure centrally in the complex and
sophisticated nature of human social life. It is via their use of language, says
Gibbard, that human agents are able to engage in a complex system of shared
evaluation of absent situations: to deliberate together about what to do and feel in
such situations (1990: 72). If this is correct, and human evaluative practice has
developed by way of and in conjunction with human language, then there should be a
particularly tight connection between evaluative language and evaluative practice. In
Gibbard's terms, we might say that evaluative practice and motivation is
'linguistically infused'( 1990: 57).
The idea here, as with the discussion of Strawson, is to see moral judgement in the
context of its role in broader evaluative practice: a practice facilitated by the
development of language. The starting point of this practice, we might say, it to find
out what to do and how to feel in living our lives. There is thus a presupposition of
interest that structures the practice, giving it its distinctive point. And if evaluative
practice of this kind is to a large extent realised linguistically, then we would expect
this presupposition of interest to be encoded in the rules governing the use of
evaluative language and the performance of evaluative speech acts. And this is what
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we find in the analysis of moral speech acts. The presupposition of interest is
reflected in the preparatory condition for the speech act of moral evaluation: that the
speaker is normatively engaged. It is also reflected in the illocutionary point or
essential condition of moral speech acts: that the speaker's utterance counts as an
undertaking to be guided by the content of the uttered evaluation.
Crucial to the human system of shared evaluation facilitated by language is the
network of reactive attitudes and emotions. These attitudes share the same
presupposition of interest that characterises moral speech acts. As we have seen, to
be susceptible to such attitudes is just to be an interested participant in evaluative
practice. Reactive attitudes are inherently evaluative in being characterised by
central cases in which they are warranted responses to the violation of or conformity
with practical evaluative requirements. These central cases thus involve evaluative,
often moral, judgements. Because of the sophisticated, highly abstract, and shared
nature ofmoral evaluations, it is by way of normative language and 'normative
discussion', as Gibbard terms it, that human agents make such evaluations (1990:
73). The rules governing normative discussion therefore come to play a central role
in what counts as normative or evaluative practice.
One reason moral judgements are language dependent is that what they are about —
e.g. moral facts - are of such complexity that it would be empirically impossible to
have moral thoughts without linguistic symbols (cf. Searle 1995: 64). Moral
practice, by contrast, including the practice ofmaking moral judgements, seems in
part to be constituted by rules governing the use ofmoral language.3 This has much
to do with the inherently social and interpersonal nature of evaluative practice.
Inherently social facts, suggests Searle, are by their very nature communicable and
3 On Searle's conception of institutional facts, facts about evaluative and moral practice would count
as institutional facts and thus language dependent (1995: chap. 3). He would also, I think, regard
evaluative and deontic facts as essentially institutional and language dependent (e.g. 1995:70). While
I am committed to viewing facts about moral practice as language dependent, this does not commit me
to viewing moral facts as language dependent. In a similar way, I might view facts about scientific
practice as essentially institutional and language dependent, without viewing scientific facts as
language dependent. These considerations raise difficult ontological issues beyond the scope of the
present work. But it does seem, as Searle admits, that there is not a sharp dividing line between
institutional and non-institutional facts or between linguistic and pre-linguistic phenomena (1995: 71).
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thus require a means ofpublic communication such as a language (1995: 77). This
inherently social or shared nature ofmoral practice is reflected in the reactive
attitudes that form a central part of that practice. As we have seen, the reactive
attitudes are inherently interpersonal: they essentially involve the assessment of the
attitudes and behaviour of ourselves in relation to others and of others in relation to
each other and ourselves.4 The dependence of the reactive attitudes on the
linguistically infused practice of evaluation suggests that such attitudes might be
what have been termed 'higher cognitive emotions' (Griffiths 1997). Higher
cognitive emotions such as guilt, shame, jealousy, and pride are contrasted with
'basic emotions' such as anger, fear, surprise, and disgust. While both types of
emotion are said to be universal in humans, higher cognitive emotions are
characterised by being 'fundamentally social in a way that basic emotions are
not'(Evans 2003: 20).5
With the above considerations in mind we can again turn to the objection that the
rules outlined in my account ofmoral speech acts are merely linguistic conventions
that provide a trivial accommodation of the internalist requirement. As already
mentioned, this argument stresses that it is always logically possible to envisage
someone having a moral belief in the absence of normative expectation and in the
absence of normative engagement. The above points about the connection between
moral language and broader moral practice help to flesh out the response I made at
the end of the last chapter. The rules governing moral speech acts reflect, in
Strawson's terms, a fundamental human commitment to the participant point of view.
My contention is that moral practice includes a conception ofmaking a moral
judgement that involves holding agents responsible as well as asserting that some
fact obtains. Strawson argues that susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and the
4 Cf. Strawson: '[B]eing involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them
precisely is being exposed to the range ofreactive attitudes and feelings...' (1962: 54).
5 Evans continues: 'You can be afraid of, or disgusted by, inanimate objects and non-human animals,
but love and guilt require other people for their existence (2003: 20-21). Gary Watson also stresses
the communicative role of the reactive emotions, seeing the point of such attitudes as forms ofmoral
address: 'The reactive attitudes are incipient forms of communication, not in the sense that resentment
et al are usually communicated; very often, in fact, they are not. Rather, the most appropriate and
direct expression of resentment is to address the other with a complaint and a demand (Watson 1987:
127-128).
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concomitant participation in evaluative practice is not something that human agents
can choose to opt out of.6 More fundamentally, even if it were possible to take up a
wholly objective attitude towards oneself and others, one would no longer be taking
up a recognisably moral point of view.7 To give up on the linguistic rules that
characterise moral practice is to give up on the norms governing the practice and the
attitudes that are an integral part of it. To abstract oneself from these attitudes is to
give up much ofwhat it is to be a recognisably human agent.
3. Conative Motivation and Normative Motivation
Much of this work has been concerned with developing a plausible version of moral
judgement internalism consistent with moral cognitivism. To some extent it has
circumvented the issue, often taken to be central to cognitivist internalism, of
whether moral beliefs can motivate independently of desire or play the dominant role
in motivation. As we saw in chapter one, opposition to the notion of cognitive
motivation is standardly based on adherence to the desire/belief model ofmotivation.
Cognitivist internalists often, therefore, see their main task as one of undermining the
desire/beliefmodel (cf. Dancy 1993: 7-9). In contrast to such approaches, I have
tried to develop a version of cognitivist internalism that does not rely for its initial
plausibility on providing an alternative to the desire/beliefmodel ofmotivation. It
has become evident, however, that the picture ofmoral motivation suggested by the
speech act account is potentially too complex to be accommodated by the
desire/beliefmodel. In light of this, I want to approach the issue of the desire/belief
model by considering it in relation to a distinction between two kinds ofmotivation.
On the speech act model, an agent making a moral judgement is doing something
more than merely describing some state of affairs. Moral judgements are active in
the sense that an agent who makes a judgement commits herself to being guided by
the judged requirement by holding herself and others to account with regard to that
requirement. This captures a robust sense of endorsement absent in the case of
6 See Strawson 1962: 54: 'A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation
which that would entail, does not seem to be something ofwhich human being would be capable'.
7 Cf. Strawson 1962: 59: '[T]o the extent to which an agent is seen [wholly in terms of the objective
attitudes]...he is not, to that extent, seen as a morally responsible agent, as a term in moral
relationships, as a member of a moral community.'
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merely believing or stating something. As a consequence, the speech act approach is
well placed to deal with the non-cognitivist anti-cognitivist argument discussed in
chapter one. Central to that argument is the claim that purely cognitive states are
incapable ofmotivating. Consider Dancy's presentation of a version of this
argument:
I start with what I take to be a recognisable form of the Humean argument that moral
judgements must be at least partly non-cognitive. If we add to a purely cognitive state a
moral judgement, is the result a complex state that is 'sufficient for action'? This phrase
'sufficient for action' is itself one of the difficulties. But the question it is used to ask is not
itself too obscure. It is whether starting from a state that is purely cognitive, and adding to
that state a moral judgement, it is conceivable that an intentional action should then occur
without further addition to, or other change in, the psychological state of the agent.
Humeans take it that the answer to this question is yes...[but] that if the moral judgement is
itself conceived as purely cognitive, the answer to our question would have... to be no. This
is because they suppose that a purely cognitive state is incapable of motivating - is not and
cannot be 'sufficient for action'- without the presence and help of an independent desire.
(Dancy 2000: 82)
As I argued in chapter one, the appropriate conclusion to draw from this argument is
that ifmoral judgements are cognitive, then they must involve something in addition
to cognition. However, this does not mean that the cognitive state involved in moral
judgement need be anything other than purely cognitive. The speech act approach
defuses the anti-cognitivist potential of the argument by showing in what sense moral
judgements go beyond cognition. And it does this without needing to question the
Humean distinction between essentially motivating states like desire and essentially
o
non-motivating states like belief. However, I think we have reason to question the
Humean account ofmotivation as it applies to intentional action. The Humean
argument says that by simply adding a relevant desire state to a cognitive state we are
in a position to explain motivation and intentional action. But on the model I have
presented, the endorsing attitudes expressed in moral judgement seem to play a
different role in an agent's motivational economy to the kind ofmotivation we have
seen can fail as the result of depression, accidie and so on. This is reflected in the
fact that while an agent who makes a moral judgement necessarily endorses that
which is judged right, she is not necessarily motivated to do what she judges is right.
8
As will become clear, I don't wish to question the Humean distinction between conative and
cognitive states, but the notion that the sense of'motivation' essential to conative states is the only
sense of 'motivation' we make use of in explaining intentional action.
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To understand how different kinds ofmotivation can fulfil different roles in the way
an agent acts, consider the difference between the attitudes that make an agent a
compassionate person and whatever it is that motivates a compassionate person in
particular instances to, for example, help someone. Though what makes someone
count as compassionate is, plausibly, a range of attitudes, such as sympathy and
concern for others, that incline the agent to help those in need, the compassionate
person may or may not be motivated by any particular instance of perceived need.
When she is motivated, there will typically be features of the situation that motivate
her concern: features she thinks warrant her compassion and her acting to help.9
Typically, an agent will not choose when to feel compassion; but when she does feel
compassion she will assess whether or not the compassion is a warranted response to
the situation. If she judges her compassion warranted, then she will tend to be
motivated to assist in some way the object of her concern. What is going on in such
cases? I suggest there are actually two different senses of'motivation' involved in
such examples. Recall in chapter one I said that the term 'motivation' is ambiguous
between motivating states and motivating considerations.10 In chapter four, I called
the former kind ofmotivation 'non-normative motivation' and the latter kind of
motivation 'normative motivation'. In the rest of this section I want to explore in
more detail the differences between these two senses of'motivation'.
If an agent has a conative or non-cognitive state that inclines her to act in a certain
way, we would standardly say that the agent is motivated to act in that way.
Conative or non-cognitive states of this kind are said to have a desire-like world-to-
mind direction of fit. If we think ofdesire as simply any state with which the world
must fit, then we can say that to have a motivating state disposing one to act in a
certain way is just to have a desire to act in that way." For example, suppose that
whenever John gets near the edge of a cliffor a tall building he is assailed by a
9
Sometimes, of course, she may think her compassion unwarranted; but in general we would expect
her compassion to track her beliefs about the kinds of things that warrant compassion.
10 I also said that 'motivation' can sometimes refer to the state that conveys the consideration in light
ofwhich an agent is motivated. This sense ofmotivation only makes sense if the distinction between
the other two senses is sound. So for now I will concentrate on these other two senses.
' Cf. Smith (1994: 117): '[I]f'desire' is not a suitably broad category ofmental state to encompass all
of those states with the appropriate direction of fit, then the Humean may simply define the term 'pro-
attitude' to mean 'psychological state with which the world must fit'...'
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strong desire to jump off. Merely having this desire means that John is, what I will
term, conatively motivated to jump off the cliff.12 To be conatively motivated to act
in a certain way is just to be in a psychological state with a world-to-mind direction
of fit that disposes one to act in that way. But there is another sense of the term
'motivation' according to which John is unlikely to be motivated to jump off the
cliff. Suppose John in no way endorses his desire to jump off high places: he does
not think the desire provides justifying grounds to jump off tall buildings and cliffs.
Moreover, suppose his tendency to experience such desires actually motivates him to
stay away from such places, and that it does this by being a consideration he takes to
favour staying away from such places. To be motivated in this way is to be, what I
term, normatively motivated13 An agent is normatively motivated to act in a certain
way if she is motivated by a consideration she takes to favour or justify acting in that
way.14 I will mean by talk ofjustifying considerations or the considerations that
normatively motivate an agent, the content of an agent's belief - what is believed by
the agent (Cf. Dancy 2000; 113). 15 So if John thinks that avoiding rush hour counts
in favour of leaving work early, then what he believes, 'that he will avoid rush hour,'
is the consideration he takes to favour leaving early.
12 This is a more precise term for what I previously called 'non-normative motivation'.
131 borrow the expression 'normative motivation' from Gibbard (1990: 56). As a non-cognitivist, he
obviously has a different account to me of the nature of this kind of motivation. Nonetheless he too
uses it in a way that is intended to capture the intuitive distinction between motivation an agent
endorses and motivation an agent does not endorse.
14 Insofar as an agent acts for what she takes to be bad reasons she acts irrationally and lacks, it would
seem, a degree of control over her actions. Practical irrationality plausibly involves an awareness of
what one is doing without full control over what one is doing. John is aware of his desire to jump of
the cliff and that he thinks it provides him with no justification for jumping off the cliff. Nevertheless,
when he is unable to resist the desire he does jump off the cliff rather than merely fall: he is aware of
what he is doing but is compelled in a way that is not consistent with fully autonomous intentional
action. Such cases seem to represent a grey area between an agent's being unconsciously caused to
behave in a certain way and being motivated to act on the basis of her rational judgement. I take it
that the central and defining cases of intentional action are those cases where an agent acts for a
reason she takes to favour the action. It is the motivation involved in such cases that I am calling
normative motivation. Velleman argues that when agents act for a reason, the reason need not be
presented as a good thing to do, although it must be presented as justified (1992: 21). I would say that
judging something to be a justifying reason for action is just to judge it a good reason for action. In
this sense, at least, an agent who acts on such a reason would seem to be acting on something she
takes to be good.
15 Ifjustifying considerations are what is believed by an agent then it seems they must be propositions.
I share some ofDancy's (2000: 114) misgivings about thinking of justifying considerations in this
way, but I will adopt this position for the purposes of this chapter as a full discussion of these issues is
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Consider again the Humean claim that only desires are capable ofmotivating agents.
Given the above distinction, we should now ask whether the Humean is saying that
only desires are capable of conatively motivating agents or whether he is saying that
only desires are capable of normatively motivating agents, or whether, perhaps, he is
making both these claims. If the Humean is arguing that only desires can conatively
motivate agents, then I think we should agree with him, given our broad definition of
desire. This means that someone is conatively motivated to act in a certain way if
and only if she has a desire to act in that way. Following Dancy, we might say that
to have such a desire is just to be in the state of being motivated (2000: 14). The
claim that only desires can normatively motivate is, I think, far more contentious. It
means that only facts about what an agent desires can count as justifying grounds
capable ofmotivating her to act. On this model, the consideration that someone
needs help, for example, cannot itself be a consideration I take to favour helping that
person and which motivates me to help.
It is crucial to note that even if agents are only ever normatively motivated by their
desires, this does not undermine our original distinction between normative and
conative motivation. Consider the following example. Suppose I desire to drink a
cup of coffee. This means that I am in a state that disposes me towards having a cup
of coffee. That is, I am conatively motivated to have a cup of coffee. Let's say I
have not decided whether or not I ought to have a cup of coffee, so I am not yet
normatively motivated to have a coffee. After considering the matter, I decide that
given I have only had one cup of coffee in the day my desire for coffee is reasonable
grounds for having another cup. So the consideration that I desire a coffee succeeds
in normatively motivating me to have another cup.16
Presumably, if I am normatively motivated by the consideration that I desire a cup of
coffee (call this desire, desire (1)), then I form another desire to have a coffee (call
beyond the scope of the present work. This view ofconsiderations enables me to make the distinction
I am concerned to make between normative and conative motivation.
16 If 1 had thought that two cups of coffee would keep me awake all night, I might have decided it best
not to act on my desire to have another cup of coffee. In this case, my desire is not itself a reason
against having a cup of coffee (in the way John's desire to jump was a reason to stay away from high
places); the reason against having another coffee is that it would prevent me from sleeping.
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this motivated desire, desire (2)). Now, the roles of these two desires in motivating
me are obviously quite different. Following Schueler's use of a distinction he
derives from Nagel, we can say that desire (1) is an 'unmotivated desire' and that
desire (2) is a 'motivated desire' (See Nagel 1970: 29; Schueler 1995: 15-28).'7 Desire
(2) is motivated in the sense that it is a desire I hold for a reason as a result of
deliberating about what to do and making a decision on the basis of that
io
deliberation. That is, it is a desire I have because I take it that there is something
that favours doing what the desire is a desire for. I take it that there are justifying
considerations that favour satisfying desire (1) and this motivates me to pursue its
satisfaction, resulting in desire (2). So desire (2) is explained in terms ofmy reason
for holding it, namely, that I have a (reasonable) desire for a cup of coffee. Desire
(1) is not formed on the basis of deliberation and is not held for any reason.19 It is in
this sense that it is unmotivated. Although desire (2) is a motivated desire, when I
have that desire I am in the state ofbeing motivated, which is to be conatively
motivated. Conative motivation is common to both motivated and unmotivated
desires. A motivated desire is the state that results when an agent is normatively
20motivated.
17
My account here is greatly influenced by Schueler's discussion of these issues (1995). Although he
does not make a distinction between normative and conative motivation, the distinction is suggested
by his account of the difference between motivated and unmotivated desires, and by his 'deliberative
model' of action explanation (Schueler 1995: especially chaps, land 6)
18 Schueler notes that if an agent decides against a course of action, like having a coffee, then she
typically will not have the motivated desires she would have were she to pursue that course of action
(1995: 22-23). Such an agent will not, that is, form a desire to boil the kettle or a desire to get the
coffee from the cupboard, and so on.
19 There will obviously be a physiological explanation ofmy having this desire which will be one kind
of reason for the desire, though not the kind of favouring reason I am concerned with here.
20 Schueler (1995: 18) distinguishes between Nagel's claim about the difference between motivated
and unmotivated desires and, what he terms, Nagel's 'entailment point': 'that whatever may be the
motivation for someone's intentional pursuit of a goal, it becomes in virtue of that pursuit ipso facto
appropriate to ascribe to him a desire for that goal (Nagel 1979: 29). This ascribed desire need not, it
seems, be a genuine desire state; rather it is a kind of 'placeholder' or a way of talking about the fact
that the agent is motivated. Schueler calls this the 'pro-attitude' sense of desire (1995: 34 - 35). The
distinction between pro-attitudes and proper desires is central to Schueler's general thesis: that
intentional action need not always involve the presence of a desire (proper). I do not consider this
position in the text. It seems to me that one can produce a similar criticism of the desire/belief model
by noting that a proper desire may or may not be part ofwhat an agent deliberates about, even though
some proper desires are entailed by intentional action because a desire is just the state ofbeing
motivated (cf. Dancy 1993: 7-9; 2000: 13).
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The Humean claim that beliefs cannot motivate without desires and cannot be the
primary source ofmotivation seems true in the case of conative motivation. To be
conatively motivated is to be in a state with a world-to-mind direction of fit such as a
desire. Beliefs cannot be internally motivating states in this sense because they have
the wrong direction of fit (cf. Dancy 1993: 3). However, the kind of state needed for
normative motivation to take place is a state that can convey the consideration in
light of which an agent is motivated. And it would seem that a state with a mind-to-
world direction of fit such as belief is ideally suited to fulfil this role. In the next
section, I explore these considerations in relation to the desire/belief model of action
explanation.
4. Normative Motivation, Intentional Action, and the Desire/Belief Thesis
It might be thought that the notion of normative motivation is mysterious and that it
should be rejected because inconsistent with the standard desire/beliefmodel of
motivation and action explanation.21 In this section, I argue that the concept of
normative motivation is crucial to our notion of intentional action, and that to deny
the possibility of normative motivation is to threaten the possibility that agents act
for reasons. Ifwe accept the basic distinction between the two senses of
'motivation', we need to determine whether the desire/belief thesis is primarily a
thesis about conative motivation or about normative motivation.22 I argue that desire
functions in the desire/beliefmodel conatively, as a motivating state, and not as a
consideration in light ofwhich the agent is motivated. However, I claim that insofar
as the desire/belief thesis concerns the explanation of intentional action, the desire in
question must be a motivated rather than an unmotivated desire. Given this, the real
explanatory power of desire/belief accounts of intentional action derives from the
considerations in light ofwhich an agent is motivated to act and not from the
psychological states an agent is in when she is motivated to act.
21
Mackie, in his argument from queerness, suggests that the notion of evaluative considerations
motivating agents is highly mysterious (1977: 38-42)
221 say 'primarily' because even if desire/belief thesis primarily concerns normative motivation, the
fact that it involves an agent's being motivated means that the agent will be in a motivating state and
so be conatively motivated to perform the relevant act.
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The desire/belief thesis is one way of understanding the Humean doctrine that all
motivation has its source in desire. It is often put forward as a theory of intentional
action explanation and as a theory ofmotivation. In general there is little or no
distinction made between intentional action explanation and the explanation of
motivation. Yet, prima facie, there is a distinction to be made because it is possible
that an agent is conatively motivated to do something without actually doing it or
even intending to do it. So it seems that intentional action cannot always be
explained by whatever explains motivation. For example, given we know that John
does not endorse his desire to jump off the cliff and that the desire is an unmotivated
desire, our explanation of his being conatively motivated to jump of the cliffwill
presumably appeal to physiological considerations (he might have vertigo) or
perhaps to unconscious psychological factors (perhaps he had a bad experience with
heights as a child). It seems clear that the desire/beliefmodel is not intended to
account for this type of unmotivated desire: one does not need to explain an
unmotivated desire to do something by invoking another desire plus some related
belief that produces it. The desire/belief thesis is not a theory about the generation of
unmotivated conative states.
Presumably, the kind ofmotivation the desire/beliefmodel aims to account for is the
kind ofmotivation closely tied to intentional action. Intentional action is action done
for a reason; the desire/belief model aims to give an account of the motivation that
occurs when an agent acts for a reason. Put another way, we might say that the
desire/beliefmodel aims to explain intentional action by citing the reasons that
motivate an agent to act. However, the debate about the nature of intentional action
explanation is complicated by there being two apparently quite different accounts of
what we are asking when we ask why an agent acted as she did. Some theorists think
that we answer this question by citing the psychological states the agent is in when
she is motivated to do something intentionally. Other theorists argue that we answer
the question by citing the considerations in light ofwhich the agent is motivated to
act. Smith, for example, appears to interpret the desire/beliefmodel of action
explanation as a model of the states an agent is in when intentional action occurs.
The explaining reasons given by this model, says Smith, are 'psychologically real'
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(1994: 96). As such, these reasons are 'psychological states.. .that play a certain
explanatory role in producing action' (Smith 1994: 96). By contrast, Dancy
interprets talk of an agent's reasons as talk of the 'considerations in light of which he
acted'(2000: 2). On this interpretation, if the desire/belief model is a model of
agents' reasons, it says that the considerations that persuade agents to act in a certain
way are always made up of desires and beliefs of the agents.
Prima facie, Dancy and Smith seem to be involved in different tasks. Smith is
offering a theory ofmotivating states and Dancy is offering a theory ofmotivating
considerations. Smith's point appears to be that we explain intentional action by
citing the conative and other states an agent is in when she acts intentionally. Take
the above example ofmy having a cup of coffee. Let's interpret it in terms of
Smith's claim that explaining reasons are psychological states present when an agent
acts intentionally. This claim, says Smith, is captured by Davidson's formulation of
the desire/beliefmodel of action explanation (Smith 1994: 92). Davidson gives the
following formulation of the desire/beliefmodel:
CI R is a primary reason why an agent performed an action A under description d only if R
consists of a pro attitude [desire] of the agent towards action with a certain property, and a
belief of the agent that A, under description d, has that property. (Davidson 1980: 5)
Let's say that the relevant description d of the action A in the coffee example is
'having a cup of coffee'. So according to CI, my primary reason for having a cup of
coffee must consist of a desire to have a cup of coffee plus a belief that to perform
action A is just to have a cup of coffee.23 Smith argues that this kind of desire and
belief combination provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
explaining reasons or reasons that explain the agent's action (1994: 96). This means
that positing such states must have a high degree of explanatory power: they must be
able to explain why an agent acts as he does without recourse to further or different
23 Schueler argues that it is unclear from the text ofDavidson's 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes'
whether CI plus C2, the claim that a primary reason for an action is its cause, are both necessary and
sufficient for explanations of action in terms of an agent's reasons or only necessary conditions (see
Davidson 1980: 12; and Schueler 1995: 44 and note 1.) Smith argues that his version of CI gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence ofexplaining reasons (1994: 96).
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explanations. Yet it is not at all clear that positing such a combination of states
provides a convincing explanation of intentional action.
Consider again the coffee example. Ifwe take my unmotivated desire (1) to have a
cup of coffee plus a belief, which I presumably have, about what constitutes having a
cup of coffee, then according to Smith we have a combination of states that satisfies
CI and can thus explain my having a cup of coffee if I in fact do. But this seems
wrong. To get from desire (1) plus the relevant belief to intentional action, I must
decide to act on desire (1) and be motivated to do so.24 This is what produces the
motivated desire (2): the desire held for a reason or on the basis of deliberation. And
it would seem to be a process that includes a decision of this sort and the related
motivation that allows us to distinguish intentional action from an agent's merely
being non-rationally caused by psychological states to behave in a certain way. The
desire (1) to have a cup of coffee plus the relevant beliefmight, of course, cause me
to have a cup of coffee even though I have decided not to have another cup. In this
case, we might say that the reason I have a cup of coffee is the presence of a desire
for a cup of coffee plus a relevant belief. But 'reason' in this sense is not the sense
appropriate for intentional explanations. In the purely causal sense of reason, it
might have been the case that the unmotivated desire to have a cup of coffee plus the
relevant belief caused me to eat a phonebook and that they were the 'reason' I ate the
phonebook. But this would presumably not mean that I intentionally ate the
phonebook.
Korsgaard, discussing an example of Nagel, makes what I take to be the same point
about the difference between intentional action and the non-rational causation of
behaviour:
In Nagel's...example, a person has been conditioned so that whenever he wants a drink and
believes the object before him is a pencil sharpener, he wants to put a coin in the pencil
sharpener. Here the co-presence of belief and desire reliably lead to a certain action, but the
action is a mad one. What is the difference between this person and one who, rationally,
wants to put a coin in a soda machine when she wants a drink? One may be tempted to say
24 This would seem to involve something more than Smith's view that the agent 'put the relevant
desire and belief together' (1994: 92). Presumably I can understand how to satisfy a desire without
being motivated to act on that desire.
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that a soda machine, unlike a pencil sharpener, is the source of the drink, so that the right
kind of conceptual connection between the desire and the belief obtains. But so far that is
only to note a fact about the relationship between the belief and the desire themselves, and
that says nothing about the rationality of the person who is influenced by them. If the belief
and desire still operate on that person merely by having a certain causal efficacy when co-
present, the rational action is only accidentally or externally different from the mad one...So
neither the joint causal efficacy of the belief and the desire, nor the existence of an
appropriate conceptual connection between them, nor the bare conjunction of these two
facts, enables us to judge that a person acts rationally. For the person to act rationally, she
must be motivated by her recognition of the appropriate conceptual connection between the
belief and the desire. We may say that she herselfmust combine the belief and the desire in
the right way. A person acts rationally, then, only when her action is the expression of her
own mental activity, and not merely the result of the operation of beliefs and desires in her.
(Korsgaard 1997: 221)
Using the notion of normative motivation, we might summarise Korsgaard's point in
the following way. If there is such a thing as genuine rational or normative
motivation, then it must be possible that agents are sometimes motivated by the
consideration that something is a reason in favour of acting in a certain way. 5 That
is, agents must be capable ofbeing motivated by the normative content of their
practical judgements.
Does the notion of normative motivation rely on a substantial metaphysical
conception of freedom of will? If some form of compatibilism, such as Strawson's,
can be made to work, then it will accommodate the distinction between normative
deliberation (and motivation) and compelled behaviour of various kinds without
relying a substantial metaphysics. I take it that Strawson claims there are standards
of normative competence internal to the participant point of view that allow us to
distinguish between someone capable of normal interpersonal relationships, capable
ofholding themselves and others accountable, and someone who is incapacitated in
such a way that they cannot act on the basis of deliberation (1962: 54-55). These
latter individuals are those to whom it is appropriate to take up the objective point of
view. However, if compatibilism fails and libertarianism proves untenable, this
would not mean the vindication of a purely conative version of the desire/belief
model. Rather, because the notion of intentional action, or acting on the basis of
25
Korsgaard argues that this is even the case with the instrumental or means-end principle (1986: 13).
Her point seems to be that in order to be rationally motivated by the consideration that x is a means to
achieving a desired end y, an agent must be moved by the consideration that x being a means to y
favours her doing x.
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reasons, is tied up with ordinary notions of responsibility and deliberative agency, we
would not have a model of intentional action at all. Normative motivation would be
like the appearance ofmoral cognitivism to the moral non-cognitivist: something
essentially illusory to be made sense of, ultimately, in other terms. My point is that
insofar as we want to explain ordinary intentional action, and not explain it away, we
will have to rely on a conception of normative motivation.
If intentional action is action motivated by favouring considerations and not merely
behaviour produced by the presence of psychological states, then unmotivated
desires will have little power to explain intentional action independently ofmotivated
desires.26 This means in the coffee example that positing desire (1) plus a relevant
27beliefwill not be sufficient to explain my intentionally having a cup of coffee.
One option for rescuing C1 might be to interpret the relevant desire as a motivated
rather than an unmotivated desire. Ifwe add this motivated desire to a relevant
belief, this might give us a combination ofstates capable of explaining intentional
action. A motivated desire is by definition a desire explained in terms of the agent's
reason for holding it (Schueler 1995: 24-25). Given that intentional action is action
done for a reason, motivated desires seem the right kind of psychological states to
indicate the presence of intentional action.
However, this kind ofmove only serves to strengthen the primacy of explanations of
intentional action in terms of the considerations in light of which agents act rather
than in terms of psychological states. It would seem that acting for a reason, in
Dancy's sense of an agent's reasons, is what distinguishes intentional from non-
26 It would be extremely difficult, for example, to predict whether or not someone will have a cup of
coffee based only on her having an unmotivated desire and a relevant belief about what action
constitutes having a cup of coffee. Without knowing more about the agent and her situation, one
could at best make a guess. The point is perhaps more obvious in the case of John's unmotivated
desire to jump off the cliff. Recall that having this desire actually motivates John to stay away from
exposed high places like cliffs. So basing a prediction that John will jump of a cliff on the fact that he
has a desire to jump of a cliff and a relevant belief about how to do this would lead one to entirely the
wrong conclusion.
27
Neither, it would seem, is desire (1) a necessary condition ofmy intentionally having another cup of
coffee. Suppose I do not have an unmotivated desire, such as desire (1), to have a cup of coffee
because I do not like coffee very much. But say a friend is relying on me to stay awake so I can pick
her up from the train station late at night, so I decide to have some coffee in order to stay awake. This
produces in me a motivated desire to have a cup of coffee. I then go ahead and have a cup of coffee in
the absence of any unmotivated desire of type (1) to have a cup of coffee.
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intentional action. A revised version ofCI that posits a motivated desire plus a
relevant belief is parasitic in terms of explanation on a prior notion ofmotivation by
favouring considerations or normative motivation. It sets out the states involved in
being motivated to act intentionally - the states involved in the conative motivational
aspect of intentional action - but relies for its explanatory power on those states
having been motivated by considerations favouring the action.
Dancy calls the view that agents' reasons for action are always psychological states
of the agents 'psychologism'(2000: 14-15). He argues, rightly I think, that such
states are rarely considerations in light of which agents act (Dancy 2000: 15). At
times, however, I think Dancy overstates his position: 'If our motivating reasons are
all 'what is believed' [rather than a belief of the agent], no reasons are psychological
states of the agent...' (2000: 99). What Dancy is objecting to here is the view,
exemplified by Smith's position, that intentional action is to be explained by citing
the psychological states an.agent is in when she is motivated to act intentionally. In
the coffee example, this view says that we explain my having a cup of coffee by
citing my desire (2) to have a cup of coffee and my belief that action A counts as
having a cup of coffee. I do not think Smith thinks these explanatory states need
necessarily be part of the content of the agent's deliberations (Pettit and Smith 1990).
These are the states standing 'behind' action. Dancy is opposed to this view, but
mistakenly thinks that if the proper form of intentional explanation does not involve
the states behind action, then the considerations in light of which agents act are never
psychological states of the agent. This seems false. For example, we have already
seen that my desire (1) for a cup of coffee can be a consideration or reason in favour
ofmy having a cup of coffee, and that John's tendency to desire to jump from high
places can be a consideration or reason in favour of his staying away from high
places. Psychological states, like many other things, can be part ofwhat agents
deliberate about.
A good deal of the confusion here would seem to stem from the notion of
'motivating reasons'. I have tended to use the expression 'explaining reasons'
precisely because it wears its ambiguity on its sleeve: there are many kinds of reason
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explanations that have nothing to do with intentional action (see Schueler 1995: 62-
63). This forces us to be clear about how we are using 'explaining reasons' in the
context of intentional explanation. By contrast, 'motivating reasons' gives the
impression of being essentially about the reasons involved in intentional action. But
it inherits the ambiguity of the term 'motivation'. This means we need to ask
whether talk ofmotivating reasons is talk of conatively motivating reasons or of
normatively motivating reasons. And this is just the difference between explanation
in terms of the psychological states an agent is in when she is motivated and
explanation in terms of the considerations in light of which she is motivated. And as
we have seen, explanation of intentional action in terms of the psychological states
an agent is in when she is motivated to act is parasitic on explanation in terms of the
considerations that normatively motivate the agent to act. Motivation by
considerations that favour action is what distinguishes the motivation involved in
intentional action from behaviour non-rationally produced by psychological states.
Smith attempts to avoid the limitations of explanations that simply posit
psychological states by construing the desire/belief model as a model of teleological
explanation. Teleological explanations, he says, are 'explanations that explain by
making what they explain intelligible in terms of the pursuit of a goal' (1994: 104).
Now, teleological explanations do have a fair degree of explanatory power with
regard to action explanation. But insofar as an agent's pursuit of a goal is
intentional, the agent must be normatively motivated to pursue whatever the goal is
and not merely non-rationally compelled by psychological states, or anything else, to
behave in a certain way. Ifmy goal is to have a cup of coffee, then I must have
decided to have a cup of coffee and have a motivated desire to have a cup of coffee.
These facts can begin to explain why, if I do, I have a cup of coffee in a way the
mere fact that I have an unmotivated desire to have a coffee, plus a relevant belief,
cannot. Note that the fact that I have an end that I am normatively motivated to
pursue can also explain why I perform actions that subserve that end in a way that
28 The explanatory impotence of such desires is in part due to the fact that they do not, as they stand,
represent the goals of the agent. To think otherwise would commit us to thinking that, for example,
one of John's goals is to jump offcliffs, or that any transitory or trivial desire that might assail an
agent reflects a goal of that agent. But in this case, we may wonder, as Korsgaard suggests, if there is
anything left of the notion of agency (1997: 247).
187
unmotivated desires cannot. Ifmy goal is to have a cup of coffee, then I will
typically have motivated desires to get the coffee from the cupboard, boil the kettle,
get out the milk, and so on. Motivated desires point to the considerations that have
normatively motivated the agent to act: the agent's reasons. If, ultimately, the
consideration that motivates the agent is an unmotivated desire, such as the desire for
a coffee, this desire still functions as a consideration in light ofwhich the agent is
normatively motivated.
The Humean conception of the desire/belief model says that we can explain the
motivation involved in intentional action and thus intentional action by laying out the
constitution of the motivating states an agent is in when she acts intentionally. The
simplest version of this model argues that any desire and related belief will
potentially be able to explain intentional action. We saw that this cannot be correct
as the presence of an unmotivated desire, and a related belief, is neither necessary
nor sufficient to explain intentional action. A more sophisticated version of this
model cites motivated desires plus relevant beliefs to explain intentional action.
However, this version relies on and does not explain the kind of normative
motivation that characterises the motivation involved in intentional action. Citing a
motivated desire simply points us towards the considerations in light of which the
29
agent is motivated, and these considerations do most of the explanatory work.
Thinking about the problem of moral motivation in terms of whether desires or
beliefs are the primary source ofmotivation obscures a more fundamental distinction
between conative and nonnative motivation. Normative motivation is only possible
29 Even citing a motivated desire plus a relevant beliefwill often be less helpful in explaining
intentional action than one might think. This is because agents often have competing motivated
desires. For example, Charles is motivated by considerations favouring going out and considerations
favouring staying at home. Charles needs to weigh up competing considerations and make a decision
about what to do. Ifwe think about the kind ofmotivating state Charles is in once he decides what to
do, it will be close to what Schueler terms an 'intention-generated motivated desire'(1995: 24). These
are desires 'which exist in virtue of some decision or intention of [an agent] and [her] beliefs about
how to carry it out...'(Schueler 1995: 24). Now, citing this kind ofdesire in conjunction with a
relevant belief or beliefs will have a high degree of explanatory power with regard to intentional
action. But, once again, the explanatory power of this kind of state is entirely dependent on its being
the product of normative motivation, in this case, overriding normative motivation. The real force of
intentional action explanation, then, comes from citing the considerations in light of which the agent
decides to act, not the states an agent is in once she has decided to act.
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if states with a mind-to-world direction of fit - cognitive states - convey the
considerations that motivate. Now, if this form ofmotivation were unique to
morality and unlike standard forms ofmotivation, then we would perhaps have
reason to be sceptical about it. Dancy worries, for instance, that cognitive theories of
motivation that treat moral or prudential motivation as a special case of non-Humean
motivation existing alongside standard cases ofHumean motivation are unacceptably
hybrid (1993: 18-21 ).30 But we have seen that our ordinary notion of intentional
action depends on a conception ofmotivation akin to normative motivation.31 If
intentional action is possible then agents are sometimes motivated by favouring
considerations, and moral motivation can be seen, not as anomalous, but merely as
one form of normative motivation.
5. Internalism, Practical Force, and the Role of Conative States
One way of viewing moral judgement internalism is as an attempt to secure the
motivating force ofmorality. Ifmoral judgements entail motivation, then it is
impossible for agents to fail to be moved by what they judge to be moral
considerations. And ifmoral judgements entail motivating states, it is thought these
states can take part in desire/belief explanations of action: there can be moral action
as a result ofmoral motivation. On this interpretation ofmoral judgement
internalism, because agents are necessarily moved to do what they judge is morally
required, there is a sense, it would seem, in which internalism secures the action-
guiding function ofmorality as well as, or as part of, its motivating force. And this
comes close to saying that moral judgement internalism secures the normative force
ofmorality, ifwe think of moral considerations as practical norms. In this section, I
argue against attempts to account for the practical force ofmorality by invoking the
motivating force of conative states. Ifmorality has practical normative force, it
30 His concern is that such theories posit beliefs that sometimes do and sometimes do not need the
contribution of a desire to motivate, and that beliefs 'are not carved up into two sorts, those that can
motivate alone and those that need some help' (Dancy 1993: 21).
31 The fundamental issue, then, is not whether beliefs or desires motivate, but the kind ofmotivation
they are involved in and the contribution they make to that kind ofmotivation. Beliefs and desires can
both be objects of normative deliberation and thus both can potentially normatively motivate agents.
But because of the difference in their directions of fit, desires but not beliefs can conatively motivate,
and beliefs but not desires can represent as true the considerations that favour action. Desires and
beliefs, with their standard 'Humean' directions of fit, are thus perfectly suited to playing the roles
required to motivate intentional action.
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cannot be secured merely by positing non-normative conative states. This means that
if moral judgement internalism is simply the thesis that moral judgements entail
conative motivation, it will be unable to account for the practical force of such
judgements.
Mele has dubbed the argument that moral judgement internalism is required to
accommodate the practical or action-guiding nature ofmorality 'the argument from
toothlessness': 'It is alleged that to reject...internalism is to drive a wedge between
moral judgements and intentional conduct, thus taking the essentially practical bite
out ofmorality' (1996: 737). We saw in chapter one that part of the appeal of non-
cognitivism is that it appears to be able to account for the action-guiding and
motivating aspects ofmorality. However, in this chapter I have argued that even the
non-cognitivist will have to account for the difference, or apparent difference,
between those desires an agent endorses and those desires she does not endorse (see
5.2). Moral judgements express an agent's endorsement or commendation of an
option, and the mere presence of a motivating state does not secure this form of
endorsement.32
Non-cognitivism aims to accommodate the cognitive appearance ofmoral
judgements and, presumably, the appearance that moral judgements have normative
force capable of guiding agents in their actions. But non-cognitivism denies the
reality ofmoral facts and properties and that moral judgements aim to describe such
facts and properties. So non-cognitivism does not explain as much as explain away
the action-guiding force ofmoral judgements. If agents are not really moved by the
normative content ofmoral judgements, then what is left to explain is the fact that
moral judgements reliably conatively motivate agents to act. Thus, when non-
cognitivists talk about explaining the actual motivating force ofmoral judgements,
32 A sophisticated version of non-cognitivism may be able to account for the apparent distinction
between merely desiring to perform an act and endorsing the desire to perform an act (e.g Gibbard
1990: chap. 4). However, following Brink, I think that we should treat moral cognitivism as the
default account ofmoral judgements (Brink: 1989: 25-29). Non-cognitivists argue that the inability of
cognitivism to account for moral judgement internalism is one of the principal reasons for rejecting
cognitivism about moral judgements. However, we saw in chap 1 that there is no quick way of
dismissing the possibility of combining moral cognitivism and moral judgement internalism.
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they must have in mind the conative force of such judgements. This is presumably
why they argue that moral judgements are constituted by conative states. And, as I
said above, ifmoral judgements entail conative states, it is thought that these states
can take part in desire/belief explanations of intentional action. 1 have argued in this
chapter, however, that the mere presence of an unmotivated desire is not capable of
playing this kind role in the explanation of intentional action.
I want to illustrate this point again by looking at a response Mele says is available to
the externalist confronted with the argument from toothlessness. He asks us to
imagine a planet, planet X, on which the majority of Xians have 'a long-term generic
desire' to do whatever is morally required of them. These beings, says Mele,
'seemingly possess a practical, action-guiding morality. Except in rare cases, they
have motivation to do what they apparently take themselves to be morally required to
do - motivation with roots in the long-term desire (1996: 733-734, 737-738). Mele's
argument is that Xians are reliably motivated to do what is morally required even if
moral judgement internalism is false: for Xians morality seems to have teeth. The
problem with this argument is that the long-term desire in question is not capable, as
it stands, of playing the kind of action-guiding role Mele ascribes to it. Mele says
that the long-term desire 'is a feature of the psychological constitution of
Xians'(1996: 733). It is a desire, that is, that the Xians have naturally; it is not
something they choose. So the Xian long-term moral desire is clearly an
unmotivated desire: a desire not held for a reason or as a result of deliberation. But
unmotivated desires cannot normatively motivate unless agents take them as
considerations favouring action. If the Xians act intentionally, they must take their
generic moral desire as a justifying ground for doing what is morally required. If
they are reliably normatively motivated by this desire, what accounts for this must be
the content of their, apparently uniform, judgement that such a desire warrants being
satisfied. Without a judgement of this kind, the unmotivated desire cannot do the
work Mele wants it to do.
To see this, imagine a world in which all agents develop at a young age an
unmotivated desire to do what is morally required but where the desire to do what is
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morally required is uniformly viewed as trivial and unjustified. Perhaps such a
desire is seen as dangerous, in the way we might view a widespread desire for
unlimited power as dangerous. In any case, on this world when an agent judges that
something is morally required, she will, given her standing desire, be conatively
motivated to do what she judges is required. However, insofar as she is aware of the
desire, she will judge it to be unwarranted and something to be overcome or
suppressed.33 So a standing desire to be moral is obviously not sufficient to account
for the practical 'toothiness' ofmorality.
Mele's Xian example shows why Xians are conatively motivated to do what they
judge is morally required, but it does not accommodate the action-guiding or
normative force involved in normative motivation. It points to a standing desire to
do what is right that the Xians may or may not endorse. The model ofmoral
judgement I have proposed aims to account not only for the cognitive nature of such
judgements and for internalism about such judgements but to allow for the role of
normative motivation or genuine action-guidingness in moral motivation. This
means leaving room for the idea that normative force is something other than the
production ofbehaviour by psychological states, and for the idea that normative
motivation has a central role to play in the explanation of intentional action.34
33 On the approach to moral judgement I have advocated, the agents on this world would not be
making genuine moral judgements, as they would not be holding themselves and others to account. In
this example, I am supposing externalism to be true and looking at the implications of its truth for the
normative authority ofmorality. Externalists tend to identify judgements as moral judgements on the
basis of such judgements being about certain things, such as human well being or other-regarding
considerations, rather than on the agent's attitudes towards the content of the judgement (such as the
attitude ofholding herself and others to account with regard to the content of the judgement) (see 2.5
for a discussion of the difference between content-based and functional views ofmoral judgement).
On the externalist model, it is always possible to lack interest in or question the justification of
particular considerations construed as moral. The problem for externalists is that an independent
desire to be moral would, it seems, need to have some normative force if it were to play a role in
intentional explanation. Another interpretation of the example is that the agents on the world reject the
influence of the unmotivated desire to be moral because it distracts them from what they think should
properly motivate agents to do what is right, namely, facts about moral rightness. In this case,
although they view the unmotivated desire to be moral as trivial and unjustified, they might view
morality itself as of supreme importance. Even on this interpretation, then, the unmotivated desire is
not what explains the toothiness ofmorality.
341 say 'leaving room' because I am not here attempting the considerable task of saying what
normativity is - although I am saying what I think it cannot be — or defending realism about normative
facts and normative motivation. I am trying to point to some of the implications of denying the
possibility of normative motivation in relation to the possibility of intentional action.
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Korsgaard notes that it 'is common among empiricists to equate the question whether
pure reason can be practical with the question whether we are ever motivated by
belief alone', where motivation is seen purely as a causal relation between
psychological states and actions (1997: 220). Implicit in the empiricist view is the
reduction of normative motivation to conative motivation. We can understand this a
little better ifwe reflect on Mele's comment that 'to reject... intemalism is to drive a
wedge between moral judgements and intentional conduct...' This suggests that
moral judgement intemalism is in part an attempt to secure the connection between
moral judgements and motivating force by securing the connection between moral
judgements and intentional action. The formulation of intemalism Mele sets up to
criticise demonstrates the empiricist point of view as applied to this problem. Here, I
pick up on a number of points discussed at the end of chapter four with regard to
moral belief intemalism. Recall Mele's formulation of moral belief intemalism:
Necessarily, any belief that one is (oneself) morally required to A constitutes motivation to
A. (Mele 1996: 731)
What Mele means here is that moral beliefs constitute motivating states: that
according to moral belief internalism moral beliefs must somehow have the direction
of fit normally associated with desire-like conative states (1996: 740).35 The
problem with this kind of view should now be familiar. What it gives us is a state
which both represents something as morally required and conatively motivates the
agent who has the belief to pursue what is represented as required: 'a noncompound
truth-seeking motivation constituting state' or 'besire' (Mele 1996: 744). Whatever
we think of the possibility of such a state, it simply cannot fulfil the role it is meant
to with regard to intentional action motivated by moral considerations. If an agent
notes he has a besire that O-ing is morally required then he can perhaps take the fact
that he is in a conative state that inclines him toward O-ing as justified by the
consideration, represented by the same state, that O-ing is morally required. This
will typically mean he will be normatively motivated to O and thus have a separate
motivated desire to O. That is, he will be motivated by the consideration that O-ing
35 Mele notes that internalists 'who equate motivation with desire are committed to the idea that some
beliefs are identical with desires or, at least, encompass desires (1996: 730). He also notes that such
states have been termed 'besires'. For discussions of the notion of besire see: Lewis 1988; Price 1989.
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is morally required. The conative aspect of the besire adds nothing to the
justification or to the normative motivating potential of the moral consideration
represented by the cognitive aspect of the besire. Consequently, the desire-like
direction of fit of the besire will play no role in the intentional explanation of an
agent's doing <1> in light of the consideration that it is morally required. This makes
the notion of a besire unhelpful in attempting to secure the connection between moral
judgements and intentional action.
In order to address the argument from toothlessness, the connection between moral
judgements and intentional action needs to be accounted for. But this cannot be done
merely by pointing to a conceptual connection between cognitive and conative states
(the Xian example) or by making cognitive states partly conative (constitutive moral
belief internalism). Both these examples suggest that normative motivation has a
central role to play in any account of intentional action motivated by moral
considerations. Even ifmoral judgements entail conative motivation, this does not,
by itself, tell us how such judgements motivate intentional action.
6. Normative Content and Internal Reasons
I said above that an adequate theory ofmoral judgement must account for the
different ways motivation figures in the motivational economy ofmoral agents. The
pressure towards internalism in part stems from a recognition that we have to explain
the connection between the practical or normative force ofmoral judgements and the
motivation involved in intentional action. Now, the obvious place to look for the
normative or justifying force ofmoral judgements is in the normative content of
those judgements. When an agent makes a moral judgement she asserts a normative
proposition of the general form 'S's O-ing is morally required' or 'S morally ought
to ®.' This suggests that in order to explain the connection between normative force
ofmoral judgements and intentional action, we need to explain the connection
between the normative content ofmoral judgements and intentional action.
One might think that the failure ofMele's Xian externalism and of constitutive belief
internalism to account for thepractical normative force ofmoral judgements stems
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from their failure to include motivation in the content ofmoral judgements.
Whatever normative force Xian moral judgements may have, such judgements rely
on a conative state entirely independent of them for their motivating power. While
constitutive belief internalism posits moral beliefs that constitute motivating states,
motivation is no part of the propositional content of such states. In chapter one, I
argued against interpreting moral judgement internalism as a form of content
internalism. However, it might be possible to defend content internalism as a
separate thesis. Ifmoral judgement intemalism accommodates the endorsing or
commendatory nature ofmoral judgements, perhaps content internalism as a distinct
thesis can accommodate the practical normative force ofmoral judgements.36
Below, I argue against this view: including a conative state in the content of a moral
judgement can no more account for the practical nonnative force of such a
judgement than adding an external conative state to a moral judgement or making
moral judgements themselves partly conative.
Content internalism about motivation is intended to bridge the gap between, what
Velleman terms, 'the story ofmotivation and the story of rational guidance' (1992:
3). That there is a gap is suggested by a common way of formulating the distinction
between explaining and justifying reasons. This is the model advocated by Smith,
according to which explaining reasons are viewed as psychological states and
justifying reasons as normative propositions. The two types of reasons, says Smith,
'are of quite different categories (Smith 1994: 96).37 We have already seen that for
Smith explaining reasons are psychological states present when an agent acts
intentionally. 1 argued that this view is unable to provide an adequate explanation of
intentional action and is dependent for the explanatory force it does have on a prior
notion ofmotivation by favouring considerations or normative motivation. Dancy
objects to Smith's interpretation of the distinction between explaining and justifying
36 I said in chap 1 that content internalism contradicts the influential doctrine that moral requirements
are categorical imperatives that apply to agents regardless of their contingent desires. It is open to the
content internalist to argue that we need to accept a revisionary account ofmoral requirements and
moral content ifwe are to explain the connection between practical normative force and intentional
action.
37 Cf. Velleman 1992: 4: 'The desire and beliefcited in [the] story [ofmotivation] are conceived as
propositional attitudes... a reason for acting [in the story of rational guidance] is a proposition whose
truth would...in some... sense justify an action.'
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reasons because he claims it threatens to make it impossible for the reasons why an
agent acts to be among the reasons in favour of action (2000: 104-105). He argues
that an adequate theory of the relation between explaining and justifying reasons
needs to explain how justifying reasons can contribute to the explanation of action
(Dancy 2000: 103).38
The view that there must be an intelligible connection between justifying and
motivating considerations is perhaps most associated with Williams' defence of an
internal conception ofjustifying reasons (1981; 1995). Williams makes the same
basic point as Dancy: that good reasons for action must be capable ofmotivating
agents and of playing a role in the intentional explanation of action:
It must be a mistake simply to separate explanatory and normative reasons. If it is true that
A has a reason to <I>, then it must be possible that he should ® for that reason; and if he does
act for that reason, then that reason will be the explanation of his acting. So the claim that he
has a reason to <I> - that is, the normative statement 'He has a reason to O' - introduces the
possibility of that reason being an explanation; namely, if the agent accepts that claim (more
precisely, if he accepts that he has more reason to 4) that to do anything else). (Williams
1995:39)
In order for justifying reasons to be explanatory in this sense, Williams argues they
must be of following form: A has a reason to d> only if 'A could reach the
conclusion that he should 4> (or a conclusion to d>) by a sound deliberative route
from the motivations that he has in his actual motivational set [the agent's 'S'] — that
is, the set of his desires, evaluations, attitudes, projects, and so on' (1995: 35).39 By
a 'sound deliberative route' Williams means a route that excludes all mistakes of fact
and logic in reasoning about what to do. The external reasons theorist claims that an
agent can have a good reason to <I> even if he has no motivation in his motivational
set that could lead him via a sound deliberative route to O.
38
My aim here is to link this issue to the problem about the connection between normative moral
content and intentional action. I am assuming, therefore, that moral judgements have, or purport to
have, normative or justifying content and that moral propositions are a type ofpractical normative
proposition. Moral reasons, then, are, or purport to be, reasons in favour of action (see 2.5).
39 Williams only concerns himself with the view that his internalist constraint on reasons is a
necessary condition for an agent's having a good reason to act, although he thinks it also provides a
sufficient condition (1989: 35-36).
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Williams' central claim is that there are only internal reasons for action and that this
places a motivational constraint on what can count as a good reason for action. His
argument has generated a vast amount of literature on the possibility of external
reasons and on the nature ofjustifying reasons.40 Here, however, I want to focus on
what he argues is one of the 'fundamental motivations of the internalist account': the
interrelation of explaining and justifying reasons (Williams 1995: 38. My emphasis.)
My basic argument against Williams is that his account of internal reasons fails to
explain how agents are motivated by justifying reasons in a way consistent with the
desire/belief thesis.41 I am assuming therefore that part ofWilliams' aim is to
accommodate the desire/belief thesis and the associated notion ofexplaining reasons
by including desire in the content of normative judgements. Williams does not
mention the desire/belief thesis by name, but it is clear that he thinks that for an agent
to be motivated to perform an act, the agent must be in a motivating (desire-like)
state: 'When the reason is an explanation of his action, then of course it will be, in
some form, in his S [his actual motivational set], because certainly - and nobody
denies this - what he actually does has to be explained by his S (Williams 1995:
39).42
In what follows I assume Williams' motivational constraint on justifying reasons
and, in the light of the constraint, consider three examples in which an agent, A,
judges of herself that she has a good reason to <I). The first case is one in which A's
judgement that she has a good reason to <f> is true. On Williams' view, part of the
truth conditional content ofA's judgement must be that were she to make no factual
or logical errors she would be motivated to <t>. As her judgement is true, this
condition is met (i.e. it is true that she would be motivated in such circumstances). In
addition, A is occurrently motivated to <h. In the second case, A's judgement that
40 For example: Korsgaard 1986; McDowell 1995; Parfit 1997.
41 The view that Williams' account of internal reasons fails to bridge the gap between explaining and
justifying reasons is suggested by Schueler (1995: 68-77). He stresses the importance of
distinguishing between 'the facts or alleged facts referred to or described in the content ofmy reason
judgement from the facts about me that are supposed to explain my action (Schueler 1995: 73-74).
42 Williams' discussion of the gin and tonic example also suggests that he views action explanation
along the lines of the desire/beliefmodel: 'The agent believes this stuff is gin, when it is in fact petrol.
He wants a gin and tonic...if he does drink [this stuff], we not only have an explanation ofhis doing
so (a reason why he did it), but we have such an explanation which is of the reason-for-action form'
(1981: 102).
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she has a good reason to do O is again true, and part of what A judges is that were
she to make no factual or logical mistakes she would be motivated to do <I>. But in
this case A has no occurrent motivation to In the third case, A judges that she has
a good reason to (I> and, again assuming Williams' constraint, part ofwhat she judges
is that were she to make no factual or logical mistakes she would be motivated to <t>.
However, in this case A's judgement is false because it is not true that she would be
motivated to d) in the absence ofmistakes of fact and logic.
Williams says that a constraint of adequacy on any account of how justifying reasons
explain motivation is that the 'difference between false and true beliefs on the
agent's part cannot alter theform of the explanation which will be appropriate to his
action (1981: 102). Suppose that Jane believes the truck is about to hit her and this is
why she moves out of the way. Williams' point is that the explanation of Jane's
moving out of the way must be the same whether or not it is true that the truck is
about to hit her. That is, we cannot say that when it is true that the truck is about to
hit Jane the reason she moves out of the way is thefact that the truck is about to hit
her, but when it is false that the truck is about to hit her the reason she moves out of
the way is her beliefthat the truck is about to hit her.43 Borrowing from our
discussion of Smith's reliability thesis in chapter two, we might add another
constraint on the adequacy of an account of how justifying reasons explain
motivation: it must be consistent with the fact that agents' motivations reliably track
changes in their judgements about what they have good reason to do.
Williams makes justifying reasons relative to an agent's motivational set so that
aspects of that set can take part in the explanation of the agent's intentional actions.
Consider this in light of our first example. A judges correctly that she has good
reason to <t> and so judges correctly that she would be motivated in suitable
41 Williams would, I think, argue that the form-of-explanation constraint supports reason explanations
that appeal to whatever is constant in this kind of scenario, namely the agent's psychological states.
But we have already seen that action explanation solely in terms of the states an agent is in when she
acts intentionally is inadequate to account for intentional action. 1 would say that the agent's reason,
the reason that motivates the agent, in the truck example is the consideration, which she takes to be
true, that she is about to be hit by the truck. This is Jane's reason both in the case where her belief is
true and in the case where it is false. See Dancy (2000: chaps 5 and 6) for a detailed discussion of the
problems raised by Williams' constraint. Also cf. Schueler 1995: 76.
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conditions (no mistakes of fact or logic) to <f>. A is as a matter of fact occurrently
motivated to <I>. Let's suppose that this is because she is in the relevant conditions
and that her occurrent desire to <1> is the desire referred to in the content of her reason
judgement. So it seems that this desire can take part in a desire/belief explanation of
her d>-ing if she does so: the desire is part of why she has a good reason and is part of
the explanation for her acting for that reason.
In the second example, A's judgement that she has good reason to <1> is true. This
means it is true that she would be motivated to <1> in suitable conditions. But A is not
in the relevant conditions and has no occurrent motivation to d>. Now, for a desire
conatively to motivate an agent, the agent must be in the desire state. So the desire A
would have under suitable conditions is, in this instance, unable to play the
conatively motivating role required of desire in the desire/belief thesis.44 We might
simply concede that agents can only be motivated by their reason judgements under
suitable conditions. But it seems implausible to suggest that agents are only
motivated by their normative judgements in cases where they make no mistakes of
fact or logic.
In order to conform to the desire/belief thesis, it seems we must posit a motivating
state other than the one mentioned in the content of the judgement to play the role of
the motivating desire. But this means that the desire included in the content of the
reason judgement in order to bridge the gap between justifying and explaining
reasons loses its point: it no longer plays any role in the explanation of actions done
for a good reason.45 Moreover, ifwe opt to explain the agent's motivation by appeal
to a desire that is not part of the content of her normative judgement, then our
explanation violates the constraint about consistency of form: when the agent is in
44 Recall that the desire/belief thesis is about the states an agent is in when she acts intentionally.
45 This is basically Schueler's argument against Williams' doctrine of internal reasons: 'The original
problem [that the internal reasons account was supposed to solve] was supposed to be that whatever
facts give me a justifying reason to do something, these facts, just by themselves, won't explain my
acting as I have a reason to act until we add some subjective elements, in particular, both my
awareness of the facts in question and the associated desire ofmine. This is not changed by the
internal-reason theorist claiming that the facts that give me a justifying reason to act always include
desires ofmine... since a belief [that 1 have a reason and thus a desire], like any belief, could be false.
I might not have the desire 1 believe I have (1995: 73).
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the relevant conditions, her motivation is explained using the desire in the content of
her normative judgement, but when she is not in these conditions her motivation is
explained using another desire that is not part of her normative judgement.
In the third example, A's judgement that she has good reason to ® is false, and it is
false because her belief that she would be motivated in suitable conditions to ® is
false. Ifonly occurrent desires can motivate, then it is obvious we cannot appeal to
the desire in the content of a false judgement to explain why, if she is, A is motivated
to ®. So, again, the desire that is internal to the reason judgement cannot fulfil its
task of bridging the gap between justifying reasons and explaining reasons, and so it
loses its point. And we have to look around for yet another desire and another form
of explanation to account for the motivation, thus violating the consistency of form
requirement.
It is surely a failure of any account of how justifying reasons explain motivation, if
agents can only be motivated by true reason judgements and only under ideal
conditions. The reliability thesis tells us that agents' motivations reliably track their
judgements about what they have good reason to do. If an agent judges that she has
a good reason to <t>, then, whether or not her judgement is true and whether or not she
is ideally placed to make the judgement, we expect her, in the absence of tiredness,
accidie and so on, to be motivated to <I>. And if she changes her mind and judges that
she has a good reason to do T instead of®, we expect her motivation to track her
change of judgement, again independently of the truth or falsity of her judgement
and independently of whether she is ideally placed to make the judgement. If only
occurrent desire states are capable ofmotivating agents and ofplaying the role of
desire in the desire/beliefmodel, then including a desire in the truth conditional
content of reason judgements will not succeed in accounting for the ability of
justifying reasons to motivate agents and to play a role in the explanation of action.
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Consider again Williams' requirement that if an agent has a reason to act, then it
must be possible for the agent to act for that reason, and if he does act for that reason,
then for that reason to be an explanation of his acting. We can meet this requirement
using the notion of normative motivation. Suppose that Charles has a good reason to
donate money to the disaster relief fund: the donation will contribute towards
relieving the suffering of those affected by the disaster. If this is a good reason for
Charles, then it must be possible for him to act for this reason. Let's say that Charles
does donate to the disaster relief fund, and that the reason or consideration that
motivates him to donate is that his donation will help to relieve the suffering of
disaster victims. We explain Charles' intentional act of donation by citing his reason
for donating: namely, to relieve the suffering of disaster victims. Thus, the reason in
favour of donating is both the reason that motivates Charles to donate and the reason
we can cite to explain his act of donating. Using the notion of normative motivation,
we can explain how a reason that justifies an action both motivates and explains an
agent's intentional performance of that action.
The above arguments suggest that the connection between justification and
intentional action that internalism sees itself as establishing cannot be secured merely
by making a conative state in some sense internal to a moral or normative judgement.
And this is what we should expect if the distinction made between normative and
conative motivation is correct. The connection between justification and the
motivation central to intentional action is best understood in terms of the concept of
normative motivation. The concept of normative motivation bridges the gap between
justification and motivation precisely because it is the concept of being motivated by
normative considerations.
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7. General Internalist Disquiet
Certain versions of cognitivist internalism adopt what in chapter one I called a
cognitivist theory ofmotivation. I used this description in relation to Nagel's
account ofmoral motivation, which I take to involve the notion that agents are, or
can be, normatively motivated by the justifying content of their moral judgements
(Nagel 1970: 65). The notion of cognitivist motivation is somewhat misleading,
however, as it is used to describe theories, such as Dancy's 'pure cognitivism', that
hold that belief states rather than desire states are what motivate intentional action
(see Dancy 1993).46 It is clearer to call the position I advocate, and which I take
Nagel to hold, a normative theory ofmotivation.
Normative motivation is characterised, as we have seen, by an agent's being
motivated by considerations she takes to be justifying. When the agent's normative
judgement is true and she acts on it, the considerations that justify her action can be
said to motivate and to explain her action. The structure of this type of normative
motivation and its relation to intentional action is captured in the following passage
from Velleman:
The story of rational guidance tells how an agent acts for a reason. According to this story, a
reason for acting is a proposition whose truth would reflect well on, count in favour of,
recommend, or in some other sense justify action. A reason for performing the action exists
so long as a proposition justifying the action is true. But an agent cannot act for this reason
unless he has mental access to it -unless he believes the proposition or at least grasps it in
some related fashion. And even if he has appropriately grasped the reason, and is therefore in
a position to act for it, he doesn't ultimately act for the reason unless his grasp if it results in
his being influenced or guided by its justifying force. An agent acts for a reason, then, when
the action-justifying character of a proposition prompts his action via his grasp of that
proposition. (Velleman 1992: 4)
While I substantially agree with this story, it misses out something crucial about
practical judgements such as moral judgements: it misses out the endorsing aspect of
moral judgements or the sense in which making such judgements goes beyond
cognition. Those who accept this model ofnormative motivation appear to view
normative judgements as purely descriptive. They also generally accept that agents
46
Dancy repudiates this form of, what he terms, psychologism in Practical Reality (2000) and adopts
the position that states of affairs or facts rather than psychological states are what motivate intentional
action.
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sometimes fail to be motivated by their normative or moral judgements. In the case
ofmoral judgements this raises a problem. It makes it difficult to distinguish the
extreme amoralist, who has none of the attitudes we would standardly associate with
a normatively competent agent, from the normal moral agent who suffers a failure of
motivation.
On the descriptivist view, the normal moral agent's judgement and the extreme
amoralist's judgement are both purely descriptive: they both function merely to
express the belief that something is morally required. On the basis of this purely
cognitive criterion, it seems that both types of agents can make genuine moral
judgements, the only difference being that the normal moral agent is reliably
motivated by her moral judgements whereas the extreme amoralist is never
motivated by her moral judgements. However, we presumably want to say that the
normal moral agent in some sense endorses, or is connected to, her moral judgements
even when she fails to be motivated by them, in a way that is clearly not true of the
extreme amoralist. Darwall makes a similar point about moral judgements and
normative judgements more generally:
If something's being a reason is simply a non-natural property of it of which we take notice
in judging the consideration to be a reason, then the desire to act for reasons is in no sense
integral to the self... So understood the desire to act for reasons is not in itself intelligible.
We cannot see it as essential to us. But... our disposition to look for reasons and to act on
those we find compelling cannot he so easily separated from us. (Darwall 1983: 58. My
emphasis)
The problem with a purely descriptivist theory ofmoral judgement is that it leaves it
unclear in what sense agents are connected to the reasons for which they act. And
this is surely grist to the externalist mill.
Here I think we find a general source of internalist disquiet: the sense that ifwe don't
guarantee the connection between morality and motivation, or something internal to
agents, then there will be agents beyond the reach ofmoral norms. This is a worry I
take to motivate both judgement and content versions of internalism. We find a
particularly vivid expression of this disquiet in Falk's seminal defence of internalism
about moral requirements and motivation. The problem with externalism, argues
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Falk, is that it contradicts our ordinary thinking about the connection between moral
requirements and motivation: 'For it is a fact about ordinary moral thinking that
morality needs.. .no sanction whatever; that somehow the very fact of a duty entails
all the motive required for doing the act' (Falk 1948: 121). According to Falk, moral
requirements entail overriding justifying reasons for action, and this amounts to their
entailing overriding motivation to act. In order to secure the overriding motivating
force ofmoral requirements, Falk reduces the kind of, presumably normative,
necessity expressed by such requirements to causal necessity. This is the only way,
he argues, of securing the intuition that the existence of such a requirement for an
agent 'is inseparable from the existence of some real check on his freedom to act
otherwise' (Falk 1948: 122).
Falk suggests a meaning of'ought' or 'duty' which he calls the 'purely formal
motivation sense' (1948: 128). In this sense, to say that an agent morally ought to do
an act, is to say that she is disposed to have a belief about doing the act which
causally compels her to do the act. This is the one use of 'ought', says Falk, 'which
could explain the habit of connecting it necessarily with motivation' (1948: 130).
According to Falk, then, agents have a duty to do those things they cannot help but
do because causally compelled to do by certain belief states. What is striking about
this view is Falk's willingness to dispense with anything resembling a normative
requirement in order to secure the connection between 'moral obligation' and
overriding motivation. The corollary of Falk's view is that agents can never fail to
do what they have a moral obligation to do because agents only have an obligation to
do those things they will be compelled to do.
Falk's paper is important not so much because of the thesis he expounds but because
it is here that he coins the tenns 'internalist' and 'externalist' to refer to two opposing
positions in ethics. However, Falk seems to have a far more literal view ofwhat
these terms mean than many of the theorists who have used them since:
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[Externalists] presuppose...that when someone 'ought or 'has a duty' he is subject to some
manner of demand, made on him without regard to his desires, and they imply that this
demand issues essentially from outside the agent: that whether made by a deity or society, or
the 'situation'...it has an objective existence of its own depending in no way on anything
peculiar to the agent's psychological constitution. Now, the view that morality needs some
sanction is a traditional associate of all views of this kind and indeed their natural corollary.
If 'I ought' means 'I am from outside myself demanded to do some act'... there will then be
no necessary connection for anyone between having a duty and being under any manner of
real compulsion to do the act. For no one really need do any act merely because it is
demanded of him...but only if, in addition, he finds within himself a motive sufficient for
satisfying the demand. (Falk 1948: 125-126. My emphasis)
So for Falk, an external theory ofmoral obligation is one that views moral
obligations as imposed on the agent from outside, whereas an internal theory of
moral obligation views such obligations as inside the agent because part of the
agent's psychology.
It is clear that Falk dismisses the possibility of fonns of necessity other than causal
necessity and that the only sense of'motivation' he recognises is causation by
psychological states.47 His insistence that there be a connection between moral or
normative requirements and states inside an agent is the aspect of his position that
has been adopted by internalists. We see it, for example, in Williams' argument for
internal reasons. Falk's position simply makes explicit the objection I raised against
Williams' views: ifwe reject the possibility of normative motivation, then it is
difficult to see how the account we give of an agent's behaviour can be an account of
intentional action or action done for a reason. Falk's agent does his 'duty' because,
he is compelled to do so. The fact that he is compelled by causal forces inside his
head rather than by external demands does not seem to alter the fact that he has no
48control over how he behaves.
47
Interestingly, Falk thinks that having a motive is not the same as having a desire. A motive is a
thought that causes or causally implies an action. A desire is the 'feeling' ofbeing compelled to do an
action, or the very fact ofbeing caused to do an action (Falk 1948: 117).
48 Falk's view suggests that in order to be morally required to perfom an act, an agent must not be free
to do anything other than perform the act. This idea is opposed to ordinary notions ofmoral
responsibility, according to which agents are held accountable for their actions precisely because they
have freely chosen to perform them. (e.g. Korsgaard 1997: 244-247).
205
Despite these misgivings, I think it would be unwise to reject completely the
intuition that generates the kind of internalism espoused by Falk and by Williams.
There is a legitimate worry central to these views that moral requirements might be
so removed from human experience and human capacities that they would have no
relevance to and no hold on human behaviour (cf. Darwall 1995: 11; Korsgaard
1997: 239-245). In the next section I explore the possibility of extending my
approach to moral judgement internalism to the issue of the connection between
moral requirements and motivation.
8. Internalism about Moral Requirements and Motivation
My principal concern in this work has been the connection between moral
judgements and motivation. I have argued that moral judgement internalism is
usefully thought of as an expression of our interested or participatory relation to
moral considerations and moral practice. I now want to explore the possibility of
extending this notion of participation to account for the purported internal connection
between moral requirements and motivation. Obviously, I cannot deal fully with the
issue ofmoral requirement internalism in the present work. What I aim to do is
apply aspects ofmy approach to moral judgements to the issue of the relation
between moral requirements and motivation. I suggest that ifmy account ofmoral
judgements can be plausibly extended in a way that sheds light on internalist
intuitions about moral requirements, then this will provide further support for my
general approach.
I said in chapter one that the view that moral requirements entail motivation can be
interpreted in a number ofways. Moral knowledge internalism says that motivation
is in no way intrinsic to ethical facts but that being motivated is a necessary
consequence of knowing ethical facts. By contrast, content internalism about moral
requirements and motivation says that part of what makes it true that an agent is
morally required to perform an act is that the agent has, or would have under suitable
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conditions, some motivation to perform the act. According to content internalism,
motivation is partly constitutive ofmoral requirements.49
The problem with moral knowledge internalism and the view ofmoral reasons it
suggests is that it makes the ability of such reasons to motivate agents somewhat
mysterious.50 By contrast, content internalism is thought to secure a close and
intelligible connection between a consideration's being a reason for and its capacity
to motivate an agent (Darwall 1983: 52, 128).51 Content internalism says that part of
what an agent judges in making a moral judgement is that she is, or would be under
suitable conditions, motivated to act in accordance with the judgement.52 The
presence of a motivating state in the content of a normative judgement is meant to
explain how normative considerations can motivate. However, we saw in the
discussion ofWilliams' view of internal reasons that content internalism fails to
show how justifying considerations are capable ofmotivating intentional action.53
Another problem with content internalism is that it contradicts the intuitively
powerful Kantian doctrine that moral requirements apply to agents independently of
their particular desires. These considerations suggest that a plausible account of the
connection between moral requirements and motivation will not be a version of
content internalism.
49
A crucial difference between content and moral knowledge internalism, then, is that moral
knowledge internalism takes moral reasons as metaphysically primary: the reason explains the
motivation; whereas content internalism takes motivations as metaphysically primary: part of the
explanation of an agent's having a reason or requirement to act in a certain way is that he has, or
would have under certain conditions, some motivation to act in that way. This means that the direction
ofmetaphysical dependence between normative facts and motivation differs between the two
doctrines, even though both positions agree that having a reason to perform an act entails, under
certain conditions, having a motivation to perform the act. Susan Hurley (2001) stresses the
importance ofdistinguishing between the issue ofdirection ofmetaphysical dependence between
reasons and motivation and the issue of logical relations between reason claims and motivation claims
when discussing internalism. She argues that this distinction is obscured by Williams' account of
internal reasons.
50 Mackie expresses this worry (1977: 38).
51 I stress again that I am assuming here that moral requirements provide normative reasons for action,
and will use 'reasons', 'moral reasons', and 'moral requirements' interchangeably.
52 Cf. Darwall (1983: 52. My emphasis): 'When we judge that some consideration is a reason... part
ofwhat we judge is a condition of our will.'
53 The point being that positing a motivating state in the content of such judgements - content
internalism - is meant to explain how justifying considerations are capable ofmotivating intentional
action. In failing to do this, content internalism fails to achieve one of its principal aims.
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Ifwe are to develop an acceptable version of the thesis that there is an internal
connection between moral requirements and motivation then our approach will have
to avoid the extremes ofmoral knowledge internalism and of content internalism. To
this end, I want to consider the very general intuitions that motivate internalism in
ethics. Darwall claims that internalism, broadly construed, is the view that the desire
to act for reasons must be 'integral to the self rather than something 'superadded to
our nature' (1983: 57).54 On this view, internalism posits some form of intimate
connection between an individual's tendency to act for reasons and her agency.
Moral requirement internalism suggests that the status of reasons or requirements
themselves is connected to the kind of agency that disposes individuals to act for
reasons. These considerations suggest the following interpretation ofmoral
requirement internalism: moral requirements or reasons must be capable of
motivating those to whom they apply, and this capacity must derive from an intimate
connection between the nature of such requirements or reasons and the natures of the
individuals to whom they apply.
I suggest that this interpretation ofmoral requirement internalism can be
accommodated by the model ofmoral agency and practice that grounds my account
ofmoral judgements.55 Consider the internalist claim that the desire to act for reasons
must be in some sense integral to the nature or identity of an agent. This claim can
be captured by my notion of the normatively engaged agent. Recall that an
individual is normatively engaged just in case she is generally susceptible to the
range of reactive attitudes that make up the participant point of view. Being
normatively engaged in this manner is a condition of normative competence: it
enables agents to hold themselves and others to expectations and thus enables them
to be guided by moral considerations. This means that normative competence is
54 Cf. Korsgaard: [T]he dogmatic rationalist [one who sees reasons as external to the agent] is unable
to explain how reasons get a grip on the agent, because he supposes that reasons exist independently
of the rational will... This model. ..seems to invite the question: but suppose I don't care about being
rational? What then?'(1997: 243-244).
55 The general form of the following argument is similar to Velleman's approach to the
internal/external reasons debate in The Possibility ofPractical Reason (1996). Velleman argues that
the debate about whether normative reasons are or are not in part constituted by agents' motivations
embodies a false dichotomy and suggests an alternative position that aims to capture both internalist
and externalist intuitions.
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partly constitutive of the status of individuals as moral agents. The tendency to be
guided by normative considerations is therefore integral to the nature of such agents,
as required by internalism.
Next, consider the internalist claim that the capacity of individuals to be motivated
by normative requirements must derive from a connection between the nature of
those requirements and the natures of the individuals to whom they apply. This
condition is met by my account of the connection between normative engagement
and normative requirements. Recall that severe normative incompetence not only
means an individual cannot make genuine moral judgements, it means she is no
longer an appropriate object ofmoral or normative appraisal. So the status of a
consideration as a requirement or reason for an individual is dependent upon the
individual's being appropriately normatively engaged. And being normatively
engaged in this way is just what explains the capacity of agents to be motivated by
normative considerations. So the model of nonnative engagement and normative
competence satisfies the various aspects of our revised version ofmoral requirement
internalism.
This, then, is a very general outline of how the approach to moral judgements I have
advocated might be extended to accommodate internalist intuitions about moral
requirements. If such a move is plausible, then 1 think it provides further support for
the general approach to moral judgements and moral motivation that I have been
considering in this thesis.
9. Conclusion
The speech act approach to moral judgement must establish a suitable connection
between moral thought and moral language to explain how linguistic rules can have
implications for moral psychology. I argue that the human capacity for language
plays a central role in the inherently social practice ofmoral evaluation. The norms
constitutive of this practice are partly structured by a presupposition of interest in
moral deliberation. To a large degree evaluative practice is realised linguistically,
and the interest in moral deliberation is encoded in the rules governing the
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performance ofmoral speech acts. The picture ofmoral motivation suggested by the
speech act account cannot easily be accommodated by the desire/belief model of
motivation and action explanation. While the standard Humean distinction between
cognitive and conative states seems correct, it is not clear that the sense of
'motivation' essential to conative states is the only sense of'motivation' used in the
explanation of intentional action. We should distinguish between normative
motivation and conative motivation, particularly given the crucial role the concept of
normative motivation plays in our ordinary notion of intentional action.
Internalists argue that there needs to be a substantial connection between moral
considerations and the individuals to whom such considerations apply in order to
secure the justifying authority and motivating force ofmorality. The notions of
normative competence and normative engagement, central to my account ofmoral
judgement, can be extended to provide a plausible account of this connection.
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Conclusion
In an early and influential discussion of the debate between internalists and
externalists, Frankena suggests the following compromise position:
He [the externalist] may hold... that judgements ofobligation have a conceptual content of an
"external" kind, but add that we do not speak of a man's assenting or sincerely assenting to
them unless he not only apprehends the truth of their conceptual content but is at least to
some extent moved to conform to it. He would then admit that it is logically possible that
one might have a "mere intellectual apprehension"...of their truth, but he would recognise
the generally practical function of language..., especially moral discourse. (Frankena 1958:
66)
To some extent my approach in this thesis can be seen as a development of
Frankena's suggestion. I have argued that we should reject the assumption that
internalism provides a prima facie obstacle to cognitivism in ethics. I have
suggested that by distinguishing between the act and content ofmoral judgements we
can secure a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation while
respecting the independence of moral requirements from agents' contingent desires
and inclinations. The speech act approach provides a structured way of combining
the practical and motivating aspects ofmoral judgements with the cognitive and fact-
stating aspects of such judgements. It accommodates the view that moral judgements
entail endorsing attitudes, a version ofmoral judgement internalism, and explains
cases in which, due to depression or accidie, moral judgements fail to motivate. It
does this by stressing the practical function of moral language as embodied in the
conditions for the successful and sincere performance of moral speech acts.
The speech act analysis ofmoral judgements also sheds light on the nature ofmoral
psychology and of moral motivation. It presents, I think, a plausible explanation of
the sense in which, in Hume's terms, morality goes 'beyond the calm and indolent
judgements of the understanding' (1739-40: Book III. Part I. Sect. I). In making
moral judgements, agents commit themselves to acting in accordance with judged
requirements. This commitment, we might say, is an agent's practical recognition of
the normative authority of the requirement she asserts. The importance of this
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commitment is suggested by the readiness with which we question someone's moral
sincerity if the commitment is absent. This intuition is perplexing if, as cognitivists,
we hold that sincerity only requires belief. It reflects, I think, the central role that the
notion of holding responsible or accountable plays in our ordinary understanding of
what it is to make a moral judgement.
It is important to understand the role ofmoral judgement in broader moral practice.
Moral judgement is properly defined by the role it has in this practice, including its
connection to moral attitudes and responses, and its relation to notions ofmoral
agency and accountability. However, there are implications of this position with
which I am not entirely comfortable. On one reading of normative competence,
suggested by certain aspects ofStrawson's position, agents who fail to recognise the
demands that others make on them are classed as normatively incompetent and, as
such, outside the realm ofmoral accountability and moral engagement. I take it that
a plausible conception of normative competence must be able to accommodate moral
views that might be offensive or significantly removed from one's moral perspective.
Otherwise we may find ourselves adopting the objective stance towards anyone with
whom we significantly disagree.
These issues are linked to the nature of the reactive and sanctioning attitudes that
make up the participant point of view. If the development of such higher-order
attitudes is fundamentally linked to human sociality and language, it seems we run
the risk that different cultural and social circumstances will produce different,
perhaps incommensurable, sets of reactive attitudes. The worry is that by removing
the internalist obstacle to cognitivism, and by extension to realism, we have created a
different kind of obstacle to objectivism and realism in ethics. Nonetheless, I do
think that any point of view that is recognisably moral, in the broad sense in which I
have used this term, will have to incorporate some conception of normative
motivation and with it some conception of responsible agency. It is perhaps in these
and related notions that we will find the basis of a point of view with which all
human agents, by their very nature, are engaged.
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